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INTHE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO
In the Matter of the Estate Of:
Vivian Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins,
Deceased .
State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare,
Petitioner-Appella nt,
-vsLynn Wiggins, Personal Representative of
The Estate of Vivian Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins
Respondent.

Appealed from the District Court of the Third Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for Washington County
Honorable Justice Linda Copple Trout

Lawrence Wasden
Attorney General
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant

R. Brad Masingill
Attorney for Respondent

Filed this _ _ _ _day of _-:---:--_ _ _ _ _--:-~-2011 .
_---:---:;._ _ _ _ _~--Clerk
By:_ _ _ _ _~="""_-=!-Deputy

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

In the Matter of the Estate of:

)
)
Vivian Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins,
)
)
Deceased.
)
)
)
State of Idaho, Department of Health and
)
Welfare,
Petitioner-Appellant,
)
)
vs.
)
)
Lynn Wiggins, Personal Representative of )
The Estate of Vivian Wiggins and Emerson )
D. Wiggins,
)
Respondent.
)

SUPREME COURT NO. 39129
RECORD ON APPEAL

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Washington.

* * * * *
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* *
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* *
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* * * * *

Honorable Justice Linda Copple Trout
* * * * * * * * *

R. Brad Masingill
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
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Case: CV-2009-0001926 Current Judge: Renae J Hoff
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Vivian M Wiggins, etal. Deceased

In The Matter Of The Estate Of Vivian M Wiggins, Emerson Duane Wiggins Deceased
)ate

Code

User

121/2009

NCIE

IBARRA

New Case Filed - Informal Estate

Gregory F Frates

APER

IBARRA

Other party: Wiggins, Lynn Appearance R Brad
Masingill

Gregory F Frates

IBARRA

Filing: L1 - Probate Matters - Application for
Gregory F Frates
Informal Probate Paid by: Masingill, R Brad
(attorney for Wiggins, Lynn) Receipt number:
0016150 Dated: 5/21/2009 Amount: $88.00
(Cashiers Check) For: Wiggins, Lynn (other party)

APIN

IBARRA

Application For Informal Probate Of Will And
AppOintment Of A Personal Representative

Gregory F Frates

ACAP

IBARRA

Acceptance Of Appointment of personal
representative

Gregory F Frates

IBARRA

Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Gregory F Frates
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by:
Brad Masingill Receipt number: 0016151 Datiad:
5/21/2009 Amount: $2.00 (Cashiers Check)

JDMT

IBARRA

Order of informal probate of estate and
appointment of personal representative

Gregory F Frates

ORDR

IBARRA

Letters of administration

Gregory F Frates

STAT

IBARRA

STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action Gregory F Frates

IBARRA

Filing: J1a - Probate, petition for distribution 01'
estate Paid by: Masingill, R Brad (attorney for
Wiggins, Lynn) Receipt number: 0018429
Dated: 11/16/2009 Amount: $25.00 (Cashier~;
Check) For: Wiggins, Lynn (other party)

IBARRA

Filing: J1d - Probate, intermediate or final
Gregory F Frates
accounting of personal rep Paid by: Masingill, R
Brad (attorney for Wiggins, Lynn) Receipt
number: 0018430 Dated: 11/16/2009 Amount:
$9.00 (Cashiers Check) For: Wiggins, Lynn (other
party)

PETN

IBARRA

Petition for approval of final settlement and
certificate of mailing

Gregory F Frates

MISC

IBARRA

Schedule of final distribution annexed to petition
for final distribution

Gregory F Frates

INVE

IBARRA

Inventory

Gregory F Frates

NOHG

IBARRA

Notice Of Hearing

Gregory F Frates

HRSC

IBARRA

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
12/02/200911 :00 AM)

Gregory F Frates

CLAI

IBARRA

Claim Against Estate

Gregory F Frates

DENO

IBARRA

Demand For Notice

Gregory F Frates

OBJE

IBARRA

Objection to final settlement

Gregory F Frates

APER

IBARRA

Other party: State Of Idaho - Human Services
Appearance W Corey Cartwright

Gregory F Frates

CERT

IBARRA

Certificate Of Mailing
Cartwright I Masingill

Gregory F Frates

122/2009

1/16/2009

112312009

Judge

000002

Gregory F Frates

late: 11/15/2011

Th

ime: 11.57 AM

Court - Washington County
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In The Matter Of The Estate Of Vivian M Wiggins, etal. Deceased

In The Matter Of The Estate Of Vivian M Wiggins, Emerson Duane Wiggins Deceased
Judge

late

Code

User

1/30/2009

NOTC

IBARRA

Notice of disallowance of claim

Gregory F Frates

INVE

IBARRA

Inventory schedules

Gregory F Frates

PETN

IBARRA

Petition for allowance of claim

Gregory F Frates

HRVC

IBARRA

Hearing result for Motion for Final Accounting
Gregory F Frates
held on 12/02/2009 11 :00 AM: Hearing Vacated
(per request from Mr. Masingill)

MEMO

IBARRA

Memorandum in support of petition for allowance Gregory F Frates

NOHG

IBARRA

Notice Of Hearing

Gregory F Frates

HRSC

IBARRA

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
01/20/201011 :00 AM) Allowance of Claim

Gregory F Frates

NOHG

IBARRA

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Gregory F Frates

CONT

IBARRA

Continued (Hearing Scheduled 02/03/2010
11 :00 AM) Allowance of Claim

Gregory F Frates

129/2010

MEMO

IBARRA

Memorandum in support of denial of lien against
Emerson d Wiggins property

Gregory F Frates

1212010

MEMO

IBARRA

Responsive Memorandum in support of denia; of Gregory F Frates
lien against Emerson d Wiggins property

AFSV

IBARRA

Affidavit Of Service (of subpoena served on
Robin Wood on 2-2-2010)

Gregory F Frates

REPL

IBARRA

Reply brief

Gregory F Frates

CMIN

IBARRA

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Department of Health & WelfarE!'s
Petition for Allowance of Claim
Hearing date: 2/3/2010
Time: 11 :31 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: None
Minutes Clerk: IBARRA
Tape Number:
Party: Lynn Wiggins, Attorney: R Masingill

Gregory F Frates

ADVS

IBARRA

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
02/03/2010 11 :00 AM: Case Taken Under
Advisement Allowance of Claim

Gregory F Frates

110/2010

MEMO

IBARRA

Post hearing Memorandum

Gregory F Frates

11/2010

MEMO

IBARRA

Supplemental post hearing memorandum re
legislative history of Idaho Code 56-218

Gregory F Frates

115/2010

MEMO

IBARRA

125/2010

RSPN

LEE

First supplemental pose hearing memorandum re Gregory F Frates
Estate of George D Perry Ada County case
CVIE0905214
Gregory F Frates
Response to March 15,2010 Memorandum

130/2010

MEMO

IBARRA

Memorandum decision denying petitioners claim
against the estate

Gregory F Frates

CERT

IBARRA

Certificate Of Mailing
Masingilll Cortwright

Gregory F Frates

REPL

IBARRA

Reply to departments March 18 Memorandum

Gregory F Frates

2/112009

2/22/2009

17/2010

13/2010

131/2010

000003

)ate: 11/15/2011

Th

User: TRACIE

ct Court - Washington County

"ime: 11 :57 AM
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Case: CV-2009-0001926 Current Judge: Renae J Hoff
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Vivian M Wiggins, etal. Deceased

In The Matter Of The Estate Of Vivian M Wiggins, Emerson Duane Wiggins Deceased
late

Code

User

17/2010

MOTN

IBARRA

Motion for attorneys fees and costs

Gregory F Frates

AFFD

IBARRA

Affidavit of counsel in support of motion for
attorneys fees and costs including the factorsn
IRCP 54

Gregory F Frates

MEMO

IBARRA

Memorandum in support of the estates motion for Gregory F Frates
attorneys fees and costs

ORDR

IBARRA

Order approving petition for final settlement of
estate and closing estate

MOTN

IBARRA

Motion for stay pending appeal and stay of appeal Gregory F Frates

BREF

IBARRA

Brief in support of motion to stay

Gregory F Frates

NTOA

IBARRA

Notice Of Appeal

Gregory F Frates

STAT

IBARRA

STATUS CHANGED: Reopened

Renae J Hoff

MEMO

IBARRA

Memorandum in opposition to the departments
motion to stay

Gregory F Frates

PETN

IBARRA

1st amended petition for approval of final
settlement and certificate of mailing

Gregory F Frates

INVE

IBARRA

First amended Inventory schedules of property of Gregory F Frates
Vivian M Wiggins and Emerson DWiggins
deceased

MISC

IBARRA

1st amended schedule of final distribution
annexed to petition for final distribution

Gregory F Frates

NOHG

IBARRA

2nd amended Notice Of Hearing

Gregory F Frates

HRSC

IBARRA

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled

Gregory F Frates

19/2010

Judge

Gregory F Frates

04/21/2010 11 :00 AM) Petition for Allowance of
Claim

114/2010

115/2010

120/2010

MISC

ANDERSON

Estimated Cost of Transcript (emailed to Cory
Cartwright) ($120.25 within 30 daysl
$157.25 within 7 days)

Gregory F Frates

OBJC

IBARRA

Objection to first amended petition and hearin~

Gregory F Frates

MEMO

IBARRA

Memorandum in support of objection

Gregory F Frates

MISC

ANDERSON

Request from Atty General's Office (Stacey
Genta) for transcript of 2/3/2010 Allowance of
Claim hearing (via phone then email)

Renae J Hoff

NOHG

IBARRA

Notice Of Hearing (Motion for Stay Pending
Appeal and Stay of Appeal)

Gregory F Frates

HRSC

IBARRA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Stay 04/21/2010
11 :00 AM) Motion to Stay pending Appeal and
Stay of Appeal (AG's office)

Gregory F Frates

MOTN

IBARRA

Motion to disallow attorney fees and costs

Gregory F Frates

AFFD

IBARRA

Affidavit of W Corey Cartwright

Gregory F Frates

MEMO

IBARRA

Memorandum in support of motion to disallow
attorney fees and costs

Gregory F Frates

MEMO

IBARRA

Memorandum in opposition to departments
motion for stay re attorneys fees

Gregory F Frates

late: 11/15/2011

Th

'ime: 11 :57 AM

User: TRACIE

Court - Washington County

ROAReport
Case: CV-2009-0001926 Current Judge: Renae J Hoff

'age 4 of 6

In The Matter Of The Estate Of Vivian M Wiggins, etal. Deceased
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Vivian M Wiggins, Emerson Duane Wiggins Deceased
Judge

late

Code

User

121/2010

CMIN

IBARRA

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion for Attorney Fees and
Motion for Stay
Hearing date: 4/21/2010
Time: 11 :03 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: None
Minutes Clerk: IBARRA
Tape Number:
Party: Lynn Wiggins, Attorney: R Masingill

Gregory F Frates

ORDR

IBARRA

Order staying distribution of estate pending
appeal

Gregory F Frates

HRHD

IBARRA

Hearing result for Motion to Stay held on
04/21/201011 :00 AM: Hearing Held Motion to
Stay pending Appeal and Stay of Appeal (AG'~;
office)

Gregory F Frates

HRHD

IBARRA

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
Gregory F Frates
04/21/201011 :00 AM: Hearing Held Petition for
Allowance of Claim

MISC

ANDERSON

Estimated Cost of Transcript (for 4/21110 hearing) Gregory F Frates
($120.25 within 30 days/$157.25 within 7 days)
Emailed to: Stacey Genta, Paralegal Attorney
Gen'l Office

MISC

ANDERSON

Request for preparation of transcript for hearing
held 4/21/2010 from Attorney General's Office Stacey Genta paralegal

Renae J Hoff

OASI

IBARRA

Order Of Assignment

Gregory F Frates

APDC

IBARRA

Appeal Filed In District Court

Renae J Hoff

129/2010

BONT

ANDERSON

130/2010

ORDR

IBARRA

Bond Posted for Transcript (Receipt 20600 Dated Renae J Hoff
4/29/2010 for 157.25)
Renae J Hoff
Order re attorneys fees and costs

CERT

IBARRA

Certificate Of Mailing
Masingilll Cartwright

Renae J Hoff

MISC

ANDERSON

Transcript of Motion Hearing held 2/3/2010

Renae J Hoff

BNDV

ANDERSON

Bond Converted (Transaction number 2327 dated Renae J Hoff
5/4/2010 amount 85.00) (Canyon Transcription)

BNDV

ANDERSON

Bond Converted (Transaction number 2328 dated Renae J Hoff
5/4/2010 amount 72.25) (Dept of H & W)

15/2010

ORDR

ANDERSON

Order for Preparation of Transcript and Appellate Renae J Hoff
Scheduling (2/3/2010 hearing) Copies to:
CartwrightlMasingili/Appeals Clerk

119/2010

MEMO

IBARRA

Post hearing memorandum re Idaho Code 12-117 Renae J Hoff

AFFD

IBARRA

Second affidavit of W Corey Cartwright

Renae J Hoff

MOTN

IBARRA

Motion to strike

Renae J Hoff

125/2010

MISC

IBARRA

Corrected attachment to post hearing
memorandum

Renae J Hoff

128/2010

MISC

IBARRA

/22/2010

126/2010

14/2010

Renae J Hoff

ate: 11/15/2011

Thi
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Code

User

111/2010

BONT

ANDERSON

Bond Posted for Transcript (Receipt 21118 Dated Renae J Hoff
6/11/2010 for 157.25)

116/2010

MOTN

ANDERSON

Motion for Additional Transcript (Wasden) (of
4/21/2010 hearing)

BREF

ANDERSON

Brief in Support of Motion for Additional Transcript Renae J Hoff
(Wasden)

11712010

ORDR

ANDERSON

Order for Additional Transcript Copies to:
MasingilllCartwrightiClerk's Office

Renae J Hoff

123/2010

ORDR

IBARRA

Order on attorney fees

Renae J Hoff

CERT

IBARRA

Certificate Of Mailing
Masingilll Cartwright

Renae J Hoff

12/2010

NOTC

ANDERSON

Notice of Cross Appeal (Masingill)

Renae J Hoff

112/2010

BNDV

ANDERSON

Bond Converted (Transaction number 2423 dated Renae J Hoff
7/12/2010 amount 40.25)

BNDV

ANDERSON

Bond Converted (Transaction number 2424 dated Renae J Hoff
7/12/2010 amount 117.00)

BNDV

ANDERSON

Bond Converted (Transaction number 2425 dated Renae J Hoff
7/1312010 amount 117.00)

BNDE

ANDERSON

Transcript Bond Exonerated (Amount 40.25)

Renae J Hoff

LODG

ANDERSON

Lodged Transcript on Motion for Attorney's Fees
and Motion to Stay held 4/21/2010. Copies
mailed to: Masisngilll
Cartwright

Renae J Hoff

NOTC

ANDERSON

Notice of Clerk's Lodged Transcript for Appeal
Copies to: Masingill/Cartwright

Renae J Hoff

117/2010

BREF

SLOAN

Appellant's Brief

Renae J Hoff

0/1512010

MOTN

TRACIE

Motion For Extension of Time For Filing
Respondent's Brief

Renae J Hoff

AFFD

TRACIE

Affidavit of Counsel In Support of Motion for
Extension of Time for Filing Respondent's Brinf

Renae J Hoff

ORDR

TRACIE

Order for Extension of Time for Filing
Respondent's Brief

Renae J Hoff

0/22/2010

BREF

TRACIE

Respondent's Brief

Renae J Hoff

1/15/2010

BREF

TRACIE

Appellant's Reply Brief

Renae J Hoff

1/29/2010

HRSC

TRACIE

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal
02/08/2011 01 :30 PM) (Before Honorable Linda
Copple Trout)

Renae J Hoff

18/2011

DCHH

TRACIE

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held Renae J Hoff
on 02108/2011 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Carole Bull
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: (Before Honorable Linda Copple
Trout)

113/2010

121/2010

Judge

Renae J Hoff

late: 11/15/2011

User: TRACIE

istrict Court - Washington County

·ime: 11 :57 AM

ROAReport

'age 6 of 6

Case: CV-2009-0001926 Current Judge: Renae J Hoff
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Vivian M Wiggins, etal. Deceased

In The Matter Of The Estate Of Vivian M Wiggins, Emerson Duane Wiggins Deceased
Judge

late

Code

User

19/2011

CMIN

TRACIE

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Oral Argument on Appeal
Hearing date: 2/8/2011
Time: 1:18 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Carole Bull
Minutes Clerk: Tracie Jo Widener
Tape Number:
In the Matter of the Estates of:
Vivian M. Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins,
Deceased

Renae J Hoff

/21/2011

NOTC

TRACIE

Notice of Augmentation and/or Supplementation
of Respondent's Brief Pursuant to IAR 34(f( 1)

Renae J Hoff

120/2011

FJDE

TRACIE

Memorandum Decision on Appeal Copies to:
Masingill,Cartwright, Frates, Appeals Clerk

Renae J Hoff

STAT

TRACIE

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Renae J Hoff

/11/2011

MISC

SLOAN

Estimated Costs of Court Transcript - 54
pgs/$175.50 - Copy to: AG OfficelLisa

Renae J Hoff

116/2011

BONT

SLOAN

Bond Posted for Transcript (Receipt 2949 Dated
8/16/2011 for 229.50)

Renae J Hoff

STAT

SLOAN

STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk
action

Renae J Hoff

125/2011

NOTA

TRACIE

NOTICE OF APPEAL (filed by Cartwright, State
of Idaho)

Renae J Hoff

126/2011

BNDC

SLOAN

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 3107 Dated
8/26/2011 for 175.50)

Renae J Hoff

BNVO

SLOAN

Bond Voided

Renae J Hoff

19/2011

MISC

TRACIE

Counsel must be served by October 7,2011
(Docket#39129-2011
Clerk's Record & Reporter's Transcripts must be
filed on or before November 11, 2011

Renae J Hoff

113/2011

NOTC

TRACIE

Notice of Cross-Appeal (Masingill)

Renae J Hoff

TRACIE

116/2011

OR DR

TRACIE

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Renae J Hoff
Supreme Court Paid by: Masingill, R Brad
(attorney for Wiggins, Lynn) Receipt number:
0003304 Dated: 9/13/2011 Amount: $101.00
(Cashiers Check) For: Wiggins, Emerson Duane
(subject), Wiggins, Lynn (other party) and
Wiggins, Vivian M (subject)
Renae J Hoff
Order Suspending Appeal

130/2011

REQU

TRACIE

Request for Additional Record (Cartwright)

0/26/2011

ORDR

TRACIE

Order (Memo Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Renae J Hoff
Against the Estate is hereby Affirmed)

0/31/2011

NOTA

TRACIE

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL (Cartwright)

Renae J Hoff

1/4/2011

BNDC

SLOAN

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 3925 Dated
11/4/2011 for 175.50)

Renae J Hoff

1/9/2011

NOTC

TRACIE

Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal (Masingill)

Renae J Hoff
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Renae J Hoff

R. BRAD MASIN GILL
Attorney at Law
27 West Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone # 1 (208) 414-0665
Fax # 1 (208) 414-0490
E-mail: bmasingill(a1hotmail.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF:
VIVIAN WIGGINS and
EMERSON D. WIGGINS,

Deceased.

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-:Wt09-1926
PETITION FOR APPROVAL OF
FINAL SETTLEMENT, AND
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Category L7 $ 9.00
Category L8 $25.00 ....

I

J,

PETITIONER, LYNN WIGGINS, of Weiser, Idaho, represents to the Court that:
1.

decedents,

Petitioner is the Personal Representative of the estme of the above named
has collected and managed the assets of the estate, ha:, filed Petitioner's final

inventory and schedules, paid all lawful claims against the estate, including all federal and state
estate, inheritance and other death taxes now due, and performed all other acts required of
Petitioner by the laws of this State pertaining to estates of the decedents:: and

2.

The time for presenting valid claims which arose prior to the death of the

decedents has expired, or it is not expected that any valid claims will be presented, all known

Petition for Approval of Final Settlement - 1

valid claims have been paid, or have been provided for in the final di~;tribution and there are no
known contingent, unliquidated, or future valid claims against the estat'~; and

3.

That Vivian M. Wiggins transferred all her assets to Emerson D. Wiggins more

than five years prior to his death and thus there are no valid Medicaid or Medicare claims; and

Petitioner has filed concurrently herewith the following:

a.

Inventory Schedules of Property of Vivian M. \iliggins and the Inventory
Schedules of Emerson D. Wiggins; and

h.

5.

Schedule of Final Distribution; and

Testacy Status:
a.

The decedents died intestate; and

b.

Petitioner has been appointed Personal Representative of the estate of the
decedents; and

c.

Petitioner affirms that the statements set forth in Petitioner's Application
for Informal Probate heretofore filed; and

6.

Based on the foregoing, and on the documents referenced above, it appears that a

final distribution of the assets at this time is proper, subject to the right to recover against the
distributees for proportionate payment of any claim or debt found by law to be due by the estate.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests that:

1.

The Court fix a time and place for hearing on this Petition; and

2.

Notice be given as required by law.

3.

After notice and hearing, the Court enter an Order:
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a.

Approving the Petition for Final Settlement and Distribution together with

the schedules as filed by the Petitioner; and

b.

Authorizing

and

directing

Petitioner

to

pay

any

outstanding

encumbrances, pay any remaining costs or fees for administration, any attorney
fees and costs remaining unpaid, any taxes due, any accOlmting fees necessary to
close the estate, transfer title in the assets of the estate a: deemed necessary by the
Personal Representative, and distribute the remainder of the assets of the estate to
the distributees in the amount (together with any intere:;t earned thereon and less
any fees or costs as aforementioned) in the manner se'i forth in the Schedule of
Distribution; and

c.

After Petitioner has made such final settJ ement and distribution,

discharging and releasing Petitioner, and closing the administration ofthis estate.

Dated this a+IJay of November, 2009.

R. Brad Ma:;ingill
Attorney for the Personal
Representative
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VERIFICATION

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Washington

)
ss:
)

The Petitioner, LYNN WIGGINS, being sworn, having read the foregoing, state that the
facts set forth therein are accurate and complete to the best of the PI~titioner's knowledge and
belief.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on the ~ay of

KAUEE EISENBARTH
NOTARY PUBUC
STATE OF IDAHO
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NO\Jerni'lr,2009.

'(ak
,Siwml/liblih
Notary Puhlic for Idaho
Residing in: We~ser
My Comm, Expires:

1--2015
8"'2:\0

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the

16.~ay

of Nevwt'f'£, 2009, a true and

conect copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION
was mailed by regular United States mail, postage prepaid thereon to the following:

Lynn Wiggins
1520 W. Second
Weiser, Idaho
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
clo Kathy Ganett
Estate Recovery Officer
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Division of Human Services

f

W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
Division of Human Services
3276 Elder, Ste. B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
ISB No. 3361
[cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov]

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL D]STRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF \VASHINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and
EMERSON D. WIGGINS,

Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2009 . 1926

CLAIM AGAINST E:STATE
(I.C. § 15-3-804)
EXEMPT: I.C. § 31-3212

COMES NOW the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, by and through its
counsel, W. COREY CARTWRIGHT, Deputy Attorney General, and he:rebymakes claim against
the above-captioned estate. This claim is based upon the Claimant's statutory right to recover the
amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the Decedent VIVIAN :tvL WIGGINS, as set forth
at Idaho Code § 56-218. The Claimant has paid medical assistance benefits on behalf of the

CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 1
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Decedent, VIVIAN M. WIGGINS, in the amount of$272,134.68 as of November 17,2009. As of
this date, $7,460.23 has been applied to this amount leaving the current amount of$264,674.45. To
the extent that the Claimant is obligated to make further medical assistance payments on behalf of
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS, it reserves the right to supplement its claim inlhis proceeding.
DATED this-,--_b_dayofNovember, 2009.

fl!~~,;~
Deputy Attorney General

VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

STACEY GENTA, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: That I am the Claimant's
Paralegal; that I have read the above and foregoing claim against the decedent's estate and know the
contents thereof; and that, to my knowledge and belief, the facts stated therein are true and correct.

TA, Paralegal

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

15t

day of November, 2009.

Notary Public for Idaho
Commission EXPires:C':~}A.

CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 2
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D.

2-D1 Z_

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that the foregoing CLAIM AGAINST
ESTATE was mailed first class, and sent via facsimile, on the I g' d.ay of November, 2009, to:

LYNN WIGGINS
C/O R BRAD MASINGILL
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 467
"WEISER ID 83672

facsimile (208) 414-0490

~A.J. 01 Cllv1lL

Marchell Premo, Legal Assistant
Division of Human Services

CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 3
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Division of Human Services
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
Division of Human Services
3276 Elder, Ste. B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
ISB No. 3361
[cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov]

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF \VASHINGTON
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and
EMERSON D. WIGGINS,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2009-1926

DEMAND FOR NOTICE
(I.C. § 15-3-204)
EXEMPT: I.e. § 31-32!2

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, (hereinafter the
"Department") pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-204, and hereby files its Demand for Notice of orders
or other filings pertaining to the estate of the above-named Decedent. The Department asserts that
it has a financial or property interest in said estate based upon the amount of medical assistance

benefits which it was required to pay on behalf of the above-named Decedent and/or Decedent's

DEMAND FOR NOTICE - 1
Y;\MRCases\Estate\Wigginsv\C&D. wpd

spouse, and based upon its right to recover the amount of medical assistance benefits paid on her
behalf as set forth at Idaho Code § 56-218.
The Department further requests a copy of the Inventory ant l Appraisement, upon its
preparation within three months of the personal representative's appointm(:nt, pursuant to Idaho Code

§ 15-3-706.
Notice should be given to the Department through its attorney, W. COREY CARTWRIGHT,
Deputy Attorney General, Division of Human Services, 3276 Elder, Suite B, P.O. Box 83720, Boise,
Idaho 83720-0036.
DATED this

12 day of November, 2009.

~/~
CO~
W.
ARTWRIGHT
DeputfA,.ttorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing
DEMAND FOR NOTICE was mailed first class, and sent via facsimile, on the I ~ day of
November, 2009, to:
LYNN WIGGINS
CIO R BRAD MASINGILL
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 467
WEISER ID 83672

facsimile (208) 41<t-0490

~{dwLtQ

fY)o

March Ie Premo, Legal Assistant
Division of Human Services

DEMAND FOR NOTICE - 2
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Human Services Division
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
Human Services Division
3276 Elder, Ste. B
POBox 83720
Boise ID 83720-0036
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
ISB No. 3361
[cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov]

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
VIVIAN WIGGINS and
EMERSON D. WIGGINS,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. PV-2i)09-1926
!

I

OBJECTION
TO FINAL
,
SETTLEMENT

--------------------------)
COMES NOW the State ofIdaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the
"Department") and OBJECTS to the Petition for Approval of Final Set:lement. This objection is
made because the Department has a valid claim against this estate pUrS"lant to Idaho Code
§ 56-218, for Medicaid payments made on behalf of Vivian Wiggins b(~fore her death, which

claim has not been paid and which the final settlement does not propose to pay.

OBJECTION TO FINAL SETTLEMENT - 1
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DATED this 18th day of November, 2009,

CARTWRIGJ~~r

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
postage pre-paid, and sent via facsimile, to the following:
LYNN WIGGINS
C/O R. BRAD MASIN GILL
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 467
WEISER ID 83672

DATED this

facsimile (208) 414-0490

11- day of November, 2009.

ndtbW~ Qa-q "

Marchelle Premo, Legal Assistant
Division of Human Services
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R. BRAD MASIN GILL
Attorney at Law
27 West Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone # 1 (208) 414-0665
Fax # 1 (208) 414-0490
Email-bmasingiII@hotmaiI.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASIDNGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATE OF:

) Case No.: CV-2f09-1926
)
)

) NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE OF CLAIM
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and
EMERSON D. WIGGINS,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)

The Personal Representative of the above-entitled estate, Lynn Wiggins, pursuant to
Idaho Code 15-3-806, hereby notifies the claimant, Department of Health and Welfare, 3276
Elder Suite B, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho, 83720-0036 that tte entire claim is hereby
disallowed.

~

Dated this 2.Lf day of November, 2009.

~

)

:/~V\ ;1:- . t!.~

Lynn Iggins,
Personal Representative

Notice - 1

i 'J

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
~

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the "1.".'-4 day of November, 2009 a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Notice of Disallowance of Claim was mailed by regular United States
mail, postage prepaid thereon to the following:

W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
Division of Human Services
3276 Elder Suite B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 ,

LYNN WIGGINS
1520 W. 2nd
Weiser,ID 83672

Notice - 2

INVENTORY SCHEDULES OF PROPERTY OF:
VIVIAN M. \VIGGINS and EMERSON D. WIGGINI;, Deceased
Dated: 11-24-09

A1et1--l.~~........_

Recapitulation

Schedule

Description

Community
Propeny

Separate
Property

Schedule A

Real Estate

$ -0-

$ - 0-

Schedule B

Stock and Bonds

$ -0-

$

Schedule C

C.D.'s, Notes and Cash

$ -0-

$ 78,508.59

Schedule D

Other Misc. Personal
Property

$ -0-

$

-0-

Schedule E

Expenditures

unknown

$

-0-

$ -0-

$ 78,508.59

Total Net Value

Schedule A - - -

Item

Description

a.

None

Total

-0-

Real Estate
Community
Property,

$ -0-

Separate
Property

$ -0-

Schedule B - - -

Item

Description

b.

None

Stocks and Bonds
Community Separate
Properr;y
Property

Total

Schedule C - - -

Item

Description

c.

Checking account # 422330274
Separate property of
Emerson D. Wiggins

Total

C.D.'s, Notes, and Cash
Community
Property

Separate
Property
$78,508.59

$ -0-

$78,508.59

Schedule D - - -

Miscellan(':ous

Item

Description

Communi1y
Propert£.

d.

None

$

-0-

$ -0-

Total

$

-0-

$ -0-

Schedule E - - -

Item

Description

Separate
Propem

Expenditures
Community
Property

Separate
Prope!!y

e.

Personal Representative
Fee and care of decedents

$12,250.00

f.

Attorney Fees and Costs
Unknown at this time.
Determined after resolution of claim

$

TOTAL

-0-

Nov. 30. 2009

3:09PM

No. 4493

P

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Human Services Division
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
Human Services Division
3276 Elder. Ste. B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0036
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
Facsimile: (208) 334-6515
1SB No. 3361
{cartwriw@dhw,idaho.gov]

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

VIVIAN M. WIGGINS, and
EMERSON D. WIGGINS}
Deceased.

)

CASE NO. 2009-1926

)
)

PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE

)
)
)
)

OF CLAIM
(I.C. § 15-3-806)

EXEMPT: I.C. § 31-3212

COMES NOW, THE STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
WELFARE, through its attorney, W. COREY CARTWRIGHT, Deputy Attorney General, and
represents that:

1.

The State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter

"Department")} paid medical assistance benefits on behalf of the Decedent, VNlAN M.
WIGGINS, in the amount ofS264,674.45;
2.

The Personal Representative did not give the Departme:llt notice ofthis probate as

required by Idaho Code § 56-218(5). The Department learned of this :rrobate upon receipt of
final distribution documents filed in this case on November 16, 2009.

PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM-

2

Nov,30,20093:09PM

3.

No,4493

, 3

Pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 15-3-804 and 56·218, a written statement of the

Department's claim in the amount of $264,674.45 was mailed to the personal representative of
the estate and filed with the Court on November 23) 2009;
4.

On November 27,2009, the Department received a Notice of Disallowance of

Claim without a stated reason for the disallowance; and
5.

The Department's statutory claim is just and valid, and payment should be

allowed for the total amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of thb,Decedent to the fullest
extent possible.

WHEREFORE, THE DEPARTMENT REQUESTS That the C)urt enter an Order
allowing the above listed claim to be paid to the fullest extent possible.
DATED this 3:p day of November 30,2009.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct cOEY 0 f L1e foregoing PETITION
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM was sent via facsimile on the 30 da7ofNovember, 2009, to:
R. Brad Masingill
Attomey at Law
27 West Conimercial Street
P. O. Box 467
Weiser) ID 83672

facsimile (208) 414-0490

Washington County Clerk
Washington County Courthouse
256 E. Court
P. O. Box 670

faCSimile (208) 414-3925

~cU6hd,(1

Weiser, ID 83672

9#mJO

MARCELLE PltEMO, Legal Assistant
Division of Humm Services

PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 2

000026

Dec. 1 2009

2:41PM

No. 4547
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LAWRENCE G, WASDEN
ATIORNEY GENERAL
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Human Services Division

W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
Human Services Division
3216 Elder, Ste. B
POBox 83720
Boise ID 83720-0036
Telephone: (208) 332-1961
ISB No. 3361

~

.-~ \.

\

,,~

Fned~:~)S)h.q~ .<:'&,D
BeTTY J. THOMAS
Clerk Distrlct:ourt

1;,

d=J:\~e-M.

~.\o~~nJlePuty

J

[cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov]

~~_£-

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASIDNGTON
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:

)
)

)
)

VIVIAN WIGGINS and

)
)
)
)
)

EMERSON D. WIGGINS,
Deceased.

Case No. CV-2D09-1926
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE

COMES NOW the State ofIdaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the

"Department") and submits the following memorandum of points and llutl10rities in support of its
Petition for Allowance of Claim:

I.
BACKGROUND FACTS
Decedent Vivian Wiggins ((Vivian") died January 30,2009, at the age of97. Her

husband Emerson Wiggins ("Emerson") died less than two weeks later on February 9,2009. He
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE - 1
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Dec,

2009 2:41PM

No 4 7

p, 3

was 98 years old. Vivian entered the nursing home in June 2002. Emerson applied for Medicaid
benefits to assist in paying Vivian's nursing home costs, and Medicaid wes approved effective
September 1, 2003. After that date, the Department, through the Medicaid program, has paid for
benefits totaling at least) $272,134.68.
About May 22, 2009, Lynn Wiggins was appointed personal repre3entative for this estate.
This matter was opened as a joint estate pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-· 111. The personal
representative did not give notice of his appointment to the Departmenf as required by Idaho
Code § 56-218(5). On November 16,2009, the Deparhnent received a copy of the Petition for
Approval afFinal Settlement, the Notice of Hearing, and other documents from the personal
representative. This was the first notice the Department had of this mater. On November 18,
2009, the Department served its Claim Against Estate, and Demand for Notice upon the personal
representative. These documents were filed with the court on Novemh~r 23,2009, The
Department asserted a claim in the amount of $264,674.45,2
Also on November 18,2009, the Department served its Objectillll to Final Settlement,

which was filed with the court on November 23,2009. On November 24,2009) the personal
representative disallowed the Department's claim without stating a rea~on. On November 30,
2009, the Department filed its Petition for Allowance of Claim.

IMcdicaid providers have up to one year to submit claims for payment. Theref;)rc, ~hc Department reserves the
right to supplement its Claim Against Estate if it pays more benefits on behalf of Mrs, Wlgg:ns.
2 A voluntary payment was

made on behalf of Vivian on March 27, 2008, in the amount of $7,460.23, reducing
the amount of the Department's claim.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
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II.

THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S DISALLO\YANCE
IS UNSUPPORTED BY LAW.

While the personal representative's Notice of Disallowance, do;s not state a reason, the
personal representative has suggested in other discussions that he belie'/es that because Vivian
conveyed her property to Emerson and the property thereby became Emerson's separate property,
the Department cannot recover. This position has no support in law.
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) provides for the recovery of Medicaid benefits from the estates
of deceased Medicaid recipients and their spouses:

56-218 Recovery of Certain Medical Assistance. - (1) Except where
exempted or waived in accordance with federal1aw medical asdstance pursuant to
this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or
older when the individual received such assistance may be recovered from the
individual'S estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any. for such aid paid to either
or both, .. ,
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (underline added). This is a joint estate which assumes that all of
Vivian's property passed to Emerson on her death. Idaho Code § 15-3·111. Idaho Code
§ 56-218 clearly authorizes recovery from this joint estate whether the lssets are derived from

Vivian or from Emerson.
Whether the property had become Emerson's separate property is irrelevant. The
DepartmenCs recovery is against any property which had been the couple's community property
at any time after October 1, 1993;
20. Limitations on Estate Claims. - Limits on the Departmentls claim
against the assets of a deceased participant or spouse are subject to Sections
56~218 and 56-21 SA, Idaho Code. A claim against the estate of a 8pouse of a
participant is limited to the value of the assets of the estate that had been, at any
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
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time after October I, 1993. community property, or the deceased participant's
share the separate property, and jointly owned property....
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 (underline added). In this case, the personal nlpresentative has

suggested that Vivian conveyed all her property to Emerson in the proc ~s of qualifying for
Medicaid benefits. Such transfers between spouses are permitted and nre routine as pmt of the
7

eligibility process, This allows one spouse to become eligible for Medicaid while the other is left
with sufficient assets to live independently in the community. Howeve~, it does not affect the

Department's ability to recover such assets through estate recovery.
Challenges to Idaho's spousal recovery law have been made in lthe past) but the Idaho
Supreme Comt put these challenges to rest in 1998 in the case ofIdaho Department of Health
and Welfare v, Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6 (1998), The Jackn:llID, case was similar to
this case in that the Medicaid recipient passed away before her surviving spouse who was
possession of aU of the couple's assets. The personal representative ch.illenged the Department's

claim on numerous grounds including federal pre-emption. The Idaho :Supreme Court, however,

upheld Idaho's spousal recovery law, holding that the expanded definit~.on of estate pennitted by
federallaw 3 and adopted by Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(b), validated reco'rery of property that had,

at any time, been community property.
The Jackman case can be difficult to read because of the way it was decided. In the
court's first decision. the Supreme Court held wholly in favor of the Depertment. Upon a
Petition for Rehearing\ the Supreme Court modified its decision to hold that the Department's
)42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B).
4The Department was given no opportunity to respond to the Petition for Rehea rin:~ either in writing or by
argument
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right to recover from property that had been cOll',ffiunity property was limhed to property that had
been community property after the effective date of the federal law, "OBRA 93" that created the
expanded definition of estate in 1993.5 Effectively, the court upheld spousal recovery, but in the
Jackman case, the couple's property had been divided by a marriage settlement agreement in
April, 1993, prior to the effective date of the law.
The published summary of the case correctly captures this two part holding:
... The Supreme Court, Johnson J.• held that: (1) ifthe estate of the individual
who received Medicaid assistance is inadequate to repay the full amount of the
assistance received, thy Deoartment can recover the balance from the estate of the
sU);yiving spouse, but (2) federal law! as in effect when recipient 3...'1d her husband
entered into marital settlement agreement transmuting most ohecipient's and
husband's community property into separate property of husband, limited the
Department to recovering any community property recipient and hllsband may
have accumulated after the agreement.
j

Jackman, 132 Idaho at 213,970 P.2d at 6 (underline added). Justice Jomson's introduction also
explains the coures holding:
This is a Medicaid recovery case. We conclude that seeton 56-218(1) of
the Idaho Code (I.C.), as it existed at times applicable to this ca!Je, authOlized the
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the Department) to recover from the
available estate of a surviving spouse the balance of Medicaid payments received
by an individual who was fiftv-five years old or older when recdYillg the
payments if the individual's estate is inadequate to repay the entire amount. We
conclude, however, that federal law applicable to this case prohibi:ed this
recovery, except from any community property the spouses may have accumulated
after a marriage settlement agreement transmuting their commu:1ity property into
separate property of each.
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 214, 970 P.2d at 7 (underline added). Justice Johnson explained that the
Department was limited in the Jackman case only because the marriage settlement agreement

5This Iimitarion is embodied in lDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 cited above, limiting spousal recovery to property that
had been community property at any time after October I, 1993.
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was executed before the effective date ofthe federal law expanding the; definition of estate for
Medicaid recovery purposes:
We conclude that this definition of "assetsll is not applicable to the
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lione! and Hildor on March 8,
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendmen~s to the federal
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or l>efore the date of
the enactment of this Act[Aug. 10, 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § B611(e). Therefore,
it does not apply to the agreement and does not anow the Department to recover
the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate pnperty. This is true
even though 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid payments for
calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993, authorizes the
Departnlent to recover the Medicaid payments from "other assets." Without the
g.efinition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.C, § 1396p(e)(1), Hofler assets" are
only those included within Hildor's estate, as defined by I.e. § :\ 5-1-201(l5}.
Lionel's separate property, including the conununity property tr msmuted by the
agreement, is not part of Hildor's estate.
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216~7l 970 P.2d at 9-10 (underline added).
Therefore, the Jackman caSe conclusively holds that in Idaho, the Department may
recover from the estate of the spouse as long as the property had been (ommunity property at any
time after October 1, 1993,

llI.
CONCLUSION
There is no reasonable basis in law for the personal representative's position in this n;ase.
Idaho law clearly pennits the Department to recover from this estate, regardless of whether it had
become Emerson's separate property through transfers from Vivian or upon Vivian)s death or
both. The characterization of Emerson's property as "separate" makes no difference in this case.
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DATED this 1 day of December) 2009)

&l~_ Q-

TWRI(H~
Deputy Attomey General

w. CO

C

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing dOClffient was mailed)
postage pre-paid, and sent via facsimile, to the following:

facsimile (208) 414-0490

LYNN WIGGINS
C/O R. BRAD MASlNGILL
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 467
WEISER ID 83612

DATED this

L

day of December, 2009.

'JJ2Ia1<!!iu LLt ~

Marchell Premo, Legal Assistant
Division of Human Services
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAl., DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATES OF:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and
EMERSON D. WIGGINS,

Deceased.

Case No.:

2009-1~j26

MEMORANDUl\1 IN SUPPORT
OF DENIAL OF LIEN AGAINST
EMERSON D. '" IGGINS' PROPERTY

Comes now, the Personal Representative of the above-entitled estates, and files his
Memorandum in Support of Disallowance of Claim against Emerson D ·Wiggins. In the aboveentitled matter, the following facts are undisputed:

FACTS:

The following are the facts upon which testimony will be adduced relative to the claim of
lien filed by the State ofIdaho, Department of Health and Welfare.

a.

Segregation. Prior to 2002, Emerson and Vivian's

estat~s

were segregated, each

holding one half as their respective sole and separate property. The tesTirrony and documentary
evidence will show that in 2002 Emerson had an account with Zions Bank, Weiser, Idaho which
held three accounts shown on Exhibit A. The evidence will show that

M(~dicaid,

Emerson, and

Vivian determined the amount of money available to Vivian, pursuant to the segregation. The
testimony and documentary evidence will show that Lynn Wiggins,

th~

personal representative

in this matter, helped Vivian and Emerson keep track ofthe moneys each owned as their sole and
separate property. Those figures generally agree with the documentary evidence from Medicaid
in which Medicaid determined all assets of Vivian had been depleted, thus making her eligible
for Medicaid in September, 2002.

b.

lVledicaid Records and Consent.

Lynn Wiggins, on behalf of his parents,

provided Medicaid (in approximately 2002) with documentation to

SGOW

what assets Vivian

owned so Medicaid could determine her eligibility for Medicaid. Lynn povided Medicaid bank
statements and certificates of deposit.

Lynn provided Medicaid all documentation they

requested, which showed what each parent owned as his or her sole and separate property. The
evidence will show that Medicaid determined the assets Vivian owned, calculated when she
would be eligible, and monitored the accounts and account statements. The documents will
show that Emerson and Vivian had provided Medicaid with all the statements and documents
showing their respective assets, all of which show the separate nature th~reof.

c.

Medicaid Planning.

The planning for Medicaid and the division of assets into

each owning their own separate property was done in connection vvi th advice from a former

Third District Judge, Wayne Fuller. The purpose of the planning was t) nake sure each spouse
had sufficient funds with which to take care of themselves.

d.

Both Blind.

Both Emerson and Vivian were blind. TIeir son and daughter-in-

law, LyrJl and Donna Wiggins, were in charge of taking them tc all medical and other
appointments.

e.

Vivian's Care.

In May of 2002, Vivian got ill ane was in need of medical

and other services. The money segregated to her was used up by me:iical and care expenses.
Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a list of expenditures on behalf of Vivian commencing in
November of 2002 and ending in August of 2003, compiled by Lynn. The list shows when her
separate funds ran out.

Vivian began receiving Medicaid on September 1, 2003, which

corresponds with Lynn's calculations. The specific dates upon which services were granted to
Vivian were as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

f.

Admit to Presbyterian Community Care Center on 5-9-02; and
Discharged from Presbyterian Community Care Cent(~r on 6-7-02; and
Admit to Weiser Rehabilitation and Care Center on 6-7-02; and
Medicaid first provided to Vivian on September 1,2003.

Emerson's Care.

In October of2002, Emerson began renting an apartment at

Park View Center Apartments and remained there through 2008. The ~pecific dates upon which
services were granted to Emerson were as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Rented apartment at Park View Center on 10-1-02; and
Moved from Park View Center on 7-5-08; and
Admit to The Cottages on 7-5-08; and
Medicaid paid nothing for Emerson. All expenses were out of his pocket.

g.

Agreement with Medicaid:

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a copy of the Zions

Bank statements of Emerson Wiggins, showing his segregated funds. A review of the statements
shows the only items which were not segregated in Emerson's bank re;ords were the insurance
premiums paid by Emerson on behalf of Vivian out of his separate property.
authorized those payments, and allowed Emerson to be reimbursed

by~eceiving

Medicaid

Vivian's social

--------

security.

h.

Vivian's Death.

Vivian M. Wiggins died on the 3Cth day of January, 2009

in Weiser, Idaho, while a resident of Weiser, Washington County, Idaho; and

i.

Emerson's Death.

Emerson Wiggins died on the 9th :lay of February, 2009 in

Weiser, Idaho, while a resident of Weiser, Washington County, Idaho.

j.

Inventory Schedules of Property. The money shown in the estate (and upon

which Medicaid seeks its lien) is Emerson's sole and separate property. See Inventory Schedules
of Property filed in the probate estate. The Inventory Schedules of Property reflect the division
and segregation of the decedents' property, i.e. Vivian had no assets and Emerson had only that
which was placed into his bank account, as his sole and separate property.

k.

The Lien.

Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a letter o~'March 5, 2009, from the

Department of Health and Welfare, State of Idaho. The letter clearly shows the lien is against
the Vivian Wiggins, only.

I.
Legal Argument
A.

Medicaid Look Back Period:

As the Court no doubt is aware, some time ago

Idaho adopted a statute which is intended to secure reimbursement for Medicaid funds lawfully
provided to a person (hereinafter the recipient). The Idaho statutes, di:;cussed below, are based
entirely upon a federal statute which requires the states (which are participating in the Medicaid
program) to attempt to obtain reimbursement for funds provided to recipients under the program.
The initial look back period for becoming Medicaid eligible was thee (3) years when the
segregation and transfers were made.

B.

Federal Statute:

The federal statute involved in the case at bar for Medicaid

liens, adjustments, and recoveries is 42 USC 1396p. The Medicaid reimbursement statute is part
of the Social Security Act of 1965.

The Medicaid program is funded jointly by each

participating state and the federal government. It is administered by the states. See recently

State Dept of Health and Welfare v. Hudelson, 196 P.3d 905 (Ida 10, 2008), 42 U.S.e. §§
1396a, and 42 U.S.e. §§ 1396k.
The issue in this case is what reimbursement is allowed under the provisions of 42 USC

1396p. Stated another way, the state is not entitled to recover medical assistance (correctly paid)
under Medicaid, unless the right to recover is allowed by federal law. Thus, the right to recover
in the Wiggins estate is limited by the terms of the federal statute.
In Hudelson, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that the State cannot fudge beyond
that which is allowed by the specific language of the federal statute:
"The Court considered 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, the anti-lien provisic1n of the federal Medicaid
statute, and found that it limited a state's ability to recover medical expenses it paid on a

Medicaid recipient's behalf. Id. at 284, 126 S. Ct. at 1763, 16~ L.Ed.2d at 473-74. A
state Medicaid plan must comply with section 1396p, which generally prohibits states
from placing liens against a Medicaid recipient's property. 7 42 US.C. § 1396a(a)(l8)."
(emphasis added).
As discussed in Barg, supra (hereinafter discussed at length in iIDother section) initially
Medicaid legislation (pre-1993) provided that the States were allowed, but not required, to
recover Medicaid benefits, and Congress specified reimbursement was cmly from the recipient's
estate, and only after the surviving spouse died.
In the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 42 U.~.c. 1396p(b)(l), and (4),
the statute allowed recovery against the "individual's estate" and again only after the death of the
SurvlVIng spouse.

It also allowed the State an option to expand the definition of property to

"any other real or personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title
or interest at the time of death
The Estates of Vivian and Emerson Wiggins have no funds available for the Medicaid
lien against Vivian because (1) all transfers have been made prior to the look back period and (2)
Emerson is the only decedent to have funds to be distributed from hi:> estate, and they ar';! not
available to Medicaid as they are his sole and separate property.

c.

Idaho Recovery Statute:

Idaho participates in the Medicaid program. Idaho

has been amending its reimbursement statute for years. The statute in ,;{fect in Idaho at the time
of death of both decedents is Idaho Code 56-218. However, Idaho ,Code 56-218 as presently
constituted is entirely different than the statute in effect when the actions of the decedents were
completed. Idaho Code 56-218, as it is presently constituted, states:

56-218. Recovery of certain medical assistance. (1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance
with federal law medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf )f an individual who was fifty-

five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistanc'~ may be recovered from the
individual's estate, and the estate ofthe spouse, if any, for such aid paid to eit ler or bot~:
(a) There shall be no adjustment or recovery until after the death of both the individual and the
spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual has no survivilg :hild who is under twentyone (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally disa)led as defmed in 42 U.S.CO
1382c.
(b) While one (1) spouse survives, except where joint probate \lill be authorized pursuant to
section 15-3-111, !dallO Code, a claim for recovery under this seeton may be established in the
estate of the deceased spouse.
(c) The claim against the estate of the first deceased spouse m 1st be made within the time
provided by section 15-3-801(b), IdaIlO Code, if the estate is administered and actual notice is
given to the director as required by subsection (5) of this section. However, if there is no
administration of the estate of the first deceased spouse, or if no ac::ual notice is given to the
director as required by subsection (5) of this section, no claim shall be required tmtil the time
provided for creditor claims in the estate of the survivor.
(d) Nothing in this section authorizes the recovery of the amount of any aid from the estate or
surviving spouse of a recipient to the extent that the need for aid resulted from a crime committed
against the recipient.
(2) Transfers of real or personal property, on or after the look-back dates d~:fu:ed in 42 U.S.C. 1396p, by
recipients of such aid, or their spouses, without adequate consideration are 'roidable and may be set aside
by an action in the district court.
(3) Except where there is a surviving spouse, or a surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of
age or is blind or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U.S. C. 1382c, the amount cf any
medical assistance paid under this chapter on behalf of an individual who wa!; fi:1y-five (55) years of age or
older when the individual received such assistance is a claim against the estate in any guardianship or
conservatorship proceedings and may be paid from the estate.
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include:
(a) All real and personal property and other assets irtcluded within the individual's estate, as
defined for purposes of state probate law; and
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal
title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of such interest, i:1cluding such assets conveyed
to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through join t tenancy, tenancy in conmon,
survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement.
(5) Claims made pursuant to this section shall be classified and paid as a debt with preference as defined in
section 15-3-805(5), Idaho Code. Any distribution or transfer of the estate prior to satisfying such clainl is
voidable and may be set aside by an action irt the district court. The personal representative of every estate
subject to a claim under this section must, within thirty (30) days of the appointment, give notice irt writing
to the director of his or her appointment to administer the estate.
(6) The department may file a notice ofUen against the property of any estzte subject to a clainl under this
section.
(a) In order to perfect a lien against real or personal property, the jepartment shall, within ninety
(90) days after the personal representative or successor makes a Wlitten request for prompt action
to the director, or three (3) years from the death of the decedent, w lichever is sooner, file a notice
oflien irt the same general form and manner as provided in section 56-21SA(3)(a), Idaho Code, in

the office of the secretary of state, pursuant to section 45-1904, Idaho C)de. Failure to file a llotice
oflien does not affect the validity of claims made pursuant to this section.
(b) The department may release the lien in whole or in part to pe:mit the estate property to be
administered by a court-appointed personal representative.
(c) The department may foreclose its lien, without probate, in any ofthe following circumstances:
(i) Where no personal representative has been appointed aJ:er one (1) year from the date
of death of the survivor of both the individual and spouse, if any;
(ii) Where the property has been abandoned by the decedent's heirs or successors, if any;
(iii) Where the real property taxes that are due and payable have remained unpaid for two
(2) years and, after demand by the department, the heirs or successors, if any, have failed
to seek appointment or pay the property taxes; or
(iv) Where all parties interested in the estate consent to foreclosure of the lien.
(7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to implement:hiE section including, but not
limited to, rules establishing undue hardship waivers for the following circumstances:

(a) The estate subject to recovery is income-producing property that provides the primary source
of support for other family members; or
(b) The estate has a value below an amount specified in the rules; or
(c) Recovery by the department will cause the heirs of the deceased individual to be eligible for
public assistance.
(8) The cause of action to void a transfer without adequate consideration e ;tablished in this section shall
not be deemed to have accrued until the department discovers, or reasonab ly could have discovered, the
facts constituting the transfer without adequate consideration.

As mentioned in the first paragraph of the foregoing statute, the power and tenns upon
which reimbursement can be achieved is "subject to" the extent of pcwer given by the federal
statute. If the State seeks to obtain reimbursement beyond the tenns and conditions allowed by
the federal statute, the action is invalid. Idaho's statute attempts to collect Medicaid from the
separate estate of the spouse of the recipient. That effort is contrary to the federal statute, as
constituted when the separate property was acquired, and is contra.:] to the present federal
statute.
Attached hereto as Exhibit E is the most recent (and most ccgent) case discussing the
very same statute Idaho has passed. The case is out of Minnesota. It is directly on point as to the
disallowance of a state's action which exceeds the federal mandate. The case is In re the Estate

a/Barg, 752

W. 2

nd

(May 30,2008 and rehearing denied on July 21, 2008). The Barg case

describes what the federal statute allows and does not allow.

In Barg, the same statute as adopted by Idaho was at issue. Barg states:
"since 1987 Minnesota law has provided for recovery of Medicdd benefits paid from the
estate ofa recipient or the estate ofthe recipient's surviving spollse. "

In Barg, supra, the overbroad recovery attempt i.e. from thE estate of the survIVmg
spouse" was determined to be in excess of the federal mandate. ThE a:tempt by the State of
Idaho, in the present case, to obtain reimbursement beyond the powers allowed by the federal
statute is as unavailing as the attempt by the State of Minnesota in Barg.

One of the issues before the Court is the State ofIdaho's attempt tc obtain reimbursement
from the separate spouse's estate 0. e. Emerson Wiggins' separate propertyl. Such is simply not

allowed by the clear wording of the federal statute. See Barg, supra and Gullberg, supra. Barg
referred to the Gullherg decision in reiterating the Gullberg restricticn in that Minnesota was
attempting in Gullberg to recover against "the value of all assets of th~ estate that were marital
property or jointly owned at any time during the marriage." (emphasis added).
Barg, supra, correctly analyzed the federal statute as follows:

"the federal statute establishes a general prohibition against r'~covery of correctly paid
Medicaid benefits, subject to three specified exceptions:
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an
individual under the State plan may be made, except hat the State shall seek
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correc:iy paid on behalf of an
individual under the State plan in the case of the following hdividuals:

(a) And (c) are both inapplicable; and

(b) In the case of an individual who was over 55 years 0:' age or older when the
individual received such medical assistance, the State :;hcll seek adjustmeEt or
recovery from the individual's estate ... " (emphasis adde,1).

Barg, supra, holds that the express exception for recovery against the individual's estate

is subject to the general rule against any other recovery. Further, the federal statute makes no
reference to the surviving spouse but only from the recipient's estate. As pointed out in Barg,
supra, exceptions to the general rule are to be construed narrowly. Comm'r v Clark, 489 U. S.
726, lO9 S. Ct. 1455, 103 L. Ed 753 (1989).

Because there is no rec(very allowed against the

surviving spouse by the clear and unambiguous wording of the federal law, such is not permitted
by the State of Idaho, as well as Minnesota.
Barg, supra, also refers to two other courts which have agreed 'rvith its interpretation, i.e.

Illinois and Wisconsin. In addition, Barg, supra, could find no contrar:r authority and found that
the House Report on the 1993 legislation referred only to the possibi lity of recovery from the
estate of the recipient. In the Illinois case, Hines v Department of Public Aid, 850 N .E.2d 148,
221 Ill.2d 222 (IlL, 2006), the principle that recovery can only be had against the recipient's
estate, was affirmed.
Hines, supra, provides that the determination of the validity of a Medicaid lien is a

question of law. Hines, also correctly points out:
"States are not required to participate in the Medicaid pro gran. Once they elect to do
so, however, they must design their own plans and set reasona1::1e standards for eligibility
and assistance. See 42 U.S.c. § 1396(a)(17) (2000). Such :Jlans and standards must
comport with the Medicaid Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder by the United
States Department of Health and Human Services. See Cohen v. Quem, 608 F.Supp.
1324, 1326 (N.D.I1l.1984); Smith v. Miller, 665 F.2d 172, 175 Oth Cir.l981)."
Hines further states:

"Where, as here, the language of a statute is clear ani unambiguous, the court
must enforce it as written. It may not annex new provisions 0 ~ substitute different ones,

or read into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions whi::h the legislature
not
express. People ex reI. Department of Professional Regulati m v. Manos, 202 Il12d
563, 568, 270 Ill. Dec. 43, 782 N.E.2d 237 (2002), quoting _TJronson v. Washington
National Insurance Co., 59 Ill.App.2d 253, 261-62, 207 N.E.2d 172 (1965). Moreover,
as the appellate court correctly observed, it is a basic principle of statutory construction
that "'the enumeration of exceptions in a statute is construed as an exclusion of all other
exceptions.' It 358 Ill.App.3d at 232,294 Ill. Dec. 691, 831 N.E.2d 641, quoting People
ex reL Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Illold 264,286,271 Ill. Dec. 881 786 N.E.2d 139 (2003).
In cases such as this, where a statute specifies exceptions to a general rule, no exceptions
other than those designated will be recognized. In re Estate of Tilliski, 390 Ill. 273, 283,
61 N.E.2d 24 (1945). The appellate court was therefore corr~ct to conclude that the
Medicaid Act cannot be construed as pennitting the state to look to the estate of a spouse
of a recipient of medical assistance for reimbursement of cmts correctly paid on the
recipient's behalf"
In fact, the Jackman, supra, case (discussed in a subsequent 3ection) also from Idaho
does not allow recovery against anything but the community property of the surviving spouse.

Jackman stands for the proposition that even if the federal statute atows (which it does not)
recovery against the spouse's estate, it would not include the spouse's separate property.

D. Prior Statute Governs:
The next issue is the timing of the attempted lien. The State is attempting to impose its
lien against the spouse's separate property based on an Idaho statute which did not become law
until after the decedents agreed to and did segregate their respective :funds.

The Medicaid

eligibility was also determined under a statute which did not allow recovery from the surviving
spouse's estate.

Thus, for purposes of the present case, the existing statlte which claims to be

able to get at the spouse's estate, is not the statute which governs the present issue. In Idaho

Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213 (1998), in ruling on an issue of
separate property (discussed infra), the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
"We conclude, however, that federal law applicable to (his case prohibited this
recovery, except from any community property the spouses may have accumulated after a

marriage settlement agreement transmuting their community property into separate
property of each."
In Jackman, supra, it is clear the applicable version of the federal statute and thus the
Idaho statute purportedly based thereon cannot be applied to the present ca.')e. The determination
of the spouse's interest in the estate and the lack of assets upon which to impose the lien, is
determined by applying the statutes in effect at the time the Wiggins developed their estate plan.
Any other interpretation would strip the ability of any person to meaningfully plan his or her
estate.

E. Separate Property is Not Subject to the Medicaid Lien:
In Barg, supra, the Minnesota Court of Appeals made the folbvving observation about

the interest Medicaid could go after in an estate:
"The court of appeals explained that, based on In re Estate of Gl 111berg, 652 N. W. 2d 709
(Minn. App. 2002), the County's ability to recover against Francis Barg's estate was
limited to Dolores's interest in marital or jointly owned property at the time of her death".

Furthermore, the present law in Idaho agrees with the aforementioned statement of law,
but goes even further. Idaho law does not allow a Medicaid lien to attach to a spouse's separate
property.

See Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213 (1998) which

held:
"We conclude, however, that federal law applicable to this case prohibited this recovery,
except from any community property the spouses may have accumulated after a
marriage settlement agreement transmuting their communi!:, property into separate
property of each."

Although Jackman, supra, predated the present statute, it is the last decision ml the
subject Based on Jackman, supra, even the present statute would olly apply to the Vivian's

community property and any community property held by Emerson. Community property law
specifically defines community property and separate property. Idaho Code 32-903. Ida..lJo law
clearly provides that a spouse's separate property is immune from li:ms created by the other
spouse. Idaho Code 32-912. In the present case, Emerson Wiggin's estate consists of only his
separate property and thus the State's lien cannot attach under Idaho law,

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully requested that this matter should be continued until the Estate has the

time to respond to the briefing by the State, and until the factual record can be completed. For
example, discovery is necessary by the Estate to the State to show the dates and the documents
used to complete the Medicaid planning accomplished by the decedents.

Dated thisctLt!1y of January, 2010.

(lm1&J);
. Brad M:t,singill
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I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the~y of January, 201(1, E true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum was mailed by regular United States mail, postage prepaid
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Lynn Wiggins
1520 W. 2 nd Street
Weiser,ID 83672
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
c/o Kathy Garrett
Estate Recovery Officer
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4223901507
4223901507

WIGGINS
WIGGINS
WIGGINS
WIGGINS
WIGGINS
WIGGINS
WIGGINS
WIGGINS
WIGGINS
WIGGINS
WIGGINS

EMERSON
EMERSON
EMERSON
EMERSON
EMERSON
EMERSON
EMERSON
EMERSON
EMERSON
EMERSON
EMERSON

4229015807
4229015807
4229015807
422901!>B07
4229015907

WIGGINS
WIGGINS
WIGGINS
WIGGINS
WIGGINS

EMERSON
EMERSON
EMERSON

504
504
504
504
_ _ n _ _ • • _ _. _

._,~*~_.

~:)jVVU.VU

VOfj.t.V/&VVb

~4V

UUV

'15,000,00
5,000,00
,000,00
5,000,00

07/19/2006
07/19/2006
10/19/2006
10/19/2006

490
980

000
000

4'90

000
000

__

~

•• _ _ _ ._._ _

~_, _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _

EMERSON

~·

_ _ ....

~_··

0

25,000,00
29LOB
291. 08
294,27
294.27

_ _ _ _ " _ ._ _ • _ _ h"' _ _ _
,,----.-"----~-

,00
,00

504
504

504
504
504
504
504
504
504
504
504

.00

01/19/2007
01/19/2007
04/19/2007
04/19/2007
07/19/2007
07/19/2007
10/19/2007
10/19/2007
10/20/2007
10/22/2007
10/22/2007

490
9BO
490
980
490
990
490
980
210
490
900

.00
,00
,00
.00
,00

03/23/2007
12/22/2007
12/23/2007
12/24/2007
12/24/2007

240
490
210
490
900

,00
,00

,00
,00
,00
.00
,00
,00

- --« - ' . - - - - - - - -

El.fERSON

980

QUUD
00'
0
0

000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
900

-.------.~-

504
504
504
504
504

0000
0000
0000

000

....

0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000

.

294,27
294,27
287,88
287,88
291.09

291. 0 a
294,27
294.27
.00
6,37
25,006,37

0000000000000
OOOn002S00000
OOO()422330274
0000002500000
0000422330274
• _•.. _ - -

--.~.-

..... *.

-~

••. - -

0000002500000
000lJ422330274
0001)002500000
0000422330274
0000002500000
0000422330274
0000002500000
000')422330274
0000002500000
0000002500000
0000550369192

-.---.

000
000
000
000
900

0000
0000
0000
0000
0000

56,000.00
2,139.12
.00
6.77
58,145.89

0000000000000
0000005600000
0000005813912
0000005813912
0000660540360

0000

25,000,00

0000000000000

.. .. -----.-.. --.--~"- ..-.-.-------... -.-.----.
"

4229017407

WIGGINS EMERSON

504

25,000 00

10/22/2007
< ___<

'-,_

---"'1-

240

000

- .... - ....
.,

r~

-~-

"

~--~~-'---

4229017407
4229017407
42290174 07
4229017407
4229017407
4229017407
4229017407

WIGGINS
WIGGINS
WIGGINS
WIGGINS
IHGGINS
WIGGINS
WIGGINS

EMERSON
EMERSON
EMERSON
EMERSON
EMERSON
EMERSON
EMERSON

.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00

504
504
504
504
504
504
504

01/21/2008
01/21/2008
04/21/2008
04/21/2008
07/21/2008
07/21/2008
07/22/2008

.

~

~

.

~

~

,

WIGGINS EMERSON

504

58,145.89

-'---'

12/24/2007

WIGGINS EMERSON
WIGGINS EMERSON

504
504

59,268,93
59,268,93

504

.00
.00

WIGGINS EMERSON
WIGGINS EMERSON

504

-~.-~-.-

4229019064
4229019064
4229019064

0000002500000
OO()O422330274
0000002500000
0000422330274
0000002500000
0000422330274
0000660284755

~.-

..

1;'

-~

0000

000

240

58,145,89

0000000000000

-.

..

~-

",,-~---

----~~--.-~

OS/23/2008
OS/24/2008
-'.

4229019397
4229019397

900

312.35
308.31
308.31
30B.30
308,30
25,000.00

-

-

4229018397
4229018397

000

312.35

..... "",..."ftr .. n ....

.

4229018397

0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000

000
000
000
000
000

490
980
490
980
490
980
900

WIGGINS EMERSON
WIGGINS EMERSON
WIGGINS EMERSON

504
504
504

---

000
000

0000
0000

1,123.04
.00

0000005814589
0000005926893

490
900

000
900

0000
0000

1,218,68
60,487,61

0000005926893
0000550383162

0000
0000
0000

7,728.29
75,48
7,803.77

0000000000000
0000000772929
00n0440139055

,- -.-

02/17/2009
02/17/2009

... ~--.----".---

.00
.00
.00

~-

490
210

,~-.-.-,----.---

04/08/2008
09/07/2008
09/08/2008

..

240
490
900

~

,--.--~

000
000
900

....

<

"

:

4

~

~

" " , . . "'" ~

EXHIBIT

Vivian Wiggins

Total Amount To
Expend $57,187.10

Expenditures
Starting November 1, 2002
Date

Weiser Rehab.

Physicians

& Care Center

Ins. Co.

Burial
Medicare

Amount Left

In. Plan

Total

$ 5,000.00

$ 5,000.00
$ 4,887.58
$ 5,529.95
$ 5,207.41
$ 4,737.32
$ 5,600.77
$ 5,337.11
$ 5,971.88
$ 5,608.70
$ 5,577.96
$ 5,606.87

Nov-02

Nov-02
Nov-02
Dec-02
Jan-OS
Feb-03
Mar-03
Apr-03
May-03
Jun-03
JuI-03
Aug-03

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

4,652.90
5,295.27
4,962.89
4,492.80
5,356.25
5,092.59
5,727.36
5,364.18
5,333.44
5,362.35

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

180.68
180.68
186.52
186.52
186.52
186.52
186.52
186.52
186.52
186.52

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

54.00
54.00
58.00
58.00
58.00
58.00
58.00
58.00
58.00
58.00

To Despense

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

57,187.10
52,187.10
47,299.52
41,769.57
36,562.16
31,824.84
26,224.07
20,886.96
14,915.08
9,306.38
3,728.42
(Jl.,818.45,

Memo
Starting Balance
Thomas Funeral Plan

.liVERPA'Yltl1l.i!il'\nr
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r---'-
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tabbies"

-

[pi
=i

-

~

...

-.- ....-- ..- -.. -

..

~.-.-.--

-

1

ZIONS BAt

~;;;~I~;;"'"

_______________________________-=-=
P.o.

Box

30709, Salt Lake City, UT

H

____ •..

Tl"is Statement: January 9,2009
Last Statement: December '10, 2008
Primary Account 422330274

C1RECT INQUIRIES TO:

0003034

24-hour Account information:
Logan:
755-9995
Ogden:
393-9995
Provo:
375-9995
Salt Lake:
974-8800
st. George:
674-9005
(800) 974-8800 (outside local areas)

P03037
OS-OOOO·lFN·PGOO23-OOOO3
OJ AVO.314 "AlHO 11 0 141083672-120820

EMERSON DWIGGINS
KENNETH LYNN WIGGINS
MAXINE BYRD

1520 W2NO ST
WEISER 10 83672-1208

11111 ... 11•• 11 ••1'1.1,.1.11'111.11.11"1111111111.111111111111
Weiser Office
506 State Street
Weiser, JO 83672-1963
WE HAVEN'T FORGOTTEN WHO KEEPS US IN BUSINESS. ®
.

.'

t§IMIRJ~i@li~l..gmi:• •ti..tM~i:M;j~&~i~~:il@~il~[)[;I~Ii;~;;i!i[I:!:;Miiii:~:i!i::!il*i~i~~:~!!t:~i::;~Mi~:~§1.~i;!~t~;;::~;1ii!iM;:i~;~~ri\!~~;\i:!i!:!:!i:\W:~!l: ~):;:): :l~:i: :iIilir!:~il!~;:( ~;j: ji:iji ~: j:jl:~il: : il !:~:~;':i l!: f,:i:~i! :!:l:l~!:r: ): :i
AccDunt Type
Gold Interest Checking

Previous Balance
25,C89.96

CheckinglSay/ngs
Ending Balance
$25,100.05

Account Number
422330274

DepositslCredits

Charges/Debits

896.66

519.11

Outstanding
Balances Owed

Checks Processed
367,46

Ending Balance
25,100.05

3 DEPOSITS{CREDITS
Date

01102
01102
01/09

Amount
563.00
307.00
26.66

Description
US TREASURY 312 SOC SEC -4OA SSREF # 1210362'~1873828 1106636519
US TREASURY 312 SOC SEC - 4 0 8 SSREF# 1210362·11873829 1106636520
INTEREST PAYMENT 0002496338

Amount
239.11
280.00

Description
MUTUAL OF OMAHA JAN INS ·K....- REF # 10400001672&;49 1106709916
PHYSICIANS MUT INS. PRE -040688REF # 104000010773677 1106839798

2 CHARGESJDEBITS
Date
01/02
01/05

3 CHECKS PROCESSED

Number............. .Date........................... ,Amount
1630
12119
205.06

Number............ :.Date ............................Amount
12122
10.00

1632*

Number..............Date ............................Amount
1633
12123
152.40

• Not in check sequence

DAILY BALANCES
Date ... ................ ....... Balancs
12119
24,884.00
12122
24,874.00

Date .. .... .................... Balancs
12123
24,722.50
01/02
25,353.39

Date ................... ....... Balance
01/05
25,073.39
01/09
25,100.05

INTEREST
Interest Earned This Interest Period
Interest Paid Year-To-Date 2009

$26.66
$26.66

31

Numb lr Cf Oays This Interest Pericd
Annus I Psrcentage Yield Eamed

1.310~

Current interest rate is 1.000%

EXHIBIT

"'""
;j

ZIONS
Interest rate changes this Interest period:

Jar,

Date

~

'rK19
; WIGGINS

New Interest Rate

12117

1.000%

Please retain this statement Interest paid on your account In 2008 was 296.34.

0003034·0000002·0005843

ZIONS tlANK.
Page 3 of 3

loao.."

Processed 12/19/08

$205.06

ChI 1630

Processed 12/23/08

$152.40

ChI 1633

-- .... ~

. ~ --.-

--.- -.., --

Processed 12/22/08

$I 0.0 0

ChI 1632

Statement of ACCOlli111S

ZIONS

Faga 1 of3
This Statement: February '; 1, 2009
Last Statement: Januarj9. 2009
Primary Account 42233027 4

0002673

DIRECT INQUIRIES TO:
24-hour Account Informaton:
.ogan:
755-9995
)gden:
393-9995
Provo;
375-9995
Salt Lake:
974-8800
St. George:
674-9995
1 (800) 974-88CO (outsid,3Iooal areas)

P02675 OS-OOOO-lFH-PGOO23-OOO12
01 AVO.324 "Auro [90144383672-120820

EMERSON DWIGGINS
KENNETH LYNN WIGGINS
MAXINE BYRO
1520W2NO ST
WEISER 1083672-1208

11111"IIIIIIIIII'I.IIII.IIIIIIIII.nlllll.,I'III.lIIlluIIIII
Weiser Office
606 State Street
Weiser, 1083672-1963

.

WE HAVENTFORGOTTEN WHO KEEPS US IN BUSINESS.
®
.

i;ii§IMMII*:;IFi:l\~INrn::.~pi!ii1li:!:!:!:i;!:'@:!~!m~;:i : :!i!i i : l ~i:l: :i ~i! i: i!:i:;:!: 1:1:@!:!: :i: ! ;: :g: : : : :j;: i: : t~: : ;@i!:§:i:i:i:i i: : : :!:;: :Hl:!: i: : : : j:l: :lji i : : :;t :i: i:i:i~: : : !li: :i: i:@: : i: ! ! : : : : ti: i :i: : i : i i: : : : \: !Ii: : :ij:j: : i: i~: :if
Account Type
Gold Interest Checking

Account Number
422330274

Deposits/Credits
878.95

PreviOUS Balance
25,100.05

.......................... .... " . " .... ....
3 DEPOSITS/CREDITS
~ ~

~

~ ~

Date
02103
02103
02111

~~~."

.......... .. .......... "" ......
,,~

~

,,,,",,~ ~ ~

CheckinglSivlngs
Ending Billance
$18,"59.44

Ending Balance
18.759.44

Crecks Processed
6.700.45

ChargesIDebits
519.11

.................... .......... _. ,. ..................... " ....... " .... " .... "" .. ...... ,,
~

OutstandIng
Owed

Balan~-s

~.~

~"

~

... .
~

~

.. "

""""~""

.""."

.... .
~

~,.'"

Amount
563.00
307.00
8.95

Description
US TREASURY 312 SOC SEC -40A SSREF # 1210362 ~18S5839 1106010887
US TREASURY 312 SOC SEC --40B SSREF # 12103624.1855840 1106010888
INTEREST PAYMENT 0002190306

Amount
239.11
280.00

Description
MUTUAL OF OMAHA FEB INS ' 1 ( - REF # 104000013225513 1107636212
PHYSICIANS MUT INS_ PRE -040688REF # 104000010157634 1105440436

.....

~

. ".

~

........ "''' .""' ... ,, ........... ...
~ ~

~ ~

.

2 CHARGESIDEBITS
Date
02102
02105

12 CHECKS PROCESSED

Number.......... _...Date ............... _..... _..... Amount
02109
4950
1635*
01/16
2,900.00
1636
01/13
41.97
1637
01/20
123.10
* Not in check sequence

o

Number.... _... _.....Date ........................... Amount
1638
02103
119.68
02104
2,900.00
1639
164D
02105
114.73
1641
02104
109.16

Number.. _...........Date ........... _... _............Amount
1642
02111
263.16
1643
02109
42.00
1646*
02111
25.00
1647
0210E
12.15

DAILY BALANCES

Date ....................... _._BaJance
01/13
25,058.08
01/16
22,158.08
01120
22,034.98
02102
21.795.87

.Date .....• _...................BaJance
0~03
22,546.19
02104
19,537.03
02105
19,142.30

Date ...... _....... _........... Balance
02106
19,130.15
02lCl9
19,038.65
021'11
18,759:44

OO()2673:0000003-O00 5327

!-'ag.

2I01\TS BAl

Feb.

")1 ~

~L09

'VIGGINS

P.O. Box 30709, Salt Lake City, UT 841

INTEREST
Interest Earned This Interest Period
Interest Paid Year-to-Date 2009

$8.95
$35.61

Number Of DriYS This Interest Period
Annual Peroertage Yie!d'Earned

Current interest rate is 0.350%
Interest rate changes this Interest period:

Date
01113

02104

New Interest Rate

0.400%
0.3...."0%

33
0.450%

ZIONS BANK

ACCOUNT # 0422330274

.............
,...,""""",

1IIID>WIO!....1IJ

-

"iII .lo¥IIL(:C:pt ot ~

. . .' - t • ..-..
..,.J"IIHIII*. .~ ....

Processed 02/09/0 9

$49.50

Processed 01/16/0 9

Processed -Ol:fi:5T69-- -- - $41.97 -Chtl636

Processed 02/03/09

$119.68

ChI 1638

Chi 1635

$29 00 .0 0

$123. 1 0 _Chi 1637

Processed _Q ).120/09

Processed 02/04IJ9

$2900.00

ChI 1639

$109.16

Chi 1641

~--------------t:HI,COOQSt.a: r, H BD 2'1

Processed 02/05/09

$114.73

ChI 1640

Processed 02/04 / 0 9

Processe d 02/11/09

$263.16

Chi 1642

Processed

::

02/09/~9

:z=s

'7

$42.00

t:('

Chi 1643

---.-~ -

Page 2ot2

_I

-~r'M'i"""'.~'."

.

~----l

~~-

0 -~___ _
..m.,

S

Processed 02/17/09

$60487.61

Processed 02/13/09

$30.00

Chi 1649

Processed 02.113/ B9

$354.03

Chi 1650

.-

.t{rr.ktr- ...,.
=-"~~1.,,..,,~_ _ _---..JI:i 9f'e'
~~!f.L.""","L&:Lo"""'

Processed 02/23/09

$25.00

Chi 1651

Processed 03/10/09

$23.08

Chi 1653

Processed 02/25/09

_ _ _ _ _ • .,.

$49.50

~

Chi 1652

0002584-0000001-0004654

ZIONS BANK
••
FlU.,,,,,
,,:.:117.".''''

. 1.tUtI&1!."'"

ACCOUN 1 tI

Page 2

~~ ~~~. ~
t

i..

::

cn ",lO"" p"c "u

01;C

-

-=

-

"'~

$50 . 00

Processed 03/17/09

- ~ ••

.~n ~

.. Uunt.,., .. " ....

Id! l 21,llJlPIl 5"':

.... : '

..

=::~~~

...

,,~

"
:;

1

I
_._
....
---

:;;::~~:=:fJ
It ~~~
_u..-.f" .. :/iC.......
;:;~ ..

,,<:,--:. . -.- ~,.

l14.L.i..).)V.l.I"t
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- - ' --"

~soaOJ

Chi 1644
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ZIONS

Statement of Accounts
Page 1 of2

This Statement: July 9, 2009
Last Statement: June 'j 0, 2009

30-0709

Primar/ Account 422330274

000327001 AV 0.335

For 24-hour account
information, please cootact:

P03273 OS-OOOO-ZFN-l'GOO23-00000
·'AUTO T1 0 1591 83672·120820

EMERSON DWIGGINS
KENNETH LYNN WIGGINS
MAXlNEBYRD
1520W2ND ST
WEISER ID 83672-1208

1-800..78B-BANK (2265)

Welser Office
606 State Street

Welser, ID 83672-1963
WE HAVEN'T FORGOTTEN WHO KEEPS US IN BUSINESS. ®

~f:I"aI:ltl:II.II§N*~_.):jjjlj)jlj!jil:;:;t;ll;;jIm:;:j~;)iijIj;:;;;~;~::::i;~::;;l::::;i:Ii:i:::;':;:::::::i:;:@::!ili::[@'llft:::!l®~zlm:::l:f::t~l!~!l~I:MH:l:::I:::ll:lnri:::~::::~lm::::!i1::::::::m;ll:::::im::m:~I!i.:::i.l:~@~f,:I~I::ll:l:::::::
CheckJngl;~'aVlngs

Account Type
Gold Interest Checking

Account Number
422330274

Previous Balance
78,708.62

DepositslCredits
24.95

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ending SaJance
$78,42.6.57

307.00
..............................

~

...

~

................

Ending Balance
78,426.57

Checks Processed
0.00

ChargeslDebits

.,.~

Outstanding
Balances Owed

~ ...... ~ ...................................................................... ~

. . . . . . . 0;"' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

~

.............

;o. . . .,.~

1 DEPOSlTlCREDIT

Date

Amount

07109

24;95

~~~~G~:=;;;7

Description
·iNTEREST PAYMENT 0007848630
•• ~~ ••••••.••••••....•.•••••••••••...••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••.••.••••••••.••••.•.•...•.....••.••.••••••••••..•••••.•.

06I1~ '"" ('"'..,.::"""~ ••3Q7:eO ":~US

...............

~-.~~

.

SlJRY 303 SOC SEC DOD :*I"*/":,, REF # 124000mi'3842330 1103904774

........ : .........................................................................................................................

.::=~~:.:

-9~..ECKS .,.R.~E[t__.:.-'

,"

-

.'

..:............... .

-

There were no transactions this period.
.............. ............ ........ ...... ............. ........................... * .................. ., .................................. ., ......... ~ ~ .. '" ......... " •• e

. . . . . . . . . ~ " ............ ., ..

~, ...... ,. ....... '• • ., ......... ,. .... ~ ..... - "' .......... ~ .... ~ ... ~ ............ ~ ... ~ ........... " ~ ..... .

DAlLY BALANCES
Date..........................Balance
07109
78,426.57

Date ..........................Ba/ance
06119
78,401.62

...................

~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

" .. e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "

.....................

~ ........... ~

eG5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '

" ......

~ . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . "' ....... ~'*' .... ,.

................ ~ ............. ~ .. ".~ ................... " ..

INTEREST
Interest Earned This Interest Period
Interest Paid Year-To-Date 2009

$24.95
$159.74

Current interest rate is 0.400% with no rate change this interest period

Number Of Days This Interest Peried
Annual PEifOSntage Yield Earned

29

0.400%

Statement of Accounts

ZIONS B

Page 1 of2
This Statement: NovemI:er 10, 2OC9
Last Statement: October 9, 2009

P.o. Box 30709, Salt Lake City. lIT 84l30-0709
\

r---

Primary Account 422330274

I

O~ZfN-I'COO23-00000

F03297

000 3 29401 AVO.335 "AUTO

For 24-hour accoont
informalicn, please ccntact

no 171583672-120820

EMERSON 0 WIGGINS

1-OOO-789-BANK (2265)

KENNETH LYNN WIGGINS
MAXlNE8YRD
1520 W2NOST
WEISER 1083672-1208

11 •• I••• II •• II•• lm Inl.IIIIIIIII.IIIIIIIIII"II.IIIIIII"III
Weiser Office
606 State street
Weiser, ID 83672-1003
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Previous Balance
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1 DEPOSIT/CREDIT
Amount
17.53

Date
11/10

Description
INTEREST PAYMENT 0007849106

..................................................................................... ,. ..........."............................. - .................................................................... .

o CHARGESIDEBITS

There were no transactions this period•

.................................................................................................................... ........ ....................................... ............................... .
"

,

o CHECKS PROCESSED
There were no transactions this period .

..............................................,........................................................................................ ................................................................ .
DAILY BALANCES
Date ..........................Balance
11/10

78,508.59

....................................................................................................................... " ....... ,...... ......................................................... ......... .
INTEREST
.-- .

$17.53
$241.76

Interest Earned This Interest Period
Interest Paid Year-To-Date 2009

Numb ~ Of Days This Interest Peric,(j
Annu.1 Percentage Yl9ld Earned

3:
0.260~

Current interest rate is 0.250%
Interest rate changes this interest period:

Date
10/13

New Interest Rate
0.250%
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C.L "BUTCH" OTIER • GOVERNOR

DIVISION OFMEDICAID
BUREAUOF FINANCIAL OPERATIONS
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, 10 83720·0036
PHONE 208·287·1150
FAX 208·334·6515

RICHARD M. ARMSTRONG· DIRECTOR

March 5, 2009

LYNN WIGGINS
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE
1520 WEST 2ND ST
WEISER, 10 8 3672
Re:

MIO#1242 7 94( S)

Notice of Statutory Claim
Estate of VJVY.aAt"l' WIGGINS; MID# 1242794 (5)

Dear Authorized Representative:
The Department of Health and Welfare (the Department) wishes to extend its condolences at the loss of
your loved one.
The Department hereby gives you notic~ of its claim against the estate m' VIVIAN WIGGINS for
benefits paid by Medicaid, to include all property the decedent had an interest in prior to death. The
Department will not demand payment as long as the remaining spouse surv ;ves; however, demand for
payment will be made against the surviving spouse's estate upon their death.
This claim is based upon the Departmenfs statutory right to recover the amc llnt of medical assistance it
paid on the decedent's behalf as set forth in the Idaho Code, Section 56-218. The Department's claim is
made against the assets in the decedent's estate. You are hereby advised that a lien may be placed against
any real property in this estate. If any of the decedent's property is improp ;!rly sold or distributed, the
Department may pursue legal action to satisfy its claim. For verification of he debt, please submit your
request in writing within thirty (30) days.
Enclosed is a questionnaire you are asked to complete and return within fifiee' l ( 15) working days.
If you have any questions about this Notice of Statutory Claim, please contzct the Estate Recovery Unit
by mail, or by telephone at 1-866-849-3843.

Sincerely,

Estate Recovery Officer
Enclosure
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In re the ESTATE OF Francis E. BARG, a/kJa Francis Edw:lrd Barg.
No. A05-2346.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
May 30, 200K
Rehearing Denied July 21,2008.
[752 N.W.2d 56]

Mille Lacs County Attorney, Melissa M.
Saterbak, Asst. Mille Lacs County Attorney,
Milaca, MN, for appellant Mille Lacs County.

equivalenttoone-haff th.e value of the property.

In re Estate of Barg, 722
[752 N.W.2d 57]

Thomas J. Meinz, Princeton, MN, for
respondent Michael Barg.
Julian 1. Zweber, St. Paul, MN, for amici
curiae Elder Law Section of the Minnesota State
Bar Association and National Senior Citizens
Law Center.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Robin
Christopher Vue-Benson, Asst. Attorney
General, St. Paul, MN, for amicus curiae
Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services.
Heard, considered, and decided by the court
en banco
OPINION

N.W.2d 492, 497 (Minn.App.2006). We affinn
in part and reverse in part.

Factual and Procedural Background.
The parties have stipUlated to the facts in
this case. Uolores J. Barg was bonr ill 1926,
mamed FranciSE. Barg in 1948,. and remained'
married to I:iiin 1IDtil her death m 2004'.JIn 1962·
and 1967, in two Sep2Iate transactions,1:1le Bargs
took title as joint tenants to real property in
Princeton, Minnesota;. 'Their home was located
'on this property. On October 24, 2001, Dolores
Barg entered a nUI1;mg home in Mille Lacs
County, at:first payingfue c.0.stsherself. In
December tZUOl, she applied for long-term
Medicaid lienefits-.,l

MEYER, Justice.
The Mille Lacs County Family Services!
and Welfare Department (County)£1ed ac;1aim
~o-ainst the Estate .of·Francis E- Ilarg:(Estate),
seeking to recover:Medicaid hendits correctly 7
pai<£ on f>elliilf of1li&~eceased~.~~ol<i[ift
Barg. The EstatepartiaITy aUowedthe$im, and
disallowed the other part. i Jh:e -district .. ceomt,
concluding that Dolores Barg's interest jn' the
couple's property was ljIDited hecause~hehad
conveyed it to herhusbandbeforeherdeaili,
evaluated her interest· as a life estate, and upheld
the partial disallowance., The County appealed,
arguing that it was entitled to recovery from the
full value of the property. The court of appeals
reversed and remaIlded,partiallyallowiugtJie
claim and evaluating Dolores Barg's interest in
the property as a jointtemmcyinterest

Anassetassessmem for Dolores Barg was
completed in February 2002~ The' Bargs' marital
·assets .inciudIDg their homestead totaled'
$131,272~().3.!2 Approval for long-term Medicaid
benefits was given retroactive to December l~
2('}():{ •

On February 27, :'2002~ Francis Barg
cexecuted.his will, nominating the couple's son
Michael F. Bargns· personal representative,
leaving :hi&esta1:e.-t(Jhis sumvlng ~scenqaJ;lts,
anel W:ilrillg1l9PlCO ,isioofor biswife: Dolores
Barg tl;ansbredher joint.tenancy interySt in the
l:romestead:property ro Francis Barg on July 2;'
2002,ilIrhen lrerdalrgh.teF.and..guardian .of her.
estate; Barl:>l;rraAnderson, executed a Guardian's
''Deed: -~mJidY'2002, '''Barbari Anderson
dcl:eted Dolo~J3arg's namefrolIl~~S~Qf"
~sii-thecOuPleheld jointly at Bremer Bank.
T

t:..
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There is no allegation that
improper or fraudulent~

thes~

actions were

On January 1, 2(J04~ Dolores Barg died;
having received $10&,413.53 in Medicaid
benefits. At- the time of her death, -assets
belonging to either::::Dolor~ or Francis Barg
included three certificates of deposit; a checking
account,· and an IRA account, aft in the name of
Fiancis fBarg alone; one-certificate of deposit}
payable to the funeral home~for Dolores- Barg's
funeral;
two
vehicles;
together worth
approximately $9;000; the homestead titlea -iri
F£allC:i& Bargs name; valued at $120;800; "and
miscellaneous householrl-good&. and furniture':
AU'of these assets: had been jointly held at some
timeffin::ingth~couple'SS5-year marriage.

On May 27, 2064;, Francis Barg died;'never
having. recci~.MediC3id henefits. on"rUly 30:
2004, the. County HIed a claim a::,oainst FJ'3l1cis·
Bargs estate, r.:king to recover $..10&,413..53,:>
tbe::full amountDalores Barg:. ha.dreceived in
Medicaid benefits.

Michael: Barg dfsaI10wed $44,533'.5Ymthe
claim; "ands allOwed $63';88"0. 1'1re"'CoUlltyi
petitioned for aIr allowance"'ef the' full· claim;
arguing: that1heentire valuec"of the-m:aritaF
property, 1Jotlrthe homestead and the eertificates
~posi1; was subject tu-- its ehrim because
DbioresJ~arg's. jointtenancyinterest ga'Ve'liera"
right to use of the-entire-property. 'Ihe district
CGm:t concluded. that -nolores-. Barg's .interest in
the property at the ti:meofher death waS

-Dolores Barg retained a joint tenancy interest in
the::.homestead at the time of her death. ld. at
497. 'The court vabed that interest as an
oodivided one-half of the property's value,'and
remanded the case tu the district court for a
recalculation of the amount of the claim that was
allowable. Id.
The County pe:itioned for review. The
Estate opposed review but sought conditional
Cross-review on the i~ sue of whether federal law
permits the State to recover at all from a
smviving spouse's est:de. We granted review, as
well as cross-review, and asked for briefing on
whether the Estate had adequately preserved for
review the issue of "whether the county may
recover Medicaid bf~nefits correctly paid on
behalf of a predecea.::;ed spouse from the estate
of a surviving spouse." We granted requests by
the Minnesota Commissioner of Human
Services to file an amicus curiae brief aligned
with the County and to participate in oral
argumene We alsc granted requests by the
ERlerl.aw;:.Sectimkcithe;Minnes01:a,S~Bar

Association and the National Senior Citizens
Law Center to file an amicus curiae brief aligned
with the Estate. Aftu oral argument, we asked
the parties for sUPFlementary briefing on the
relationship of the 2003 and 2005 amendments
of Minn.Stat. § 25613.15, subds. 1 and lc-lk
(2006), to the authority the County argues exists
under Minn.Stat. § 2:56B.15, subd. la (2006) and
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2 (2006), and how
that relationship affects preemption analysis and
the scope of recovery permissible under
Minnesota law.

[752 N.W.2d 58]

Statutory Fram!Work
~nivffi.eIrfto;;a Jjfe£~~, and~upheldthe:partiak
~owance.

eOng:ress:en1l.ct;rl Medicaidirr 1:9.65- as Title

XIX of the Socid Security _Aw to-ensure i
The O:mnty~led. The~~ourt ofappea:l$
~lained. that', based ,-ell fIn re£state':,oj
Qullbe:rg;-a 652 N.W.2d 709 (Minn.App. 2002),

the-- Couniy'sabilityto reoover'agamst: FranciS'
Bargs-:estate was limited. tQ.:Doleres'.s~stm
marital or jointly owned.property at:thetimeoP
herdeath.iBarg, 722 N.W.2d at 496. The-'C0urt
decided -that property: law"'principies: csfl0uldk il
applieEl:ro-.·determine·the-namrem..1hatinterest
a:rui-:that under'fedet:al"law 'and' Giillberg;
t:.

fastcase

medical.care to individuals who. do not have the
resomces to coyer essential medicaIs~:rv:i:res.

Martin ex rel. Hojf v. City of Rochester, 642
N.W.2d 1, 9 (Mm. 2002). ~tedicaid. was'
intended to be the payor of lastreson. ld. The
wcogram:isj¢iatly fund'ed-'Witii·'the states:.as... a:
"cooperatfve-eridef:vor in which the -Federal
GO-vernment provi ies financial assistance ..to'
partic4,>a:til'lg .Statef:- to ,aid .them.- m..imnishing
-2-
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health care to needy-persons. n. Harris v. lvfcRae,

448 U.S. 297, 308, 100 S.Ct 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d
784 (1980). Participating states enact legislation
and rules, incorporate them into state medical
assistance plans, and suomit those plans:tothe·,
U.S. Secretary of Health and. Human: Services
for approvaL~~ U.S.C. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 &
Supp. ill 2003). Afterthis, the states can receive
federal payments. ~ U.S.c. § 1396 (2000).
Each state adminiSters its own f'Cogram within
the federal requiremenis, and the Centers fur
Medicare and Medicaid Services f(CMSt
::rd1TIihister
[752 N.W.2d 59]
the program and approve state plans. Martin,
642 N.W.2d at 9. One of the requirements
imposed on state p~ ~that they must "complY'
wiili the provisions- E>f[~ U.s.c. § B96pJwftlv
respect to lieDS','3djustruentsandreoovmes of
medical assistance correctly paid, ~fers of
assets, and treatment of certain trusts." W2 U.S.c.
§ 1396a(a)(l8) (2000).
r(YTeeeiveMedieaid;'·a:'PersODN.nusL~

n.eectr.

~either,n.ca:tegorically"'· or"mediGa:1ly" .

Estate of Atkinson v. M1nn. Dep't of Hwnan
Servs., 564 N.W.2d 209,210-11 (Minn. 1997). A
person is ~~gorically needy1' if he is eligible
for other speQifiedfederal assistance .pro~
ld at 211. A person is "medically needy" ifhe
incurs medical expenses: that reduceJrisincome .
to roughly .the level of those who are .
categ:oiicaI!yneedy. ld To qualify as medically
needy a person mayhaveincome..»Qimgherfuan ,
a defined threshold.amLmay o'W:!!assets . ofllo~
more: tharr a defined value. ld. Ifihe-assets of a;,;:
Medicaid applica:rit andherspousecexceedthe
qualifying tfrreshOld; they-must "spendjioWli'
their assets lIDtiltlreyo are at or ~below·the
qua:lifYirlg 1:breshold. ld. Ifa;potential Meilicaip
recipienttransfers:. assetsPeiow faikmarket:vame
within a certain periodortime.be:fore.~!ig:ibi1jty,
the:recipient is deellledineligi1Jle;for~1itscfor'
a time period mandatedby:sfutnte. ~ U.S.C. ~
1396p(c) (2000). This provision: prevents people
whO' are not needy trom 15ecommg eligi51efor
Medicaid bytransferringtherr,assetsaw~:y.

r-.

rastcase

"v'hendetermini:lg the eligibility of a
married person to receive Medicaid, states
consider assets of both husband and wife as
available to the spouse requesting benefits. 42
U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c) (21)00). But there are several
provisions in place to protect the community
spouse' from being iJ::apoverished as a result of
.the;'Spend-down of assets needed to qualify the
applicant for Medicaid. See Atkinson, 564
N.W.2d at 211; ~7 U.s.c. § 1396r-5 (2000). The
value of the couple's home is not included
among assets consicered eligible to pay for
medical care. ld § 1396r-5(c)(5); ~2 U.S.C. §
1382b(a)(l) (2000). Too community spouse of a
Medicaid recipient is also entitled to an
allowance of income and assets designated fot
his or her needs that is not considered available
tD pay for the recipiert spouse's medical care. ~~
U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d). Furthermore, the recipient
spouse has the right 10 transfer assets, including
an interest in the }~op1estead, to his or her
community spouse. ~~ U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2).
Medicaid thus balmces the obligation of
community spouses t) contribute to the payment
of medical expenses for their recipient spouses
against .the .accomm )dation of the community
spouse's need to provide fur his or her own
support

Federal Medicc.id Recovery Provisions.
Although it is not applicable to the facts
before us, it is· usefufto start with: the pre-1993
fOOerallaw on. Med~caid recovery, because it is
relied on in the pa rties'arguments '3lldis 'ihe
~)for tJ:re,:ratromle ~:f:seY;era1,~leyant cases.
£rior to. amen<iments,adopted in the Omnibu§
BUdgetReconciliatijn Act (OB.RA) of 1993".the ,
federal Medicaid ·~stated ageneraJ
principle that there Should be TIO recovery of
~rrectlyp:¥dMedi ~d benefits, ·subject
[752 N.W.2d 60]

tp several exceptions; one of wlrich is relevant:

Ilere:

No-. adjustment.oc recQYel)': of any medicale
~ce

correctly paid on behalf of an
individual under be State planPJaY ;be ma4e,
iexcept3

In re Estate of
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****
(B) in the case of any other individual who
was 65 years of age or older when he received
such assistance, from his estate.

(B) In the case 0°&'1 individual who was 55
years of age or older when the indivjduaI
received such medica 1 assistance, the State shall
seek adjustment or recovery from the
individual's estate * * *.

4~ U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(l) (1988): Under this
pre-1993 law, states were allowed, but not
required, to recover Medicaid benefits paid to
recipients 65 or older; and the statute specified
the recovery would be from the recipient's
estate. The statute also provided that this
recovery from the recipient's estate could only
be made after the death of the recipient's'
surviving spouse. Id § 1396p(b)(2) (1988).
Despite this prohibition against recovery before
the death of a surviving spouse, there was no
express mention of recovery from the estate of a
surviving spouse. 'The pre-1993 federal law
contained no definition of "estate."

Id The amenied version of section
1396p(b)(1 )(B) retain.ed the express reference to
recovery
from;he
recipient's
estate.
Furthermore, as was true pre-amendment, this
recovery from the recipient's estate is only
permitted after the death of the recipient's
surviving spouse: "Any adjustment or recovery
under paragraph (1) nay be made only after the
death of the individUf:l's surviving spouse, if any
* * *." ~1 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2) (emphasis
added). And like the pre-1993 version, the
amended f-ederal st:ltute contains no express
atrthorization for, or rreference to, recovery from
a surviving spouse's estate~

Section I 396p(b) was amended as part of
the OBRA amendments of 1993'. Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub.L. No.
103-66, § 13612(a), (c), 107 Stat 312, 627-28
(codified as amended at ~i U.S.C. §
1396p(b)(1), (4) (2000». As amended, the
federal law retained the general proln'bition'
against states attempting to recover lVledicaid
payments correctly paid on be~alf of an
individual, with limited exceptions'. i!~ U.S.C. §
1396p(b) (2000). J3!fIt:'~ifre';:I~J ~en.ts"
change& section f3.96p{b): ms:everat ways. 'First,
they lowered: 1he age:crite.r:!on for~veI"Y:from
~t055~$eoond,.1;hey made recovery .allowecl·
by the. exceptions mandatory rather::t:hap.
,pemllssiye. ;:nm~they addeda..d~~ 0f
"estate~ It. "Which . itself had both lnaIrdatory :.and
permissive. elementS'; As-mnended, the ~enera'l
noniecDvery ru:leandthe.relevan:t e~ceptionre~
as follows:
(1) ~ adjustment or ree<wery ~of any
medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an
individual under the State plan may be made,
except that tIre- State sba1lse€?~ adjustment or
recoverylSof any medical assistance correctly
paid on behalf of·an:fu:diviffil3:t1.mder the State
plan in the case ofthe following individuals:

t:

****

fastcase

'I'Iie f993' amen :nnentsadded a definition.

ofttesta1!e" for purpcses of Medicaid recovery,
with a mandatory pro.V:sion that looks. to stat~
probatela", "3Ild IDl optional provision that
ooth.orizesstat.es to e::::pa:nd the definition beyond
the scope of probate l'a.vv7
gIhe term

"e::;tat~",

with respect to a'

dece3Se<ffudi:vl{fual'~-

(A) shall mclt:de alLreal andpersonai
properly.and.£)t:l:rerlSSets inclnded within the
:_..3'!.-..:.3.. _1 ............. ~.;
defined
lllW¥.ru.u:<U."'· e",F"',ras .' ..
. :t
[752 N.W.2d 61]
f~urposwofState pIPbareJaW; and'

(B) tnayii:tcfnd€; at~t>ptron..of the:$tate; *
* * ahyQthet::reaL andpersf>nal .pr()pergrand '"

ether.assetsin. whi ili .the individual had any

ikgal.tj:tle,.Qf kterestat the tfme'gfdeath (to the
extent of such interest), indudingsnchassets·
eonv.eyed to ~ surv::voT,.'hei:J;, .or.assign of the
deceaSed 'individua r through joint tenancy,
tenancy-ineommoIl, survivorship, life estate;
livingtrust; or other ·arr:mgement.

i%uB..c. ~§C. HI)6p(b)(4Memphasis added).
Under:Ailri£~pr€)v4sit)]l, a~state has the option to
- 4-
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adopt a defInition of "estate" for Medicaid
recovery purposes that includes some assets
which, under ordinary probate law, would not be
part of the Medicaid recipient's estate, because
they would pass immediately to someone else on
the recipient's death. For example, when two
persons hold property in joint tenancy with a
right of survivorship and one dies, the deceased
joint tenant's interest ordinarily passes directly to
tlie surviving joint tenant and is not part of the
probate estate. Under the optional expanded
defInition allowed by federal law, for Medicaid
recovery purposes the interest of a deceased
joint tenant who had received Medicaid would
be included in his estate, ·rather than passing
directly to the surviving joint tenant.
'Minnesota's Medicaid Recovery Laws.
Minnesota has long had a policy of
requiring participants in the Medicaid program
and their spouses to use their own assets to pay
their share of the cost of care during or after
enrollment. Minn. Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1(a)
(2006). To implement this policy, since 1987
Minnesota law has provided for recovery of
Medicaid benefits paid from the estate of a
recipient or the estate of the recipient's surviving
spouse. Minn. Stat. § 256B.15, subd. la
(originally enacted as Act of June 12, 1987, ch.
403, art. 2, § 82, 1987 Minn. Laws 3255, 3347).
As relevant here, subdivision la provides that,
n on the death of the survivor of a married
couple, either or both of whom received medical'
assistance,' * * * the total amount paid for
medical assistance rendered for the person and
spouse shall be fIled as a c1aimagainst the estate
of the {recipient] or the estate of the surviving
, spouse." Id (emphasis added). A claim against
the estate of a surviving' spouse --for medical

o~emay

asSistan"C"e provided to the reC,iPient SP,
\
be made'up to "the value of the assets of the
estate that were marital property' "Or jointly
owned property at any time during the
iage. " Id, subd. 2 (emphasis added).
The broad.estate· reco:veIY authority
contained in subdivisions la and 2 'was
supplemented ill 2003~by-amendments to the"
statute. ~xpanding suh~ion --1,,· and··' adding'

subdivisions 1c-l k. f,ct of June 5, 2003, ch. ] 4,
art. 12, §§ 40-50, 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec.
Sess. 1751, 2205·17. These amendments
implement the optiO!lal expanded defmition of
"estate" authorized il the 1993 amendments to
the federal law. See l,finn.8tat. § 256B.15, Bubd.
1(a)(2) (2006); ~~ U.S.C. § 1396P(b)(4)(B). The
2003 amendments to the Minnesota estate
recovery law modify common law to provide for
continuation of a redpient's life estate or joint
tenancy interest in r 21 property after his death
for the purpose of recovering medical assistance,
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1(a)(3) (2006), and
include that continued interest in the recipient's
estate. Minn. Stat. § 256B.l5, subds. 19, Ih(b),
li(a), Ij. The 2003 amendments also establish
specifIc procedures f)r exercising claims against
these continued life estate and joint tenan9Y
mterests, as well as procedures and waiting
periods that differ according to whether' the
recipienfs spouse, d ~endent children, or other
.;relatives
1

[752 N.W.2d 62]
living-in the homeftead survive the recipient.
Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 14, art. 12, §§ 48-49,
2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1751,2213-17
(codifIed as amended at Minn.Stat. § 256B.15,
subds. Ii and Ij). b:i~ease, the-County filed
·its clai:t:n undersubdivisions fa and 2 and did not
rely on _ provisions added in the 2003
amendments:
The issues pre rented in this case involve
several questions ah)ut the relationship between
the recovery previsions of federal and
Minnesota Medicaid law. The court of appeals
held that a partial disallowance of the County's
claim was proper, mlyng on its earlier decision
in Gullberg that lhe broad authorization in
subdivision 2 for rel~oyery up to the value of all
assets of the estate t hat were marital property or
jointly owned at my rime during the marriage
was partially preempted by the 1993
amendments to the federal law that limit the
expanded estate to ass:ets in which the recipient
spouse 1:J.ad a legalmterest at the time oj her
death Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 595-96 (citing
Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d at 714).

h

fastcase
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The County: and its supporting amicus
curiae the Commissioner of the Department of
Human Services, argue that the court of appeals
was wrong, both here and in Gullberg, in finding
any preemption of the broad estate recovery
authorized in subdivisions la and 2. They
contend that there was nothing in the federal
statute prior to the 1993 amendments that
limited the states' authority to pursue estate
recovery of Medicaid benefits paid, and that the
1991 amendments were intended by Congress to
expand state options, not limit them.
Alternatively; the County argues that even ifl
recovery is limited to the assets in which the
recipient had an interest at the time of her death,
Dolores Barg had an interest in the property
notwithstanding the conveyance to her husband,
and. the court of appeals erred in valuing that
"interest~as ouly one-half the va1ue of the
homestead.

l

The Estate and its supporting amici curiae
counter mat fed~rallaw authorizes recovery only
from a recipient's estate, and Minnesota law thai
allows recovery from a surviving spouse's estate
is therefore preempted.6 The Estate argues that
recovery is also barred because, to the extent
recovery is allowed from the estate of a
surviving spouse, federal law limits that
recovery to the value of assets in which the
recipient had a legal interest at the time of her
<ieath, and subdivision 2 of section 256B.15 is
preempted to the extent it allows broader
recovery. Finally, the Estate argues that there
should re no recovery here because Dolores
Barghad no legal interest
[752 N.W.2d 63]
in the homestead or the certifIcates ofdeposit at
the time of her death, having conveyed her
interest to her husband during her lifetime.

Thus, the issues presented are as follows.
FiTst; does federal law preemptthe mIthorization
irr'Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. la, forrecbverj
ofMedicaid benentspaid for a Tecipientspouse"
from the estate ofthe smviving ~ouse? Second,
iFsuch recovery from a surviving spouse's estate
is; not preempted, doesfederal1aw ·limit .the

r-.
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recovery to-.assets in which the recipient had an
futeresf:if fue time of her death, preempting the
broader recovery 2.l10wed in Minn.Stat §
256B.I5, subd. 2, as to assets owned as m:.rrital
property or in joint t,~nancy at any time during
the marriage? Third, if recovery is limited to '"
assets in which the recipient had an interest at
the time of her deatl:. what, if any, interest did
Dolores Barg have in the homestead or the
certificates of deposit at the time of her death,
and specifically, was the court of appeals correct
in holding that Dolores Barg had a joint tenancy
interest for purpose:;; of estate recovery even
though she transferred that interest to her
husband during her lifetime? We address these
issues in tum, after first reviewing basic
preemption pnnciplef:.
L

Whether federaIT law preempts state law is
primarily an issue)f statutory interpretation,
which we review de novo. Martin, 642 N.W.2d
at 9. The application of law to stipulated facts is
a question of law, which we also review de
novo. Morton Bldgs., Inc. v. Comm'r a/Revenue,
488 N.W.2d 254,257 (Minn.1992).
Congressional purpose is "'the ultimate
touchstone'" of the preemption inquiry. Malone
V. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504, 98
S.Ct. 1185, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978) (quoting
Retail Clerks IntI' Ass'n, Local 1625 v.
Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct 219,
11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963)). Our primary focus in
the analysis must be to ascertain the intent of
Congress. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,280-81, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93
L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). The United States Supreme
Court has explained that "[c]onsideration of
issues arising under the Supremacy Clause
'start[s] with the assl!lllption that the historic
police powers of lhe States [are] not to be
superseded by Federal Act unless that [is] the
1II
clear and manifeEt purpose of Congress.
Cipollone v. Liggetr Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,
516, 112 S.Ct 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992)
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447
(1947)). Thus, preemption is generally
·6·
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disfavored. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 11 (citing
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516, 518, 112 S.Ct.
2608).
Congress may preempt state law in several
ways. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S. at
280, 107 S.Ct. 683. First, it may do so with
express language preempting state law. Id.
Second, it may do so by fully occupying the
field, that is, "congressional intent to pre-empt
state law in a particular area may be inferred
where the scheme of federal regulation is
sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable
the inference that Congress 'left no room' for
supplementary state regulation." Id. at 280-81,
107 S.Ct. 683 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67
S.Ct. 1146). Here, it is clear that Congress
neither expressly preempted state law nor so
completely occupied the field as to leave no
room for state action, because the Medicaid
program specifically permits and even requires
action by participating states. Martin, 642
N.W.2d at 11.
The third kind of preemption is at issue in
this case. Even when Congress
[752 N.W.2d 64]

has not chosen to displace state-Iaw expressly or
by:fully occupying the field, "reaeral law may
nonetheless pre-empt state law to the extent it
actually conflicts with :federaf law." Cal. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 281, 107 S.Ct.
683. Conflict preemption. occurs when
compliance with both state and federal laws is
imposSIole, Fla. Lime Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10
L.Ed.2d 248 (1963),-'Or when the state law is "an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct.
399,85 L.Ed. 581 (1941).

n.
We now turn to the question of whether
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1a, which requires
Medicaid recovery against the estate of a
Surviving spouse,"is preempted by federal law,
particularly
U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l)(B).
h
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Because only con'lict preemption may be
applicable, we set k to determine whether
compliance with boo h statutes is impossible or
whether the state la 101 stands as an obstacle to
accomplishment of The purposes of the federal
law.
The County s.~eks recovery here under
subdivision la of section 256B.15, which
authorizes-indeed
requires-recovery
of
Medicaid benefits nom the estate of the
surviving spouse 0 f a recipient. The Estate
argues that this state law authorization to recover
from the estate of the surviving spouse is
preempted because i< conflicts with 4:2 U.S.C. §
1396p(b)(1), whie!. prohibits recovery of
correctly paid Medic lid benefits except from the
estate ofthe recipien: of the benefits.
<

The federal statute- establishes a general,
teC€}very ef correctly paid
Medicaid benefitS; subject to three speemed
exceptions:
pmhibition~oainst

(1) No adjustment or recovery of any
medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of
an individual under rhe State plan may be lnade,
except that the Stat~-sha:ll seek adjustment or
~recovery of any medical assistance cor:.ectly
paid on behalf of ru: irdividual under the State
plan inthe<(!;(,[Se €)fth?followingindivid1l£iJ.,s:
U.S.C. § 1396J:(b)(1) (emphasis acded).
0:n:ly-oneexceptienporentiaUy ~pplies t,5) theeircumstanceofthis ·~ase:
(B) In the case of an individual who vvas 55
years of age or ddet when the individual
received such medicli assistance, the-State shall,seek adjustment or-recovery from the
.iNdividual's estate· * .~ *.
Id. § 1396p(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
Because this express exception to the general
rule against recov!~ry of Medicaid benefits
directs that recovery come from the recipient's
estate and makes n D reference to a surviving
spouse's estate, the Estate argues that recovery
from the surviving s:)ouse's estate is not allowed
under federal law. llee:ause- -exceJ!)tions tea
gerreral statement orpolicy are to be construed.7·
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narrowly, Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739,
109 S.Ct. 1455, 103 L.Ed.2d 753 (1989), it
appears on its face that recovery from the
surviving spouse's estate is not permitted by
federal law.
Two courts have agreed with this analysis
and concluded that section 1396p(b)(1 XB)
authoriZes recovery only from the recipient's
estate and does not allow recovery from the
estate of a surviving spouse. Hines v. Dep't of
Pub. Aid, 221 Ill.2d 222, 302 IlLDec. 711, 850
N.E.2d 148, 152~53 (2006); In re Estate of
Budney, 197 Wis.2d 948, 541 N.W.2d 245, 246
(1995), rev. denied 546 N.W.2d 471 (Wis.
1996). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals
'explained that the federal statute never
"counter[ed] the initial blanket prohibition"
[752 N.W.2d 65]
on recovery by authorizing recovery from the
surviving spouse's estate. Budney, 541 N.W.2d
at 246. The TIlinois Supreme Court noted thaf
under federal and nlinois law, the state had
authority to seek reimbursement from the
recipient's estate after the death of bis surviving
spouse. Hines, 302 TIl.Dec. 711, 850 N.E.2d at
153. But instead, as here, the state sought
recovery from the estate of the surviving spouse.
Id. The court explained that federal law allows
only three exceptions under· which a state may
seek reimbursement and '''[a]ll are specifically
directed .to the estate of the recipient. ~:o
provision- is made for collection from-the-"e:state
of the. recipient's spouse." Id The court declined
to add to the unambiguous language of the
federal statute or to recognize exceptions beyond
those specified in ffie federallaw. Id
The Commissioner argues that Hines and
Budney were wrongly decided, misinterpreting
the federal statute, particularly in light of the
presumption against preemption. The County
contends that this statutory exception to the
nonrecovery principle allows recovery generally
against individuals who received benefits after
age 55, and does not narrowly limit the sources
of recovery. The County asserts that the
reference to the individual's estate is merely a

designation of the timbg for recovery mther

than a limit on the s ;ope of recovery, because
the language does n·)t say that the state may
recover "only" from the individual's estate. The
County argues that, a'Jsent such express limiting
language, and applying me presumption against
preemption, section 1396p(b)(1)(B) merely
specifies one potentill source of recovery, the
recipient's estate, ane does not preclude others,
such as a spouse's estate.

In our view, the p~ain language of section
1396p(b)(1 )(B) comI= orts far more closely with
the interpretation of the lllinois Supreme Court
in Hines than with t1: e County's expansive view
of the anthority ill parted by that provision.
Moreover, we know of no court that has adopted
~ounty's broad v:ew' of that language alon~
Indeed, in expla~: the then-exisring law in a'
report on proposed CBPA amendments::in1993,
a"lt'duse Report referred only ro--tbe possibility
ofrecovery from the estate- of the- recipient; even"
when-describing recovery after the death of a
surviving spouse:
Under current bLw, a State nag-the option of
seeicIDg recovery of amounts correctly paid oI1'
behatFoftm fudi-vfaual under its Medicaid
program from the indiVidual's estate if the
individual was 65 ye:rrs or older at the time he or
she received Medicaid benefits. The State may
not seek recov:e:ry from the beneficiary's estate
pntiLthe death of the surviving spouS~, if any,
and only if the indiv'dual has no surviving minot
or disabled
child.
...

~.,..

~ -.~;

,

;ffiR.Rep. No. lO':;,~Xg, at 208 (1993), as.
reprinted frr 1993" ·mi~qC.A.N. 3:1&, 535
(emphasis added). In contrast, describir:.g the
proposed 1993 amendments to the Medicaid
recovery law passed by the House, t:bfLsame,
Hwre Rep&rt--statecr mat newly-required state
estate recovery programs would have to
"provide for the collection of the amounts
correctly paid by Medicaid on behalf of the
individual for long· term care services from the
estate of the individual:. o'rlhe-S1ifRJiringYJX!llS€."
Id. 1'1ilis;"wnen. .the:llouse--wanted: to dL'Scribe
-;:;: ,., • •
'j
..
recovery from the'- SW::VWlllg spO.1,!Se s estate, .It'
C::said.so,clearly.

h
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Nevertheless, despite the seemingly plain
ianguage providing only for recovery from the
recipient's estate, we acknowledge that several
courts have interpreted tf1e federal recovery
provisions to allow recovery from the estate of a

surv1Vmg

recipient "had any legal title or h"1terest in cJ the
time of death," it is a matter of little moment
whether the department seeks to recover the
benefits paid by filing a claim in the estate <-1 the
recipient after the death of the recipient's
survtving spouse or by filing a t;}aim in the
surviving spouse's esrate.
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spouse. TIle courts reaching this conclusion have
for tf1e most part relied on the 1993 amendments
to the federal law that allow the states to adopt
an expanded definition of estate for purposes of
Medicaid recovery. For example, the New York
Court of Appeals explained, in dicta, that
although federal law did not expressly provide
for recovery of Medicaid payments from the
"secondarily dying spouse's estate," the 1993
amendments gave the states power to recover
against the spouse's estate for certain categories.
of assets. In re Estate of Craig, 82 N.Y.2d 388,
604 NY.S.2d 908, 624 N.E.2d 1003, 1006
(1993). The North Dakota Supreme Court
agreed with the Craig interpretation that the
1993 expanded estate provision gave the states
the option to recover against a surviving
spouse's estate assets conveyed through joint
tenancy or right of survivorship. In re Estate of
Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 847, 850 (N.D. 1998).
Indeed, the court in Thompson rejected the
ruling in Budney that recovery against a
surviving spouse's estate is not allowed under
federal law on the basis that the Budney court
had not considered the optional expanded
definition of "estate." Thompson, 586 N.W.2d at
850. The North Dakota court jIDncluded that
"consideration of all the relevant statutory
provisions, in light of the Congressional purpose
to provide medical care for the needy, reveals a
legislative intention to allow states to trace the
assets of recipients of medical assistance and
Iecover the benefits paid when the recipienfs
surviving spouse di~s. n Id. at 851. The court
explained that, under the circumstances, it made
difference whether recovery was from one
,estate orthe other. .

no

Because the expansive federal definition of
"estate" in
U.S.C_ § 1396p(b)(4) extends only;
to assets in whichthe medical assista.nre:henefits

c.
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Id. n. 3 (emphasis added). Finally, in IdahQ
Department of Healt~ ~71d Welfare v.Jackman,
132 Idaho 213, 970 P2d 6, 9-10 (1998), the
Supreme Court of Ua110 also ruled that some
recovery of Medicaid benefits could be made
from the estate of a Slli-vlving spouse, but held
that such recovery was preempted by federal law
except to the extent c f assets that had been in the
recipient's estate as defined by state probate law.
TIie8'e courts provi~ little explanation: for
their _~c::o!1ciusions tl:at the statutory language'
expressly mentioning recovery only from the
recipient's estate also allows recovery from the
surviving spouse's estate. We infer that the
courts viewed the authority to recover from
assets that were part of the recipient's estate after
the death of the survivng spouse to fairly imply
authority to recover those assets from the
surviving spouse's estate to which they had
passed on the deatl. of the recipient. 1» other,'
wordS, to the exteJt assets in the _surviving
sponse's-estate aretb ere because they had pass~,
ill the surviving spouse from the estate of the
recipient, recovery from those assets in the
.surviving spouse's e:ltate is, in essence, recovery
from the recipient's (:st:.te.

TIi6-Nlnth eiro lit C~of, Appeals appea+s
trrhavemade .a si:nnnrnnspoken inference in:
assessing,_preemptIoR -of €:dif~Medi~
reco:v:~@~i!;t~o,cases. Bucholtz v. Belshe,
114 F.3d 923 (9th Cir.1997); Citizens Action
League v. Kizer, 887 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir.1989),
cert. denied, 494 US 056, 110 S.Ct. 1524, 108
L.Ed.2d 764 (1990). In both cases, the
[752 N.W.2d 67]

N"'m.th=,;Circmt addressed whefuerCa:li£)fnia!s
Medicaid .recovery law was preempted bYPI;e1993.amendment federal law. Tae California
;tawaHowedihestate to seek recovery nf>t only
·9·
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from the estate of the deceased Medicaid
recipient, but II' against any recipient of the
property of that decedent by distribution or
survival.'" Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1005 (quoting CaL
Welf. & Inst.Code § 14009.5 (West
Supp.1989». Thus, California law allowed the
state to trace assets of the deceased Medicaid
recipient and seek reimbursement from the
recipients of those assets.

In Kizer the plaintiffs were individuals who
had owned property in joint tenancy with·"3.
Medicaid recipient and had succeeded to
ownership by right of survivorship upon the
death of the Medicaid recipient. Id. at 1005. To
determine whether California's claimed right of
recovery from these surviving joint tenants was
inconsistent with federal law, the court looked to
section 1396p(b)(l)(B), which, as discussed
above, provided the general prohibition against
recovery with the exception for individuals who
were 65 years old when they received assistance.
Id. at 1006. The Ninth Circuit noted that the
federal statute proVlaed only for recovery from
the individual's "estate," and in the absence of a
federal statutory definition of estate, looked to
common law for the meaning of the tenn. Id. at
1006. The court held that an "estate" under
common law did not include properi¥ heldm
joint tenancy at death, and therefore the
California law that allowed recovery agairist
such property went beyond the recipient's estate
and was too broad. Id. at 1008. The court in
Kizer did not expressly address the issue of
whetfier assets within the definition of "estate"
couId only be reached bya claim against the
recipient's estate, or. whether federal law would
permit the state to follow those assets and make
the. claim against a surviving joint tenant-or, as
here, a surviving spouse.
Several years later, still applying pre-1993
federal law, the N'mth Circuit 3.oaain addressed a
preemption challenge to the same broad
California Medicaid recovery provision.
Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 924. At issue in Bucholtz
was application of the state recovery law to
assets of Medicaid recipients that ,had 'beel}
subject to three forms of joint interests: iOier
vivos trusts, tenancy in common, ~~

COIlli"1lunity property. Id. at 924. 'The court
applied the Kizer prir ciple that "'use of the word
"estate" in the [federal] recoupment provision
limits a state's rec )very to property which
descends to the recipient's heir or the
beneficiaries of the recipient's will upon death,'"
id at 925 (quoting lI1zer, 887 F.2d at 1005), to
each of the forms of;hared interest at issue, The
court concluded that, tke the joint tenancy in
KiZer, property heldn an inter vivos trust is not
part of the deceden~s estate under California
connnon law, and therefore was not part of the
estate subject to reccvery under the federal law.
Id. at 926. In contnst, the court explained, a
decedent's interest in property held irr tenancy in
connnon or commurrity property is ,subject to
disposition and administration as part of the <
decedent's estatenndet' C3li:forma law. Id at
926-27. The Ninth Cir:;w conclnded not only
that the decedent's iateresf mpr-operty held in
tliore- f()Bl1S.:was,smtlect 'ilJ. recovery- under,the
federal law; .aut ~tl.so held; albe:iLwithout
~lanation; tiJ::J.'t;teC1:lVe1Y could be sought from"
the fieirs or-beneficiaries; whoreceiv.ed that
,:property:< "[California] may,ftowever; pursue'
penplewho recefipd propertY' held by the
decedent in the forni·of tenancy in common or
Qffimnunitypropert:'." Id. at 928 (emphasis
added). ,Like other courts, the. Ninth Circuit
seems to nave i:nIerrea 1hat the federal laws
¢er:enceto recovery from the Medicaid
~ient's "estate" conferred
[752 N.W.2d 68]
authority to follow the assets' from that estate
and recoverthem from the-people who received
,the property.
~;::fu:e comts'that ha.veconSlaeredtbet'
issne.'~ split on tle question of wheth,er the

narrow reference In section 1396p(b)(1) to
recovery from the estate of the Medicaid
recipient allows rec overy only through a direct
claim against that e:;tate, or whether recovery is
also allowed from those who received covered
assets from the Medicaid recipient's estate,
including the estate of a surviving spouse. Were,,"
this ,an tmii:nar)' t}Uestien ,of st2ttutory'
inrerpreta1io~ we- woold conclude that the plain '

h

fastcase

10 -

in re Estate of Barg. 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn., 2008)

language of the federal statute provides only for
recovery against the Medicaid recipient's estate,
as the Illinois court persuasively reasoned in
Hines. But we are influenced by the principle
that preemption of state laws is disfavored,
combined with the fact that allowing recovery
against a surviving spouse's estate is consistent
with both the federal provision precluding
recovery from the Medicaid recipient's estate
until after the death of a surviving spouse as well
as with the purposes of the federal legislation. 7
These additional considerations lead us to
conclude that the split in authority, in these
particular circumstances, illustrates sufficient
ambiguity about the intent of the federal estate
recovery language that we cannot say that
Minnesota's requirement in Minn.Stat. §
256B.15, subd. la, to seek reimbursement from
the estate of a surviving spouse conflicts with
federal law such that it is preempted.
Accordingly, we hold that federal law does
not preclude all recovery from the estate of a
surviving spouse, and the authorization in
subdivision la to make a claim against the estate
of a surviving spouse is therefore not preempted.
The question remains whether federal law limits
the scope of recovery against the estate of a
surviving spouse and, in particular, whether that
recovery may reach all property previously held
by the Medicaid recipient spouse either as
marital property or jointly with the surviving
spouse during the marriage, as allowed by
Minn.8tat. § 256B.15, subd. 2.

m.
We tum to a determinationDf whether the
scope of recovery from a surviving spouse's
estate allowed under Minnesota law is consistent
with federal law. Subdivision 2 of Minn.Stat. §
256B.15 allows the state to recover from a
survivingspouse's-estafe "t:Ire value ofthe· assets
of the estate that were marital property'orjointly
owned: property at any timedztring tlie
marriage. " (Emphasis added.) The County
argues that this broad estate recovery authority
does not conflict with federal law because the
pre-1993 version of section 1396p(b) should be
construed broadly and the 1993 amendments

fastcase
"

were intended to expand, not restrict, state estate
recovery authority. In asserting this
[752 N.W.2d 69]
argument for broad e!ltate recovery authority, the
County emphasizes that it is consistent with the
dual goals of federal law of recouping Medicaid
expenses to make REsistance available to more
qualifYing
reclpleats,
while
protecting
community spouses from pauperization during
their lifetimes. The Estate argues that, because
section 1396p(b)(1) 21l0WS recovery only from a
recipient's estate and section 1396p(b)(4) allows
expansion of the est2:te only to include assets in
which the recipient had an interest at the time of
death, the "any tim.e during the marriage"
recovery allowed by subdivision 2 is preempted.
The County's argument would take us too
far down the path of favoring the purpose of the
<law at the expense of the plain meaning of-its
-language. SignificaU'Jy, no court has embraced
the County's argume:at that the pre-1993 federal
law authorized recovery from a surviving
spouse's estate of as~ets that were jointly owned
dnring the marriag ~ but transferred by the
recipient spouse prior to her death. Indeed, of
tliecourts that have interpreted federal law tD
allow direct claiI:m against the estate of a
surviving spouse, only one has construed that
authority to exter.d to assets that were
fransferredbefore tie death of the Medicaid
recipient, and that CCl'lTtrelied on language from
the-1993 amendrnen::s to support that extension,
See In re Estate of Wirzz, 607 N.W.2d882, 88586 (N.D.2000).
Olheret:>urts-tflIlthaverecognized authority
t&TeCOVertrom :a SOl lI'Ceotherthanthe Medicaid~
recipient's eStatehavecons1:rned that authority to
~chj)nly assets in which the Medicaid
recipient had an inte rest at the .time of heL death,
fu.at is, assets which were p~ of the recipient's.
e$teas definedby traditional state probate law
0I7)inclllded, in' the estate under an expanded
defuritionallowed by the 1993 amendments to
federnFlaw. ) See 13t.:choltz, '114 F.3d at 925-27
(.lim:i1:l:Q:gr-eeovery~:o assets :th1ltyv;ere .part of
recipient's:estafe a;; defined by state probate
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law); Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1006 (same); Jackman,
970 P.2d at 8-10 (holding that recovery from
surviving spouse's estate allowed by Idaho
Medicaid recovery statute is limited by federal
law to assets that were part of the Medicaid
recipient's estate as defined under state probate
law); Thompson, 586 N.W.2d at 851 n. 3
(recognizing that "expansive defmition of
'estate' in [section] 1396p(b)(4) extends only to
assets in which the medical assistance benefits
recipient 'had any legal title or interest in at the
time of death"'); see also In re Estate of Smith,
No. M2005-0141O-COA-RJ-CV, 2006 WL
3114250 at *4 (Tenn.CLApp. Nov.l, 2006)
(explaining that courts that have allowed
recovery against estates of surviving spouses
have required that recipient had interest in assets
at time of death).
Similarly, in relying on the 1993
amendments as authority for recovery from a
surviving spouse's estate, our court of appeals
acknowledged that the 1993 amendments limit
the assets subject to recovery to those in which
the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the
time of her death. See Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d at
714 (holding that Minn.StaL § 256B.15, subd. 2,
authorization to reach assets that were marital
property or owned jointly at any time during the
marriage, is partially preempted by federal law
limitation to assets in which recipient had
interest at time or death). And the court of
appeals acknowledged that limitation again in
this case. Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 496 ("After
Gullberg, the state's ability to recover was
limited to the recipient's interest in marital er
jointly owned property at the time of the
recipient's death.").
As noted above, the only decision to
deviate from this limiting principle requiring
[752 N.W.2d 70]
an interest at the time of death is Wirtz:.
Although the North Dakota court had
acknowledged in its earlier Thompson decision
that recovery allowed under section 1396p(b) is
limited to assets in which the Medicaid recipient
had an interest at the time of death (indeed that

was the basis on which the court rationalized
allowing recovery fr.;)m the surviving spouse's
estate), 586 N.W.2d at 851 n. 3, the court held in
Wirtz that any assets conveyed by the Medicaid
recipient to his spouse before his death were
subject to recovery from the surviving spouse's
estate, 607 N.W.2d at 886. The court stated that
limiting recovery under section 1396p(b) to
"assets in the surviving spouse's estate that the
Medicaid recipient had legal title to and
conveyed through joint tenancy, tenancy-incommon, survivorship, life estate, or living
trust" would ignore the words "interest" and
"other arrangement" in the federal law. Wirtz,
607 N.W.2d at 885. Concluding that the words
"interest" and "other arrangement" are
ambiguous, the court relied on the Congressional
intent it perceived "to allow states a wide
latitude in seeking Medicaid benefit recoveries. "
Id. at 885-86. The court did not explain why the
same purpose acknowledged in Thompson was
consistent with the limitation to recovery from
assets in which the recipient had an interest at
the time of death, y.;:t also justified abandoning
that limitation in Wil'lz.
We cannot agree that the "other
arrangement" language in the 1993 amendment
is ambiguous in the .sense implied in Wirtz. The
plain meaning of "other arrangement," read in
the context of section 1396p(b)(4), is
arrangements other than those expressly listed
that also convey assets at the time of the
Medicaid recipient's death.
We return agnin to the language of the
federal statute. The l'ederal optional defmition ef
"estate" allows inclnsionof
any other remand personal property and
other assets in which the individuaf had any
iegal title or interest at the time of death' (to the
extent of such interest), including such assets
conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the
deceased individual through joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate,
living trust, or other arrangement.
~<~ U.S£.

§ 1396p(b)(4)(It) (emphasis
added). The "including" clause further describes

t:.
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the assets that a state may include in this
expanded estate. The clause describes those
assets in two ways-first by the limiting
adjective "such," and second by the language
describing how and to whom "such assets" are
"conveyed." The "such" limitation plainly refers
back to the immediately preceding clause
describing the assets as those "in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the
time of death." The including clause then
describes to whom "such" assets may have been
conveyed-a "survivor, heir, or assign of the
deceased individual." fd (emphasis added). And
fmally, the clause describes several methods by
which the conveyance of "such" assets might
take place - "through joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or
other arrangement." fd
Inclusion in the list of examples of "such
assets" is predicated on the recipient having it
legal interest at the time of death. When we
construe a federal statute we must, if at all
posswle, give effect "to every word Congress
used." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,
339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). TO'
read "other arrangement" to include a lifetime
transfer would be to read the words "at the time
of death" out of the statute. The conclusion that
"other arrangement" cannot
[752 N.W.2d 71]

~

include lifetime transfers is further supported by
the additional context. "[O]ther arrangement~t
ends a list of examples of conveyances that
occur at the time of death. The list of recipients
of the conveyance, "a survivor, heir, or assign of
the deceased individual, " leaves no doubt that
the "individual," a Medicaid recipient, must
have died for the conveyance to occur. A
recipient cannot have heirs or survivors during
his or her lifetime. Nor can there be an "assign
of the deceased" during the recipient's lifetime.
In light of the plain statntory language and its
context, the conclusion of the Wirtz court that
"other arrangementff is sufficiently ambiguous tD
include lifetime transfers is unreasonable.

h
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We conclude that there is no principled
basis on which to interpret the federal law to
allow recovery of as:;ets in which the Medicaid
recipient did not have an interest at the time of
her death. As explained above, the rationale for
finding authority to recover from a surviving
spouse's estate at all emanates from the authority
granted in the federal law to recover from the
"estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property
transferred prior to death would not be part of
tberecipient's estate. Further, as recognized by
every decision except Wirtz, to the extent the
1993 amendments nllow states to expand the
definition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery
purposes, the langua!~e of the federal law clearly
limits that expansion to assets in which the
recipient had an inter est at the time of her death.
Accordingly, we hold that Minn.Stat. § 256B.15,
subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent that
it authorizes recovery from the surviving
spouse's estate of assets that the recipient owned
as marital property or as jointly-owned property
at any time during the marriage. To be
recoverable, the assets must have been subject to
an interest of the M;ldicaid recipient at the time
~f her death.

IV.
This brings us to the .,question of whether
Dolores Barg had allY interest in property at the
time her deafb:that would allow the County to
make a claim' against the estate uf her 'SUrViving
spouse, despite her t:rnnsfer of her joint interest
in the property prier to her death. As we have
noted, the court of appeals acknowledged the
interest-at..:time-of-d:>ath .,limitation cOn :spousai
estaterecovery,but nevertheless found that for
these purposes Doleres retained a joint tenancy
i,nterest at the time of her death that made the
value of that interest recoverable from Francis's
estate. Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 496, 497.
Eschewing reference to either marital property
law or probate law to determine the nature of
any interest at the time of death, the court of
appeals looked to st mdard real property law and
Gullberg in decidilg that Dolores retained a
joint tenancy intere:;t. fd. at 496-97. We do not
agree.

of
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The court of appeals determined that
Dolores retained a joint tenancy interest in the
property based on its understanding that the
court in Gullberg had recognized a continuing
joint tenancy interest because the lifetime
transfer was an It other arrangement," and
because the court apparently understood section
1396p(b)(4) to "explicitly allowD a state to
broaden the definition [of estate] beyond the
meaning used in probate law and to include
joint-tenancy interests that have been previously
conveyed to a spouse." Id. at 497. Section
1396p(b)(4) cannot be construed to include
lifetime transfers of property in the phrase "other
arrangement" because the plain language and the
context require that phrase to be limited to
conveyances occurring upon the death of the
recipient. For that reason, we cannot
[752 N.W.2d 72]

defmition of estate beyond probate law. See
Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 497. We therefore agree
that real property law principles, informed by
principles of probate law, should be the basis for
ascertaining any interests at the time of death.
Any interest recognized must be consistent with
the underlying fOlmdational rationale that
recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is
allowed only because of its relationship to the
recipient's estate, iTem which federal law
expressly allows recovery. With those principles
in mind, we caution that for an interest 10 be
traceable to and reeoverable from a surviving
,spouse's estate, the: interest must be (1) an
,interest recognized by law, (2) which the
MediCaid recipient held at the time of death, and
(3) that resulted in a eonveyance of an interest of
some value to the surviving spouse that occurred
as a result of the recipient's death. Further, to the
extent the interest is not part of the standard
probate estate, Minnesota law must have

agree with the court of appeals' characterizati0TI

expanded the definition of estate to include the

of section 1396p(b)(4) as allowing the expanded
definition of estate to include "previously
conveyed" joint tenancy interests. The language
of section 1396p(b)(4) requires that any interest
included in the expanded estate must be one in
which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at
the time of her death, not one that was
previously conveyed. We conclude that Dolores
did not retain a joint tenancy interest in the
property at the time of her death, because that
interest was effectively and legally transferred
before her death.

interest, as authorized by section 1396p(b)(i:~).

The question remains whether Dolores had
any other interest in the property at the time of
her death that may be considered part of an
expanded estate for recovery purposes under
Minnesota law. We agree with the court of
appeals that courts should not look to marital
property law to find such an interest, because the
statute in which marital property is defined
limits the definition to the purposes of that
chapter. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subds. 1, 3b
(2006);8 see Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 496. Similarly,
we agree that the recognizable interests at the
time of death cannot be limited to those defined
by probate law, because the purpose of section
1396p(b)(4) is to allow states to expand the

Dolores's joint ownership in the homestead
and certificates of deposit no longer existed~
the: time of her death. No other recognizable
intere&t has been identified.
The County argues that the reference to
marital property in subdivision 2 reflects the
Minnesota legislature'S intent to make all marital
property subject to spousal estate recovery. But
subdivision 2 makes no reference to an interest
at ihe time of death or 10 re-defining the probate
estate to include all marital propertY, even
l'roperty transferred prior to death. This is not
surprising because subdivision 2 was enacted
,long before the optional estate definition
auihority was added to federal law.
The district court indicated that because
Dolores was married to Francis even after the
transfer of her intf:rest in the homestead, she
retained some intfrest in the property. But
whatever that interest, it dissipated at Dolores's
death, rather than resulting in transfer of an
interest of value'to francis,.

~
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We conclude that Dolores had no interest in
assets at the time of her death that were part of a
probate estate or an expanded estate defmition
pennissible under federal law, and therefore
there is no

752 N.W.2d 52

need to enact the 2003 amendments to reach
those assets in the caSt! of a recipient who leaves
a surviving spouse. The parties apparently agree
that the 2003 amendments do not apply to or
influence this case, fer reasons that are not clear
to us.

[752 N.W.2d 73]
basis for the County's claim against the estate.
Finally, we note that in 2003 the Minnesota
legislature amended section 256B.15 by
extending the definition of estate for Medicaid
recovery purposes to include assets owned by a
recipient spouse in joint tenancy or life estate at
the time of her death. Act of June 5, 2003, ch.
14, art. 12, §§ 40-50, 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec.
Sess. 1751, 2205-2217 (codified as amended at
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subds. 1, lc-lk). The
amendments do not mention the other forms of
conveyance at death listed in the federal
definition of "estate," except that the "right of
survivorship" is mentioned with respect to joint
tenancies.ld subds. 1(a)(6), 19, Ih(b). Thus, the
legislature chose only to include two fonns of
ownership in the expanded definition of estate.
Also, as provided in the federal law, the
inclusion of joint tenancy and life estate interests
in the recipient's estate is expressly limited to
interests the recipient owned at the time of
death. Minn.Stat § 256B.l5, subds. Ih(b)(2),
li(a). The amendments further limit the scope of
recovery by exempting from the reach of
subdivisions Ic through lka "homestead owned
of record, on the date the recipient dies, by the
,recipient and the recipient's spouse as joint
tenants with a right of survivorship." Minn.Stat.
§ 256B.15, subd. l(a)(6). In 2005, the legislature
.retroactively made the provisions continuing life
estates and joint tenancies effective only for life
estate and joint tenancy interests created on6r
after August 1, 2003. Act of July 14, 2005, 1st
Spec. Sess., eh. 4, art. 7, 2005 Minn. Laws 2454,
2649 (codified at Minn.Stat § 256B.15, subd.
l(c)).
It is difficult to discern the intended reach
of the 2003 amendments. 9 IFthec;pr~{)03, ·law
allowed ·recovery againsttlJe ~ving spouse's
estate as argued by the Comity,·· there was lirtle

"-
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It suffices to S;2;y that even if the 2003
amendments were applicable, they would
provide no basis for the County's claim. The
new subdivision l:i specifically applies to
circumstances in which a Medicaid recipient
against whom a recovery claim could otherwise
be filed is survived by a spouse. Minn.Stat. §
256B.15, subd. li(b). That subdivision provides
procedures for filing a claim without making a
recovery until the death of the surviving spouse.
Id., subd. 1(f). If this subdivision were to be
applied to this case:. several limitations would
preclude recovery. Dolores Barg, the recipient,
owned no life estate or joint tenancy interest at
the time of her death. If she had owned a joint
tenancy at the time of her death, it would have
been a homestead owned of record by her and
her spouse as joint tenants with a right of
survivorship, and thus exempted from the reach
of subdivision Ii. ld, subd. 1(a)(6). Finally, that
joint tenancy was established in the 1960s, well
before August 1,2003.

In summary, we bold that federal law does
Hot preempt all Medicaid recovery from sJPousal
estates, and Minn. Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1a, is
therefore not preempted to the extent it allows
claims against the e::;tate of a surviving spouse of
a Medicaid recipient. However, the allowable
scope~ of spousal estate recovery is limited.
Subdivision 2 of section 256B.15 is preempted
to tlJe extent that it allows recovery from assetS
in which the deceas'~d Medicaid recipient did not
have a legal interest at the time of death, and to
[752 N.W.2d 74]
the extent that it J)ermits recovery beyond the
extent of the recipitmt'sinterest. Finally, we hold
that Dolores Barg lIad no interest in property at .
tlIe tirrre of her de.; th that can form the basis for i

recovery againsttheestate.ofFrancis.Bar~,
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We have concluded that the County's claim
for full recovery against all the assets in Francis
Bargs estate was preempted by federal law
because recovery is limited to assets in which
Dolores had an interest at the time of her death,
but the question of the appropriate remedy
remains, because the County argues that the
Estate waived the right to deny the claim in its
entirety. Although we have decided as a matter
of law in our preemption analysis that the state is
preempted from requiring reimbursement from
assets in a spouse's estate in which the recipient
spouse had no interest at the time of her death,
that does not resolve the remedy issue here.
Although a state may not compel payment from
a spouse's estate beyond the scope authorized by
federal law, feneraI preemption does not
preclude an estate from voluntarily paying all or
part of a claim that could not be compelled.
Here, the Estate only partially disallowed'
the County's claim; thus -allowing the remainder
of the claim. Minnesota Statutes § 524.3-806(a)
(2006) provides that, on petition of the personal
representative after notice to the claimant, the
court may "for cause shown permit the personal
representative to disallow" a previously-allowed
claim. But the personal representative made no
such request here. When questioned at the
hearing in district court whether the personal
represent.ative was challenging the entire claim
of the County, the representative affirmed that
he was challenging only the part already
disallowed. When the district court affirmed that
partial disallowance and the County appealed,
the Estate did not file a notice of review in the
court of appeals to challenge the implicit award
to the County of the allowed part of its claim. A
respondent who does not file a notice of review
to challenge an adverse ruling of the district
court waives that issue in the court of appeals.
See Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 106; Ford v. Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. RR Co., 294
N.W.2d 844, 845 (Minn. 1980). Having partially
allowed the County's claim and having then
failed to properly seek a reversal of that
allowance in both the district court and court of
appeals, the Estate will not be permitted to seek
that relief for the first time in this court.

Accordingly, th,~ decision of the court of
appeals is affmned in part and reversed in part.
The court's denial of the County's claim for full
recovery is affirmed., The court's remand for an
award to the County based on the existence of a
joint tenancy interest is reversed. The matter is
remanded to the d.istrict court for entry of
judgment based on the partial allowance made,
but not subsequently ,~hallenged, by the Estate.
Affmned in par; and reversed in part.
ANDERSON, PAUL H., J., took no part in
the consideration or decision of this case.
DIETZEN, J., not having been a member of
this court at the time of the argument and
submission, took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.

Notes:
1. "Medicaid" is the popular nam~ for this
cooperative federal-state program. See ~~ U.S.c. §
1396-1396v (2000). In Minnesota it is referred to as
"medical assistance." Minn. Stat. § 256B.02, subd. 8
(2006).
2. For purposes of detennining eligioility of one
spouse for Medicaid, the value of a couple's home}§
excluded. ~ U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(2), (5) (2000); ;1!2
U.S.c. § 1382b(a)(1)(:!oOO). In the asset assessment
for Dolores Barg, $104,875 was excluded. This
amount corresponds to the value of the home, one
jointly-owned vehicle, and a burial lot. When
completing the asset assessment, a portion of the
couple's resources is reserved for~.the needs of the
spouse not applying fer Medicaid. ~2 U.S.c. § 1396r5(c)(2), (f)(2XA) (2000). Protected assets for the
nourecipient spouse, Francis Barg, were calculated to
be $24,607.
3. The Commissioner'S motion to supplement the
record on review is granted as to the following
documents: North Dakota Medicaid State Pl~
Transmittal No. 95-016; Indiana Medicaid State Pl~
Transmittal No. 05-012; Idaho Medicaid State Plan,
Transmittal No. 01-006; and Minnesota Medicaid
State PI~ Transmitill No. 06-10. The motion is
denied as to the e-mail correspondence dated
November 4, 1999.
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4,

Formerly
the
Health
Care
Financing
Adminiswdtion (RCF A). See Wis. Dep't of Health &
Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 479 n. 1, 122
S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935 (2002).

expected the estate reC(NelY provISlOns to allow
government to realize savings of $300 million over
five years, and that the savings have been even
greater).

5. Throughout this opinion, our discussion of spouses
is premised on circumstances similar to those of the
Bargs. One spouse, who we refer to as the recipient
spouse, applies for and receives Medicaid benefits.
The other, who we refer to as the community or
surviving spouse, receives no Medicaid benefits and
survives the recipient spouse.

8. Formerly Minn.Stat. § JIS.54, subds. 1,5 (2004).

9. The parties' supplemental briefs shed little light on
this question.

6. The Estate sought cross-review on this issue of
"whether the cOlmty may recover Medicaid benefits
correctly paid on behalf of a predeceased spouse
fi-om the estate of a surviving spouse." We requested
briefing on whether that issue had been adequately
preserved for review. The County argues that the
Estate fulled to preserve the issue because it only
partially disallowed the County's claim, it confirmed
before the district court that only the disallowed
portion of the claim was contested, and it asked the
court of appeals to affirm the district court's decision.
The County's arguments go to the scope of the
remedy available in this case, an issue that we
address infra. But this issue also has a legal aspect
independent of the specific scope of recovery
available in this case. That legal component is
necessary to a thorough analysis of the preemption
issues presented here, and we will therefore address
the issue in that context. No new or controverted
facts are needed in order to address this purely legal
question, and no prejudice will result from our
consideration of the issue becanse the parties
addressed the issue in their briefs to the district court,
the court of appeals, and this court. See Watson v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 566 N.W.2d 683, 687-88
(Minn. 1997).
7. The United States Supreme Court has described
Congress's passage of the anti"-impe-veriSfimem;:
provisions' as an effort to "protect community spouse$
'pauperization' while preventing financially
secnrecouples from obtaining Medicaidassistanee. "
Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534
U.S. 473, 480, 122 S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935
(2002). Allowing recovery from a spouse's estate
does not risk impoverishing a community spouse,
because the spouse must be dead for the recovery to
occur. Nor does it impede the furnishing of Medicaid
benefits to other impoverished individuals; indeed, :it
can be expected to do quite.the- opposite. See West
Dep't ofHealth & Human Servs., 289
Virginia v.
F.3d 281, 285 (4th Cir.2002) (noting that Congress
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OJF 'VASIDNGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATES OF:

VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and
EMERSON D. WIGGINS,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: 2009-19'26
RESPONSIVE
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DENIAL OF :LIEN AGAINST
EMERSON D. \VIGGINS' PROPERTY

Comes now, the Personal Representative of the

above-entitk~d

estates, and files his

Responsive Memorandum in Support of Disallowance of Claim against the Estate of Emerson
D. Wiggins.

FACTS:

The testimony at the hearing will include the testimony of the personal representative and
Robin Wood, the Director of the Weiser Care Center, that the property remaining in the Estate of

Emerson Wiggins is the separate property of Emerson Wiggins, through transmutation of his and
Vivian's assets by Vivian and Emerson, themselves.

LAW

The Department filed a brief yesterday alleging that the first Jackman case, found at 132
Idaho 213(1998), hereinafter referred to as Jackman I, changes the issue presented by the
personal representative in the instant case. However, a close reading of Jackman I does not
have the meaning portrayed by the Department.

Jackman I determined, as did the Barg decision, that the definition of "assets" by federal
law is the same. Jackman I states:
"The federal definition is significant. Federal law includes witlnin the recipient's estate
"all real and personal property and other assets included ~rvithin the individual's
estate ... " ... and "any other real or personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time I]J death ... " 42 U.S.c.
J39p(b)(4). "

The foregoing is correct, and applied to the instant case refers only to Vivian's estate.
Vivian had no estate and had no legal title or interest in Emerson's separate property at the time
of her death, and therefore there is no recovery under the first part of Ja.,~kman 1.
The Department then takes a mighty leap of logic concluding that the following language
allows the Department, under Jackman I, to get at Emerson's separate property. However, the
second part of Jackman I deals only with the issue of Barbara Jackmarl, Hildor's niece, signing
away Hildor's and Lionel's interest in their respective estates. The second part of Jackman I
states:

"Under federal law, Hildor's assets would include her income :md resources as well as
Lionel's income and resources. The agreement does not affect the status of assets that
federal law considers to be part of the recipient's estate because the definition of assets
includes "income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled
to but does not receive because of action by a person ... with legal authority ---to act in
~lace of or on behalf of the individual or such individual:;' spouse." 42 U.S.C.
139(e)(1)(B). Jackman's signing of the agreement constitutell action by a person on
behalf of Hildor and Lionel."

The import of part two of the Jackman I case is federal law prohibits someone other than
the individuals themselves from being able to transmute the property and put it beyond
Medicaid's reach. When Barbara Jackman, instead of Lionel or Hildor, executed the agreement
to transmute the character of the property, that property was brought ba(;k into Medicaid's grasp
by the terms of federal law above quoted. It is this part of the federal le,w which the Department
states "Medicaid law ... does not provide any protection for subsidy for the heirs."
The instant case is entirely different from the second part of .;1ackman 1. Each of the
spouses, Emerson and Vivian, signed the marital settlement agreementshemselves. Thus, there
was no action by a third person "on their behalf' signing the document transmuting the property.
To otherwise hold, no person in Idaho could ever transmute their property and avoid the reach of
Medicaid.

The Idaho legislature, to do so, would need to completely ;remove the authorization

under Title 32, Section 9 of the Idaho code, and rewrite it. The right to deal with ones property as
he or she sees fit, would be eliminated under the Department's position.
Under the facts of the instant case, not only did both Emerson and Vivian signed an
agreement transmuting their property to separate property, but afterward, in furtherance of their
intent,

Vivian spent down her separate property to a point where :;he became eligible for

Medicaid. She had no further interest in Emerson's separate property, under Idaho or federal law,

at that time. The Department seeks to resurrect title to property she faikd to have in 2003. Even
the Department of Health and Welfare does not have that power.
Once again, the Idaho Supreme Court held in Hudelson, supra, that the State of Idaho
cannot receive more power over a person's property than the language of the federal statute
allows:
"The Court considered 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, the anti-lien provision of the federal Medicaid
statute, and found that it limited a state's ability to recover medical expenses it paid on a
Medicaid recipient's behalf. Id. at 284, 126 S. Ct. at 1763, 164 L.Ed.2d at 473-74. A
state Medicaid plan must comply with section 1396p, which generally prohibits states
from placing liens against a Medicaid recipient's property. 7 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18)."
(emphasis added).

In the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 42

u.~'.C

J396p(b)(J), and (4),

the federal statute allowed recovery only against the "individual's estate". The import of that
language has not changed, and the Idaho legislature has no authority to exceed that mandate. We
all understand that the Idaho legislature may give it a try, because the worst that can happen is
the Court declaring the infringing portion ineffective, but the Court's of this State are here to
stop such a blatant attempt to exceed the grant given by the federal statme.
In Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho :; 13 (1998) (Jackman II),
the Idaho Supreme Court specifically prohibited Medicaid from collecting beyond the
community property the spouses accumulated after a marriage settlement agreement transmuted
their property, i.e.:
"'We conclude, however, that federal law applicable to t:,tis case prohibited this
recovery, except from any community property the spouses mayhave accumulated after a
marriage settlement agreement transmuting their communitY..-Qroperty into separate
property of each."

Contrary to the claim of the Department that Jackman II only dealt with the modified
federal statute in 1993, the Court was clearly speaking of the case where individuals themselves
transmute their property by way of a marriage settlement agreement.

The Jackman II Court

used the word "a" when referring to a marriage settlement agreerr ent, not "the" marriage
settlement agreement signed by Barbara Jackman, on behalf of her aunt and uncle, in the

Jackman I case. The Court cannot not assume the Idaho Supreme Court did not know the
difference between the word "the" which would have referenced the agreement in the Jackman I
decision and the word "a" they used in the Jackman II decision. The Idaho Supreme Court in

Jackman II was clearly referring to any marriage settlement agreement and used the word "a" to
so signify.
Furthermore, it is the State of Idaho, Department of Health and "\1elfare who has prepared
and provides to the persons seeking to transmute their property to qualify for Medicaid. A eopy
of the same is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

This marriage settlemen: agreement, provided by

the Department, uses all the wording necessary for each party to effectively transmute their
community property into separate property. To induce the people looking to plan for Medicaid
into signing an agreement the Department has prepared, which pur ports to transmute their
community property to separate property is unconscionable, because at the time the Department
is advising them how to comply with Medicaid law and protect treir separate estates, the
Department knows (according to the allegations made by the Depa rtment in this case) the
agreement will not be effective to do so.

The Department does not tave the right to dupe the

citizens in Idaho into believing they are executing an agreement which will put the non-recipient
spouse's separate estate out of harms-way, and then having the Department assert that the
agreement is not effective to do so. Further, if the separate property of a spouse is part of the

recipient spouse's estate, as claimed by the Department, there wou.d be no reason for the
maniage settlement agreement the Department provides. The Department cannot have it both
ways, i.e. permitting the spouse's to transmute their community propelty into separate property
by the Department's own agreement in order to become eligible for Medicaid, but only thereafter
take the position the agreement is not effective to do so.
The mamage settlement agreement also advises that the

incom~

from spouse's separate

property is community property. The agreement then states such community property will be
used to determine eligibility, implying that the separate property itself w ill not be an impediment.
That position is again inconsistent with the position presently taken by the Department.
If the mamage settlement agreement provided by the Department was not intended to
shelter the separate property of the non-recipient spouse, the Departnent has the duty to so
inform the persons signing the same.
Finally, even if the Minnesota legislature changed its law to ge:1 around Barg (which is
not shown by the Department's allegation of the same), if Minnewta has not had a case
challenging the new statute, it is of no precedential or other value to the Court in Idaho.
Barg correctly analyzed the federal law as prohibiting any recovery by the States except
for the three limited exceptions. Those exceptions are to be strictly construed. None of them
allows the States to collect from anyone other than the "individual's estate", other than the
situation in which someone" other than the individual's themselves" attempted the transmutation.
The Department has presented no legal authority which prohibits the individual,
themselves from transmuting the character of their property and thus leaving it beyond the
authority of recovery given by federal law.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully requested that the Court make its decision WhiC~l upholds both Idaho and

Federal law on the subject. Both Idaho and Federal law prohibit the State from exceeding the
authority given by the Federal statute.

Dated this~~day of February, 2010.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the ~'hay of February, 2010, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Responsive Memorandum was mailed by regular Ur ited States mail, postage
prepaid thereon to the following:

Lynn Wifgins
1520 W. 2 8 Street
Weiser, ID 83672

Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
c/o Kathy Garrett
Estate Recovery Officer

P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 836720-0036

&]~.n-giH-

HW0970
Revised 04/01

State of Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare

MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT AGREEMEN'r
THIS

AGREEMENT,
by

and

is

made

and

executed

on

this_

day

cf

beUNeen

hereinafter referred to as the "Husband" and
hereinafter referred to as the 'Wife".

WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS,
Idaho; and

the Husband and Wife are married and are resi! ~ents of the State of

WHEREAS, the Husband and Wife desire that certain propert:! owned by them bl:~
owned as separate property of each spouse and not as community property; and
WHEREAS, the Husband and Wife own certain property as community property as set
forth in Schedule A, and desire to transmute and divide such property inte the separate property
of each spouse as set forth in Schedules Band C; and
r-.IOW, THEREFORE, it is agreed by and beUNeen the Husband anj Wife as follows:
1. TRANSMUTATION AND/ORTRANSFER: Certain property which is owned as separate
and/or community property is hereby transmuted and divided, or trar sfarred into separate
property of each of the Husband and Wife. The property set forth on Schedule "8", attached
hereto and incorporated herein by this reference, shall hereafter be the sElparate property of th4?
husband and the property set forth on Schedule "C", attached hereto andncorporated herein by
this reference, shall hereafter be the separate property of the Wife.
2. CONVEYANCES: The Husband does hereby transfer, convey ami a:3sign to the Wife all
of his interest in the property set forth on Schedule "C". The Wife does hereby transfer, convey
and assign all of here interest in the property set forth on Schedule "8". The Husband and Wife
each agree to execute such additional documents of conveyance, including deeds, bills of sale,
and assignments as may be necessary to transmute or transfer the property set forth on
Schedule "8", to the Husband and the property on Schedule nc" to the Wij'e.
3. Separate Income: Pursuant to 16 IDAPA §03.05620, all the future income from the
Husband's separate property and all the income from the Wife's sepal"atl7 property shall bl9
considered the community property of Husband and Wife for purposes o·f determining eligibility
for Medical Assistance under Federal Spousal Impoverishment.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this document the day and
year first above written.

"Husband"

''WIfe''
STATE OF IDAHO
County of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-J)
On this
day of
, 20_, before IT Ie, the undersigned, a
Notary Public in and for said state, personally appeared _ _ _~~ ______--:_
and
Husband and WifH, known or identifiecl
to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the vlithin instrument and
I

acknowledged to me that they executed the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affi}ed by official seal th,;
day and year first above written.

Notary Public for Idaho
(Seal)
Commission expires: _ _ _ __
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SCHEDULE A
Community Property of Husband and Wife

Value

Description

------~----------------------------------------~-

Date

Husband's Signature

Date

Wife's Signature
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SCHEDULE B
separate Property of Husband

Description

Value

-

Date

Husband's Signature

Date

Wife's Signature
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SCHEDULEC
Separate Property of Wife

Description

Value

-

-

-

Husband's Signature

Date

i

,

1

r.

!b

r"

Date

Wife's Signature

~

b:

I

I
,I
I
I
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R. BRAD MASIN GILL
Attorney at Law
27 West Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone # 1 (208) 414-0665
Fax # 1 (208) 414-0490
Email-bmasingiU@hotmail.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL llISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATES OF:

) Case No.: 2009-1')26
)

VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and
EMERSON D. WIGGINS,
Deceased.

) SUPPLEMENTAL POST-HEARING
) MEMORANDUI'i1 RE: LEGISLATIVE
) IDSTORY OF IDAHO CODE 56-218
)
)
)
)

Comes now, the Personal Representative of the

above-entiH~d

estates, and files his

Supplemental Post-Hearing Memorandum in support of disallowance of the Department of
Health and Welfare's claim against the Estate of Emerson D. Wiggins.

LEGISLATIVE IDSTORY

The Department of Health and Welfare claims the statute, Idaho Code 56-218, is intended
to allow a Medicaid lien to attach to the separate property of a non -institutionalized spouse.
However, a review of the legislative history of the statute belays that pt)sition. The following is

the language from the Senate bill, thereafter becoming Idaho Code 56-218, which specifically
states that its purpose is to be limited to attaching the communitLoroperty of the noninstitutionalized spouse, not the separate property of the non-institutionalized spouse:
"MEDICAL ASSISTANCE - Amends existing law to clarify when medical assistance
may be recovered; and to specify when the cause of action aecrues to void a transfer
which was made without adequate consideration.
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

RS 13525
Under federal and state law, the state is authorized to set aside "ransfers of assets owned
by recipients of Medicaid where the transfer is made without adequate consideration and
those assets could have been used to pay for the medical assi stance provided through
Medicaid. In a recent decision, a state district cOUli ruled that the state's action was barred
by a four year statute of limitations which ran from the date of th~ transfer even though
the circumstances of the transfer were not reasonably discovered by the state until after
the four years had elapsed. The proposed legislation adds language to Idaho Code Section
56-218 that would prevent the statute of limitations from running until such time as the
state discovers, or reasonably could have discovered, that the a ~set transfer was without
adequate consideration. "Discovers" or "reasonably could have discovered" as used in
proposed subsection 56-218(8) is intended to have the same mearing as "discovery", as
interpreted by the courts, in subsection 5-218(4), Idaho Code. The proposed legislation
also makes a technical correction to Idaho Code 56-218 to clarify that the non-Medicaid
spouse of a Medicaid recipient need not survive the Medicaid recipient in order for the

claim against the community pl'Ql"Jerty of the nonMedicaid spouse's estate. (emphasis added).
department to file a

The foregoing legislative history shows that the legislature never intended the statute to
permit such an outrageous result as taking someone's separate property to pay for the debt of the
spouse who has the misfortune of needing Medicaid.
The Department's position encompasses, within its ambit, such situations as occur when
two older folks become married, both having substantial separate property from their former
relationships.

The Department's position is such that the subject cl)uple can do nothing to

protect their separate property from the Medicaid lien. It is unconscionable to think: that people
who get married the second or third time around, presumably in their later years, would lose their
separate property to Medicaid when that separate property was not produced by the recipient
spouse.

The statute as applied in the manner demanded by the Department, is overbroad and

unconstitutional.
However, the statute need not be so interpreted, as it is clear the legislature did not intend
anything but the community property of the non-institutionalized spouse from being subject to
the Medicaid lien. The Department's claim that it applies to the non-;nstitutionalized spouse's
separate property is not supported by either federal law or the Idaho statute.
In addition, then, to the previously provided memorandums, the Wiggins estate avers
that the Court, upon a review of the legislative history of Idaho Code St.-21S, will determine that
neither the terms of the statute, nor the public policy of this State, snpports the Department's
proposition that the separate property of the non-institutionalized is subjeet to the Medicaid lien
incurred by the institutionalized spouse.

CONCLUSION
The claims of the Department violate both the intent of the statute and the public policy
of this State, and it should be denied.

Dated this \ 5t' day of March, 2010.

~~»'
R. Brad Masingill

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the
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t day of March, 2010, a true and correct copy

of the foregoing Supplemental Post-Hearing Memorandum was mailed by regular United States
mail, postage prepaid thereon to the following:

Lynn Wilgins
1520 W. 2° Street
Weiser, ID 83672

Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
c/o Kathy Garrett
Estate Recovery Officer

P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 836720-0036

R. BRAD MASIN GILL
Attorney at Law
27 West Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone # 1 (208) 414-0665
Fax # 1 (208) 414-0490
Email-bmasingill@hotmail.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATES OF:

) Case No.: 2009-1')2,)
)

) FIRST SUPPLElv'CENTAL POST-HEARING
) MEMORANDU]\;[ RE:
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and

)

) Estate of George D. Perry, Ada County case:
EMERSON D. WIGGINS,
Deceased.

)

Case No. CVIE0905214

)
)

Comes now, the Personal Representative of the above-entitled

I~states,

and files his First

Supplemental Post-Hearing Memorandum in support of disallowance of the Department of
Health and Welfare's claim against the Estate of Emerson D. Wiggins.

Estate of George D. Perry, Ada County Case No. CVIE0905214

The Department of Health and Welfare was denied its claim of lien in the Estaitc of
Perry, supra, a copy of which is attached hereto. The Perry case wa;; handed down on March
10, 2010.

The case just came to counsel's knowledge and after reading the same it is clear it

has significant effect on the case at bar. In fact, although it is not controlling precedent for the
case at bar because it is from a Court of equal jurisdiction, it is respectfully submitted it has
decided the case in a manner which is identical in many respects to the case at bar. The Perry
case cites both Idaho Dept. of IIealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213 (1998) and In re

the Estate of Barg, 752 N. W. 2nd (May 30,2008 and rehearing deniled on July 21,2008), as
being controlling and discusses the federal and state statutes involved in the case at bar.
After review of the same, it is submitted the Department's claim in the case at bar is not
well founded.

The Perry case clearly provides that if the Medicaid recipient spouse does not

own an interest in the non-recipient spouse's property, such as community property, at the time
of death, the claim does not attach. In the case at bar, Mr. Wiggin's separate property is not
subject to the Department's claim oflien under Perry.
The Department did not send a copy of the Perry decision to counsel, nor did it alert
counsel of the decision, despite its clear impact on the case at bar. It is great to be a member of
the Idaho Trial Lawyer's Association!

~

Dated this £day of March, 2010.

/J/~JJi~
~Singill

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the

I~Y of March, 2010, a true and correct eopy

of the foregoing First Supplemental Post-Hearing Memorandum was [nailed by regular United
States mail, postage prepaid thereon to the following:

Lynn Wiggins
1520 W. 2nd Street
Weiser, ID 83672

Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
c/o Kathy Garrett
Estate Recovery Officer

P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 836720-0036

R. Brad Masingill
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

MAGISTRATE DIVISION
In the Matter of:
Case No. CVIE0905214
GEORGE D. PERRY,
ORDER DISALLOWING CLAIM
Deceased.
On February 26, 2010, the Court conducted a hearing on the chltm of the State of
Idaho. Department of Health and Welfare (Department) against George Perry's estate.
The Department seeks to recover Medicaid benefits paid to Mr. Perry':; wife, Martha
Perry. The personal representative ofMr. Perry's estate, Barbara McCormick, is
represented by Peter Sisson and the Department by Corey Cartwright. The parties have
agreed to the relevant facts and have presented written memoranda and made oral
argument.
L Background.
During George and Martha Perry's marriage, Martha owned a home at 2104
Tendoy Drive in Boise. On November 18,2002, by quitclaim deed, Martha transferred
this property to herself and George. On July31, 2006; agai& by quitclaim deed, the
property was transferred to George a1one. I
Over the years, Martha's health has failed and, since October

j,

2006, she has

received assistance from the Medicaid program to pay for her nursing home care. At the
time of George's death, February 25, 2009, Medicaid had provided over $100,000.00 in
benefits to Martha. In March 2009. Ms McCormick, in her capacity a 5 personal
t The court has determined that George Perry held a valid power of attorney from ?vurtha and that he had
the authority to transfer the property to himself.

ORDER DISALLOWING CLAIM Page 1

representative of George's estate, sold the Tendoy home and has preserved the net
proceeds of the sale in an estate account. This money is the only significant asset of
George's estate.
On April 15,2009, the Department filed its claim against George's estate and on
June 4,2009, Ms. McCormick filed a notice of disallowance of the clai m. Pursuant to
Idaho Code 15-3-806, on June 15,2009, the Department filed its Petition for Allowance
of Claim \vhich is now before the court.
II. Issues Presented.

The ultimate issue is: May the Department recover Medicaid benefits that it has
paid to Martha (who is still living) from George's estate--the proceeds of the sale of the
Tendoy home? Under the Department's reasoning, since Martha had an interest in the
Tendoy horne during the marriage (and after federal statutory changes in 1993), it may
recover benefits paid in an amount equal to Martha's ownership intere:it from the
proceeds of the sale of the horne. The personal representative (PR) argues that the
Department may only recover, from George's estate, an amount equal

10

Martha's

interest in the Tendoy home at the time of her death. Since Martha is still living and
neither this horne nor its proceeds will ever pass to her, the PR denies that the
Department may recover any amount.
The foundation of the Department's claim is Idaho Code 15-56-218(1) which
provides:

Recovery of certain medical assistance.-(l) Except where eKempted or waived
in accordance with federal law medical assistance pursuant to this chapter
paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55) year so age or older when
the individual received such assistance may be recovered from the individual's
estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to ~~lther or both:

ORDER DISALLOWING CLAIM Page 2

(b) While one (1) spouse survives, except where joint probate will be authorized
pursuant to section 15-3-111, Idaho Code, a claim for recovery under this section
may be established in the estate of the deceased spouse.
(emphasis added)
The only Idaho case dealing with recovery of Medicaid benefit: from the estate of
the recipient's spouse is Idaho Department of Health alld Welfare v. Jackman 132 Idaho
213 (1998).2 Jackman's essential holding is that the Department is not limited to the

estate of the recipient for recovery of Medicaid benefits, but may reeo\' er appropriate
amounts from the estate of the recipient's spouse. The case was remanded to the probate
court for a determination of whether the Medicaid recipient (Hildor Knudson) had an
interest in community property, at the time of her death, the value of which, the court
suggested, could be recovered from her husband's estate.

Jaclanan does not directly address the critical question for our :;ase: To what
time, during the marriage, may the court look in assessing a Medicaid rcecipient's interest
in property-any time (after 1993) during the couple's marriage or the cime of the
recipient's death.:>
The Department's claim depends upon an interpretation of the definitions of
"estate" and "assets" found in Idaho and federal statutes. 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(l)
provides:

No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf
of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an
individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals:
re ESfate of Kaminsky 141 Idaho 436 (2005) involved a claim to recover Medicaid b<~nefits from the
recipient's estate and was decided on the grounds that the Department's claim was urtimely.
3 Jackman certainly suggests that the time of the recipient's death is the determinativt: time: "The record
before us does not disclose whether Lionel and Hildor had any community property,!!! the time of Hildor's
death~ Jfthey did, Lionel's interest in that community property property may therefore be part of Hildor's
"estate" that 42 U.s.c. 1396p(b)(l )(B) and (4) authorizes the Department to recover End apply against the
balance of the Medicaid payments." [d. at 216. (emphasis added)
2 In
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(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or oldt~r when the
individual received such medical assistance, the State shaH sed; adjustment or
recovery from the individual's estate,
This statute goes on to define "estate" in 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(4):
For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a deceased
individual(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets induded within
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State ... any other real and~rsonaI property
and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or injerest at the time
of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets cQnveved to a
survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through join]: tenancy, tenancy
in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arran!?~ent.

(emphasis added)
Finally, 42 U.S.C.1396p(h) contains general definition provisions:
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income and
resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including any income
or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but
does not receive because of action-(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such
individual's spouse, or
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at
the direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's
spouse.

To paraphrase the Department's argument, it may recover from George's estate because
Idaho Code 56-218(1) allows recovery from the estate of a recipient's spouse; 42 U.S.c.
1396p(b)(4) includes the word "assets" in its definition of "estate" and 42 U.S.c.
1396p(h)(l) says "assets" includes property that a person transferred to her spouse. The
court cannot accept this interpretation.

ORDER DISALLOWING CLAIM Page 4

The reasoning urged by the Department is similar to that presented in Estate of
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N. Dakota 2000). Clarence Wirtz had received Medicaid
benefits and North Dakota sought to recover the payments from the estate of Verna Witz,
Clarence's wife. The Winz court analyzed the federal statutory definitions of "estate" and
"asset" as quoted above and held that " ... any assets conveyed by Clarence Wirtz

to

Verna Wirtz before Clarence Wirtz's death are subject to the departmeilt's recovery
claim." Id at 886. This ruling depends, however, on an awkward interpretation of the
tem "other arrangement" in 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B). The North Dckota court in Wirtz
interpreted the "other arrangement" language independently from the n:st of the section.
The bulk of the section refers to transfers of property that occur in an alltomatic fashion
on the death of the owner, such as joint tenancies, survivorship transfen and life estates.
It would have been a drafter's nightmare to list every imaginable transfer of property of
this type. Consequently, the more natural interpretation in the context ,()f the surrounding
language is that "other arrangement" is meant to include transfers of a :;,imilar, automatic
nature not any possible transfer.
The case of Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008) provides a more
reasonable interpretation of the federal statutory language.
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which t) interpret the
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did not
have an interest in at the time of her death. As explained above, the rationale
for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at all emanates
from the authority granted in the federal law to recover from the "estate" of the
Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death would n;)t be part of the
recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every decision except Winz, to the
extent the 1993 amendments allow states to expand the definition of "estate" for
Medicaid recovery purposes, the language of the federal law clearly limits that
expansion to assets in which the recipient had an interest at the Time of her death.
ld at 71.J emphasis added)
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, J. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certif\l that I have
mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the Order Disallowing Claim, pursuant to
Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes
addressed as follows:
PETER SISSON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2402 W JEFFERSON STREET
BOISE ID 83702

W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
DEPUTY ATIORNEY GENERAL
MEDICAID ESTATE RECOVERY
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0036

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District C
Ada County, Idaho
Date: 10 March, 2010

DEBR
By _ _
_ _---.::.
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III. Conclusion.
The federal statutory definition of "estate" does not include tran:;fers of property
made by a Medicaid recipient before she died. When making a claim against the estate of
a Medicaid recipient's spouse, the Department may only recover agaim;t property in
which the recipient spouse had an interest at the time of her death. Martha Perry
conveyed all of her interest in the Tendoy home during her lifetime. There was no joint
tenancy, right of survivorship or "other arrangement" that would have conveyed any
interest in this property to Martha at George Perry's death. The Department may not
recover Medicaid benefits paid to Martha from the proceeds of the sale of this property.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Department's Petition for Allowance of claim is

denied.
DATED This 10th day of March, 2010.

CHRISTOPHER M. BfETER
Hon. Christopher M. Bieter
Magistrate Judge
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Human Services Division
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
Human Services Division
3276 Elder, Ste. B
POBox 83720
Boise ID 83720-0036
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
ISB No. 3361
fcartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov]

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL. DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
VIVIAN WIGGINS and
EMERSON D. WIGGINS,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2009-1926

RESPONSE TO MARCH 15,2010
MEMORANDlJM

----------------------------)
COMES NOW the State ofIdaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the
"Department") and responds to the personal representative's third post hearing memorandum,
denominated "First Supplemental Post-Hearing Memorandum etc." by the personal
representative.
The Department has attached a copy of it's Notice of Appeal in the George D. Perry case,
cited by the personal representative. The Department believes the Magi;3trate decision in the
IJm:y case was incorrectly decided and did not address the dispositive authorities presented in

RESPONSE TO MARCH 15,2010
MEMORANDUM - 1

Z:\MRCaseslEsta':e\Wigginsv\Response to Supp Memo,wpd

this case. The ~ decision also lacks any analysis of the reasoning gi ven by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman. 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d
6 (1998),1 and fails to acknowledge that the reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme Court in In re
Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008), is not contrary to Jackman, but that each court was
interpreting its own state's law. (See Section IV of the Department's Reply Brief, herein,
beginning at page 10).
Moreover, the facts of this matter are substantially different from those in the £gry
matter. In this case, the Medicaid recipient pre-deceased her spouse and this matter was filed as
a joint probate which anticipates that the assets are unified for administration. Idaho Code § 153-111. In the ~ estate, the Medicaid recipient is still alive, and probate was opened for the
deceased spouse who had a will disinheriting his spouse. In the ~ case, there are formal
documents purporting to transfer the couple's real property to the non-"tdedicaid spouse. In this
case, the personal representative has never produced a formal document, such as a deed (as in
~)

or a marriage settlement agreement which effects any transfer of Vivian's interests to

Emerson.
DATED this 18 day of March, 2010,

N6~_->Z1

"W:COJkEY CARTWRIGI:IT
Deputy Attorney General

lIn response to the statutory framework discussed by the Supreme Court in JackI::lan at 132 Idaho 216, the court
in ~ merely states that it "cannot accept this interpretation" without further analysis.

RESPONSE TO MARCH 15,2010
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
postage pre-paid, and sent via facsimile, to the following:
facsimile (208) 414-0490

LYNN WIGGINS
C/O R. BRAD MASINGILL
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 467
WEISER ID 83672

DATED this

1K

day of March, 2010.

March lle Premo, Legal Allsistant
Division of Human Servic~:s
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LAWRENCEG. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL

"It OAVI9 NAVARRO, Cltltk
By r. BOURNE
DEPUTY

JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Human Services Division
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
Human Services Division
3276 Elder, Ste. B
POBox 83720
Boise ID 83720-0036
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
ISB No. 3361
[cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IN THE MATIER OF THE ESTATE OF:
GEORGE D. PERRY,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV IE 0905214

EXEMPT: I.e. § 31-1212

--------------------------~)
TO:

BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, AND HER
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, PETER SISSON, ATTORNEY AT LAW, AND TO THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT THE STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF

HEALTH AND WELFARE (hereinafter "the Department"), appeals purlUsnt Idaho Code § 17201 and Rule 83, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows:
1.

The title of the court from which the appeal is taken is the Magistrate Division of

the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho in md for the County of
Ada, Magistrate Judge Christopher M. Bieter, presiding.
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.

?If

2.

The title of the cOUli to which the appeal is taken is the District Court ofthe

Fourth Judicial District of the State ofIdaho in and for the County of Ada.
3.

The Depaliment appeals from the ORDER DISALLOWE-JG CLAIM filed

March 10,2010.
4.

This appeal is taken upon matters oflaw.

5.

This matter was heard by oral argument on February 26, ~;Ol 0, at Boise, Idaho;

however, no evidentiary hearing was had and no testimony or evidence vIas taken. The hearing
was tape recorded and the recordings are in the possession .of the clerk 0>: the court.
6.

The issues on appeal are:
1.

Did the Magistrate err in detennining that the gen'~ral power of attorney

held by George Peny gave him authority to make a gift tc himself of Martha
Perry's real property?
2.

Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of Idaho Code

§ 56-218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim agdnst the estate of George

Perry?
3.

Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1396p as pre-empting application ofIdaho Code § 56-2 L8?
4.

Did the Magistrate err in failing to apply the Idaho Supreme Court holding

in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, J 32 Idaho 213 (1998) to
the facts of this case?
5.

Is the Depruiment entitled to attorney fees on appeal?
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DATED this 18th day of March, 2010,

Q~ /----.--~

W. Cp Y CARTWRIGBT
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a hue and con'ect copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
p~stage pre~paid) to the following:

BARBARA K MCCORMICK
c/o PETER C SISSON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2402 W JEFFERSON ST
BOISE ID 83702
DATED this.tl- day of March, 2010.

~~r2amO

Marchel e Premo, Legal A~;sistant .
Division of Human Servic€s
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THRID JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON
MAGISTRATE DIVISION

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

)
)
)
)

Vivian M. Wiggins and
Emerson Wiggins
Deceased.

)
)
)

Case No. CV 2009-1926
MEMORAND'Jl'vf DECISION
DENYING PETITIONER'S CLAIM
AGAINST THE ESTATE

Hearing on the Department of Health & Welfare's petition for allowance of a
claim against the estate of Vivian M. Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins was heard on the
3rd day of February 2010. Corey Cortwright appeared on behalf of the: claimant, the
Department of Health & Welfare. The personal representative Lynl ·Wiggins appeared
and was represented by R. Brad Masingill.
Background
A joint estate was opened May 21,2009, pursuant to Idaho Code 15-3-111. On
November 23,2009 the Department of Health & Welfare filed a claim (pursuant to Idaho
Code 15-3-804) against the estate for medical assistance paid on behalf of the decedent
Vivian M. Wiggins in the amount of $264,674.45 made pursuant to Idaho Code 56-218.
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The personal representative filed a Notice of Disallowance c,[the claim pursuant
to Idaho Code 15-3-806 on November 30, 2009. The claimant filed a Petition for
Allowance of Claim pursuant to Idaho Code 15-3-806 on December 1, 2009.
The parties stipulated to the following facts:

1.

The Department of Health & Welfare treated Vivian Wiggins and
Emerson Wiggins as though they had a Marriage Settlement Agreement
(hereinafter MSA) which divided their assets.

2.

The MSA transmutted Vivian Wiggins and Emerson Wiggin's community
property to separate property.

3.

Although no executed copy or original MSA was presented to the court,
the parties agreed that one was executed in 2002.

4.

The first application for Medicaid Assistance took place in 2002 and the
second occurred August 27,2003.

5.

Unless the MSA had been executed, Vivian WigginE would not have been
eligible for Medicaid Benefits.

6.

Plaintiff s Exhibits A through G were admitted; they support the amount
claimed by the Department $264,674.45 that was pa d on behalf of Vivian
Wiggins and has not been recovered; and, that a Notice of a Statutory
Claim regarding the Estate of Vivian Wiggins was s!~nt to the Personal
Representative on March 5, 2009 (Plaintiffs Exhibi: B).
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The court further finds based on the pleadings that Vivian and Emerson Wiggins
were married at the time of Vivian's death. Vivian M Wiggins died on the 30th day of
January 2009. Emerson Dale Wiggins died on February 9, 2009.
The personal representative did not contest the amount of the claim or that the
Medicaid funds were expended for the care of Vivian Wiggins.
The assets in the joint estate were the separate property of Emerson Wiggins.
The Department did not challenge the validity of the MSA, even though no
original or copy of the original was delivered to the court and no proof was made that the
MSA complied with Idaho Code sections 32-916 et. Seq. The Department has not
brought any action in the district court to challenge the MSA.

Issue
May the Department recover Medicaid benefits paid for Vivian's care from the
separate property of her husband, Emerson?
Idaho Code 56-218 provides for the recovery of Medicaid b(mefits from the
estates of deceased Medicaid recipients and their spouses. Idaho Code 56-218 provides;
(1) Recovery of Certain Medicaid Assistance - (1) Excepl where exempted or

waived in accordance with federal law, medical assistance pursuant to this chapter
paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55) year:; of age or older when
the individual received such assistance, may be recovered from the individuals
estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both:

The Department argues that the legal basis for its claim aga;nst Emerson's
separate property is Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jadanan 132 Idaho 213
(1998). That case parallels this case factually. Jackman's holding is that the Department
is not limited to the estate of the recipient for recovery of Medicaid benefits, but may
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recover amounts from the estate of the recipient's spouse. The Idaho Supreme Court held
that: (1) "if the estate of the individual who received Medicaid assiE:tance is inadequate
to repay the full amount of the assistance received, the Department can recover the
balance from the estate of the surviving spouse, but (2) federal law, as in effect when
recipient and her husband entered into marital settlement agreement transmitting most of
recipient's and husband's community property into separate property of husband, limited
the Department to recovering any community property recipient and husband may have
accumulated after the agreement.
In this matter the personal representative for the estate denied the claim because
the claim to recover for benefits paid on behalf of Vivian Wiggins 'V/aS made against
property which pursuant to the MSA would be the separate propert;/ of Emerson
Wiggins.
The Department argues that recovery against the separate property of Emerson
should be allowed because the MSA between Emerson and Vivian ,)ccurred in 2002 after
the law applicable in Jackman was amended to include a more expansive definition of
"estate" and "asset". In Jackman the parties entered into a MSA in April of 1993 and the
Federal Law was amended in October of 1993 (OBRA 93).
The Department's claim relies on an interpretation of the dEfinition of "estate"
and "assets" found in Idaho and federal statutes amended in Octobm of 1993. 42 U.S.C.
1396p(b)(4) provides:
For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a deceased
individualMEMORANDUM DECISION
DENYING PETITIONER'S CLAIM
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(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State ... any other real and personal property
and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the
time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed
to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living, or other arrangement.
The term "asset" is defined in 42 U.S.C. 1396(h):
(1) The term "asset", with respect to an individual, includes all income and
resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including any
income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is
entitled to but does not receive because of action(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, ...

The Department argues that it doesn't matter whether the property is Emerson's
separate property or not because the Department may under these definitions recover
against any property which had been the couple's community propet1y at any time after
October 1, 1993;
20. Limitations on Estate Claims. - Limits on the Department's claim against the assets
of a deceased participant or spouse are subject to Sections 56-218 and 56-218A, Idaho
Code. A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the value of the
assets of the estate that had been, at any time after Octoberl, 1993, community property,
or the deceased participant's share of the separate property, and jointly owned property .
.. .IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20.
The Department points to the language in 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B) as the basis
for its position that property transferred to the spouse after the look back period is
recoverable. This proposition is based on the Department's interprr;;tation that "other
arrangement" contained in 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B) includes property transferred by
way of a Marriage Settlement Agreement. That section contains a laundry list of assets
which may be recovered at the option of the State, "assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or
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assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
survivorship, life estate, living tmst, or other arrangement."

All of the specific transfers of property listed in that section occur in an automatie
fashion upon the death of the o-wner. Under the Department's interpretation all
arrangements or transfers of any type occurring after the look-back date would be "other
arrangements". There is no specific mention of Marriage Settlement Agreements in that
section.

Marriage Settlement Agreements are recognized under Idaho law and require
specific statutory compliance 32-916 et. Seq. An MSA allows one spouse to transmute
community property to the other. Furthermore, the Idaho

legislatur,;~

contemplated that

transfers could be made by recipients of Medicaid andlor their spow;es without
compensation in order to avoid repayment. A remedy is provided in Idaho Code 56-218
(2) which addresses these transfers. That section provides that transfers of real or
personal property, on or after the look-back dates defined in 42 U.S,C. 1396p, by
recipients of such aid, or their spouses, without adequate consideration are voidable and
may be set aside by an action in the district court.

A transfer of community property by a Marriage Settlement Agreement is not an
automatic transfer like those specifically listed in 42 U.S.C. 1396(bl(4)(B). Another
remedy for recovery is provided in Idaho Code 56-218(2). The Departments expansive
interpretation to include all transactions is not reasonable.
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Conclusion

The Marriage Settlement Agreement in this case has not been voided. The assets
in the estate are the separate property of Emerson; there is no evidence to the contrary.
The Department may only recover against property in which the recipient spouse had an
interest at the time of her death. Since Vivian predeceased Emerson she has no legal
interest in the Separate Property of Emerson under Idaho Law. The Department's Claim
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R. BRAD MASINGILL
Attorney at Law
27 West Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone # 1 (208) 414-0665
Fax # 1 (208) 414-0490
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL, DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATES OF:

VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and
EMERSON D. WIGGINS,
Deceased.

) Case No.: 2009-1'\J26
)
) REPLY TO DEP ARTMENT'S MARCH 18
) MEMORANDUM:
)
)
)
)
)

Comes now, the Personal Representative of the above-entitled estates, and files his
Response to the Department's Response to March 15, 2010 Memorandu m.
Joint Probate:

First, the Department claims that the filhg of a joint probate has

something to do with the issue before the Court. It does not. The prohate was filed jointly, but
the documents clearly show that the money over which this issue is discussed was designated as
Emerson's separate property, and the documents further show that Vivian had no interest therein.
Emerson's Separate Property: Second, the Department c1airJs that the fact that there
was no Marriage Settlement Agreement or the like somehow has an impact on the Court's

decision. Again, it does not. In fact, in open Court, as well as by written stipulation, the
Department stipulated that the property in question was Emerson's separate property.
Perry:

Finally, the Department claims the Perry decision did not address the

dispositive authorities. That is also false. The Perry decision, one the Department failed to let
the Court or Wiggins counsel know about, discussed the appropriate :,tatutes, the federal and
state, and the dispositive case, In re the Estate of Barg, 752 N W. 2nd (J\1ay 30, 2008).
Conclusion and the Law:

The legal position of the Department is not supported by

either fact or law.
The following are the uncontradicted facts and the uncontradicted legal authority in this
case:
1. The property in question is Emerson's separate property. See stipulation in open

Court and subsequent written stipulation; and
2. Idaho Code 56-218 is subject to the constraints of the federal statute. State Dept. of
Health and Welfare v. Hudelson, 196 P.3d 905 (Idaho, 2008); Emd
3. The Federal statute, 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(4), specifically provides no right to get to the
separate property of a non-recipient spouse, and speaks only of the "individual's"
obligation to repay Medicaid funds; and
4. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 132 Idaho 213 (1998), known and cited
as Jackman, clearly provides that community property is the only property subject to
Idaho Code 56-218; and
5.

Idaho Code 32-903 provides that separate property cannot be subject to the
community or separate debt of a spouse. Simplot v. Simp/ol, 96 Idaho 239 (Idaho,
1974); and

6. In re the Estate of Barg, 752 N W 2nd (May 30, 2008) is directly on point with the
Personal Representative's position; and
7. Subsequent Minnesota statutory law does not affect Idaho statutory law, Idaho ease
law, or Federallaw; and
8. The legislative history of Idaho Code 56-218 reveals the legislature'S intent to
include only community property of the non-recipient spouse as subject to
recoupment; and
9. Judge Beiter has entered the Perry decision, which is directly on point and belies the
Department's position. The Department's appeal will fail.

.

sr

Dated thls3L'day of March, 2010.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the

31sfday of March, 201 0, a true and correct copy

of the foregoing Response to the Department's Response to March 15, 2010 Memorandum was
mailed by regular United States mail, postage prepaid thereon to the following:

Lynn Wiggins
1520 W. 2nd Street
Weiser, ID 83672

Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
c/o Kathy Garrett
Estate Recovery Officer

P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 836720-0036
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R. BRAD MASINGILL
Attorney at Law
27 W. Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone #1(208)414-0665
Fax #1(208)414-0490
Email: bmasingilI(al.hotmail.com
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF II)AHO

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

13
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IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATES OF:
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS

)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM lIN SUPPORT OF
THE ESTATE'S MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEI:£S AND COSTS

EMERSON D. WIGGINS )
Deceased.

)
)
)

20
21

22

COMES NOW, the above-entitled estate, by and throu~;h its attorney, of record,

23
R. BRAD MASIN GILL, and hereby submits the following Memorandum of Points and

24
Law in support of the Estate's Motion for Attorney's Fee and CO!:ts.
25

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEYS'

1

I.

2

THE ESTATE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

3

PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 12-121

4
5

A.

Frivolous Claims:

6
Idaho Code 12-121 confers the broad power of the court to "award
7
reasonable attorney fees to "a prevailing party or parties" in any civil action. An avvard
8

9
10
11

under this code section requires an analysis of IRCP 54(e), which generally provides that
attorney fees can be awarded when the Court finds, from the facts presented, that the case
was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.

12

Idaho Code 12-121 is applicable to estates. See KoJ'ouch v. First Sec. Bank

13

of Idaho, 911 P.2d 779, 128 Idaho 186 (Idaho App., 1996). The Idaho Supreme Court,

14

in Kolouch, supra, sustained an attorney fee award of $50,000 in an estate case, stating as

15

follows:

16
17
18
19

"Helen asserts that the magistrate erred in awarding attorney fees to the
respondents in their action to remove her from the position of personal
representative. She argues that because her defense of the petition to remove was
not frivolous, the fees were wrongfully granted. Further, she claims that the
amount of attorney fees granted was inappropriate and urges this Court to review
the amount awarded. She also disputes the magistrate's order granting attorney
fees without first conducting a hearing on the issue.

20
21
22
23
24
25

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1) provides that an award under Idaho
Code Section 12-121 may not be made unless the court finds, from facts presented
to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivDlously, unreasonably or
without foundation. In re Estate of Kunzler, 109 Idaho J50, 354, 707 P.2d 461,
465 (Ct.App.1985). Applying these criteria to the facts of a particular case is a
task invoking the judge's discretionary function. The judge's determination as to
whether the criteria for an award of attorney's fees have been satisfied will not be
disturbed on appeal unless such discretion has been abused. Id. Like the award
itself, the reasonableness of the amount is a discretion2ry determination by the
trial court. DesFosses v. DesFosses, 122 Idaho 634, 635, 836 P.2d 1095, 1099
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(CLApp.1992). When reviewing an exercise of discretion" an appellate court must
determine whether the lower court properly applied the legal standard. Estate of
Kunzler, 109 Idaho at 354, 707 P.2d at 465.

1

2
3

The magistrate found that the respondents were the prevailing parties in the
removal action and met the criteria for an award of atlomey fees under Idaho
Code Section 12-121 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(B). The
magistrate further found, pursuant to Rules 54(d)(I)(B) a:nd 54(e)(I) and (2), that
Helen's defense against the petition for removal was unreasonable and frivolous.
The magistrate then used the criteria set forth in LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) to determine the
amount of the attorney fee award. Finally, the magistrate fmmd that equity would
not be served by requiring Peggy's children to pay for r,epresentation to remove
Helen as the personal representative when she was, in bad L'lith, misappropriating
funds and property from the estate.

4
5

6
7

8
9

The magistrate used the correct legal standard in determining whether an
award of attorney fees was appropriate and in what amount. The magistrate's
factual findings of Helen's bad faith misuse of estate funds support the conclusion
that her defense of the removal action was unreasonable and frivolous. The
magistrate found that the time, skill, and labor required, novelty and difficulty of
the issues and the financial impact upon the estate jmtified an award in the
amount of $50,000. It was not an abuse of discretion in this situation for the
magistrate to award attorney fees in that amount to the estate for the removal
proceedings.

10
11

12
13
14
15

B.

Frivolous, Unreasonable, or Without Legal or Factual Basis.

In the present case,

16

the State came to the court arguing that Idaho Code 56-218 provided that the separate

17

property of Emerson was liable for the Medicaid paid on behalf of his spouse.

18
19

It was

wrong and its actions were frivolous, without a legal or factual basis, and unreasonable.
In fact, this Court found that its interpretation of the law and fact~; was "unreasonable".

20
By way of synopsis, the following factors show the State's attempt to lien

21
Emerson's separate property was frivolous, without a lega:i or factual basis, and

22
23
24
25

unreasonable under Idaho Code 12-121:

1. Joint Probate:

First, the Department claimed that the filing of a joint probate

rendered its lien valid against Emerson. The filing of a joint probate, when the
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1

schedules of property show that all the money in the estate was the separate property

2

of Emerson, is completely valid. In fact, joint probates a re filed all the time, but

3

which decedent owns property is set forth in the schedule~:. The claim that a joint

4

5

filing makes the State's lien effective is frivolous and wibout any legal or factual
basis.

Filing a joint probate did not transmute Emerson's separate property into

6
community property, or into any other property to which the State's lien would
7

attach.

8
9
10

2. Emerson's Separate Property: The Department claimed that the fact there was no
Marriage Settlement Agreement had an impact on the Court's decision. That claim is

11

frivolous, without a legal or factual basis, and unreasonable. In open Court, as well

12

as by written stipulation, the Department stipulated that the property at issue in this

13

case was Emerson's separate property.

14

3. Perry:

The Department claimed the Perry decision did fil)t address the dispositive

15

authorities.

16

unreasonable. The Perry decision discussed the appropriate;tatutes, both federal and

17
18

That claim is frivolous, without a legal or factual basis, and

state and the dispositive cases, Barg and Jackman.

The fact that neither case

supported the Department's position does not make it wrong.

19
4. Failure to Alert. The State of Idaho, Department of Heal th and Welfare, lost the
20

identical issue in the Perry case. The State failed to alert the Court or opposing

21
counsel of the Perry decision, despite its obvious relevance

[0

this case. The failure

22

23
24

25

to disclose dispositive, relevant case law would be the subject of a bar reprimand if
done by private counsel. The State of Idaho's counsel should be held to a higher
standard. The State's blatant failure to disclose is unreasonal:le.
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1

C.

Conclusion: the Facts and the Law: The legal position taker by the Depmiment was

2

frivolous, without a legal or factual basis, and unreasonable.

3

1. It was frivolous and unreasonable to claim Emerson's separate property was subject

4
5

Se(~

as follows:

to the Medicaid lien, when the State assisted the Wiggi:r;s in making Emerson's
property separate so his wife could qualify. It is simply uncon~cionable not to advise

6
the decedents that the spend down and division of property the State sanctioned
7
would be subsequently ignored by the State when the estate was administered; and

8
2. Idaho Code 56-218 is subject to the constraints of the

fed~ral

statute, as per State

9
10
11

Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Hudelson, 196 P.3d 905 (Idaho, 2008). To claim the
State's statute could alter the federal statute when the

~,tate

support~d

participated in the

12

Hudelson case, and knew that position was not

13

participated in is frivolous, without a legal or factual basis, ard unreasonable; and

14

3. The State frivolously failed to properly analyze the Fecleral statute, 42 U.S.e.

15

1396p(b)(4), which specifically provides there is no righ to get to the separate

16

property of a non-recipient spouse.

17

"individual's" obligation to repay Medicaid funds; and

18
19
20

by a case the State

The federal statute speaks only of the

4. The State presented the Court with an unsigned, unverified, imd wholly inappropriate
section of some document, claiming it was what the Idaho Supreme Court would have
decided in Jackman. To quote and submit to the Court som~thing so preposterous is

21
frivolous and unreasonable; and
22

23
24
25

5. In Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v Jackman, 132 Idaho 213 (1998),
known and cited as Jackman, the law clearly provides that cl)mmunity property is the
only property subject to Idaho Code 56-218. The State's pm:ition that Jackman does
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1

not stand for that proposition was, and still is, frivolous,

2

basis, and unreasonable; and

3

4
5

6

~ itl:out

6. Existing law, codified in Idaho Code 32-903, provides that

a legal or factual

~eparate

property cannot

be subject to the community or separate debt of a spouse. Simp/ot v. Simp/ot, 96
Idaho 239 (Idaho, 1974). To claim otherwise is frivolous, \rithout a legal or factual
basis, and unreasonable; and

7

7. The case of In re the Estate of Barg, 752 N W

rd

(May 30, 2008) is directly on

8

point with the Personal Representative's position. The Department's position that it
9
10

11

was not controlling law in the present case was frivolous, vrithout a legal or factual
basis, and unreasonable; and

12

8. Contending subsequent Minnesota statutory law affects Id::ho statutory law, Idaho

13

case law, or Federal law was frivolous, without a legal or factual basis, and

14

lmreasonable; and

15

9. The legislative history of Idaho Code 56-218 revealed the h:gislature's intent was to

16

include only community property of the non-recipient spcuse as being subject to

17

recoupment under the State's Medicaid lien. To assert to the contrary is frivolous,

18

19
20

without a legal or factual basis, and unreasonable; and
10. The Department frivolously and unreasonably contended that Judge Beiter entered the

Perry decision without properly addressing the issues, and that Perry was not directly

21
on point, was frivolous, without a legal or factual basis, and 1: nreasonable.

22

23
24

25

The issue of the State's right to lien the non-recipient srouse's separate property
was discussed by the Idaho Supreme Court in In re Estate of Elliott, 141 Idaho 177
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1

(2005). In Elliott, attorney's fees and costs were awarded against the State and affirmed

2

on appeal by the Idaho Supreme Court. The same award should be made herein.

3

4

H.

5
6

THE ESTATE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
7

PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 12-117
8

9
10
11

12

A.

The Statute.

Idaho Code 12-117 was enacted to pJOvide mandatory relief

to persons (including estates) which have incurred attorney's fees and costs because a
governmental agency acted without any basis in law or fact.
Idaho Code 12-117 reads as follows:

13

14
15
16
17
18

19

"In any administrative or civil judicial proceediag involving as adverse
parties a state agency, a city, a county or other taxing (listrict and a person, the
court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorne/s fees, witness fees and
reasonable expenses, if the court [mds that the party aga inst whom the judgment
is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law."

Case Law.

Idaho Code 12-117 has been applied against the State of Idaho regarding its
improper attempt to impose its lien under the very same code ;ection, Idaho Code 56-

20
218, which has been amended since the Elliott case, but is neveltheless instructive to the

21
22
23
24
25

case at bar.

See Matter of Estate of Elliott which stated as follows:

[I]n any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse
parties a state agency, a city, a county or other taxing district and a person, the
court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorne:y's fees, witness fees and
reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party ag::tinst whom the judgment
is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
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2
3

4
5

6
7

8
9
10
11

12
13

14

15
16

17
18

19
20

21
22
23
24

25

I.C. § 12-117(1)(2004). This Court has held that the purpose of this statute is
"two-fold: '(1) to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action; and
(2) to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified
financial burdens defending against groundless charges or attempting to correct
mistakes agencies never should ha(ve] made." Rincove'( Vo State, Dep't of Fin.,
Sees. Bureau, 132 Idaho 547, 549, 976 P.2d 473, 475 (1999) (quoting Bogner v.
State Dep't of Revenue & Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 859, 693 P.2d 1056, 1061
(1984)). If the Court determines that a party acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law, an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117 is mandatory. Id.
In ruling from the bench on the personal representaLve's request for attomey
fees, the district court noted that, "[s]o although I ruled in the (personal
representative's] favor and although I found that the State action was without
basis in law, as did Judge Dutcher, I do not find that the action was so
unreasonable or crossed that broad canyon that I think is ~'equired in 12-117." The
district court found that the Department's actions were without a basis in law but
were not unreasonable. This determination is inconsistent considering the
circumstances of this case. The Department presented a flawed interpretation of
I.C. § 56-218, an unambiguous statute, that both the magistrate and the district
court judges rejected, as does this Court.
In Rincover, this Court determined that the prevailing party was not entitled
to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117 against the Department of Finance. Id. at 550,
976 P.2d at 476. This Court noted that the Department of Finance, in wrongly
denying the party's application for registration to sell securities, relied upon
statutory provisions that had not been previously constmed by the court. Id. The
Court explained that, "[w]hile the district court bebw disagreed with the
Department's interpretation and application of [the statut~s] to the facts presented
by [the applicant's] case, it does not appear that the Department's action was
unreasonable under the circumstances." Id. This determination was based on the
Court's finding that the Department did not act "withou or contrary to statutory
authority." Id.

This case is distinguishable from Rincover, where t le Court determined that
the Department of Finance's actions were not "without or contrary to statutory
authority." The Department presented an erroneous interpretation of an
unambiguous statute, I.C. § 56-218. The Department acted without statutory
authority in presenting its appeals to the district court and this Court.
Additionally, the Department submitted issues beyond th~ scope of the order from
which this appeal arose. The Department's actions in thi~; case were unreasonable
and without a basis in law. I.C. § 12-117 required the district court to mvard
attorney fees where the Department's actions were brought without a basis in law.
The district court correctly perceived the law but failed to properly apply I.C. §
12-117. The personal representative is entitled to her fees incurred in the appeal to
the district court and in the appeal to this Court pursuant to I.C. § 12117.Although the statute has been changed since this c;].se, the attorney fee and
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cost issue remains good law and applicable law to the present case. persons who
file frivolous cases against the government, and in favor cf governmental agencies
which have done exactly what the County of Washington has done in this case.
Less than a month ago, the Idaho Supreme Court staced in Waller v. State,
Docket No. 33831 (Idaho 812612008) (Idaho, 2008) as fonows:
"The State requests attorney fees on appeal pmsuant to LC. § 12-117.
Under that statute, this Court must award attorney fees where a person did not act
with a reasonable basis in fact or law in a proceeding involving a state agency
which prevails in the action. Id.; Rincover v. State, Dep't of Fin., Sec. Bureau, 132
Idaho 547, 549, 976 P.2d 473, 475 (1999). On cippeal, Waller has not
acknowledged, much less addressed, the decisions of this Court relating to
application of the doctrine of res judicata in cases invo'_ving default judgments.
He has identified no legal authority to support his claim of entitlement to pursue
an independent action to set aside the default judgment. He has not addressed the
district court's factual or legal findings regarding his cJ aim for equitable relief.
Under these circumstances, we find that Waller has purslled this appeal without a
reasonable basis in fact or law and award attorney fees to the State pursuant to
LC. § 12-117.

No Law or Facts.

Idaho Code 12-117 is applicable to the Jresent case. The State

had no law upon which it could make a cogent argument. Furtlelmore, the facts of the
case clearly showed, as the State so stipulated, that the property the State was seeking to
lien was not community property of Mr. and Mrs. Wiggins, not the separate property of
Mrs. Wiggins, but the separate property of Emerson D. Wiggins. There are no facts upon
which the State could have been justified in bring this lien claim.

III.
COSTS

Costs Generally:
In Idaho, "costs" incurred in an action are to be paid as set £orth in the rules of the
court. Idaho Code 12-101 states as follows:
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"12-101.
Costs. Costs shall be awarded by the ;ourt in a civil trial or
proceeding to the parties in the manner and in the amc,unt provided for by the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure."

1

2

3

4

B.

Costs as a Matter of Right.

Costs as a matter of right

f

re set forth in IRCP

54(d)(l)(C). The cost of subpoenaing witnesses is such a cost. TIle Estate is entitled to

5
6

recover the $20.00 it spent for the subpoena service on Robin Wo,)d.

7

It is respectfully submitted that the costs for the foregoing, inch Ided in Exhibit A to the

8

Affidavit of R. Brad Masingill in Support of Motion for Attorrey Fees and Costs filed

9

concurrently herewith, is properly awarded to the Estate pursuan: to Idaho Code 12-101,

10

and IRCP 54(d)(I)(C).

11
12

C.

13

Discretionary Costs.

Discretionary costs

are

also

allowe, i

pursuant to

IRCP

54(d)(1)(D). It is respectfully submitted that the consultation 'vith an elder law expert,

14

such as Dennis Voorhees, at a cost of $700.00 is an appropriate discretionary cost. It was
15

Dennis Voorhees knowledge of the Perry case, and its timely mbmission to the Court,
16

which aided this Court in arriving at the proper decision.

17

18
19
20

21
22
23

D.

Attorney's Fees as Costs.

IRCP 54(e)(5) provides for attorney's fees as costs.

"Rule 54(e)(5). Attorney fees as costs. Attorney fees, when allowable by statute
or contract, shall be deemed as costs in an action and processed in the same
manner as costs and included in the memorandum of costs; provided, however,
the claim for attorney fees as costs shall be supported by an affidavit of the
attorney stating the basis and method of computation of the attorney fees
claimed. "

24

25
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1

The fees incurred to Dennis Voorhees are covered by this not to well known

2

provision of IRCP 54, but it is applicable to the present case by virtue of IRCP 54(e)(8)

3

which provides:

4

5

6

"The provisions of this Rule 54(e) relating to attorney fees shall be applicable to
all claims for attorney's fees made pursuant to section 12··121, Idaho Code, and to
any claim for attorney fees made pursuant to any other s';atute, or pursuant to any
contract, to the extent that the application of this Rule 54(e) to such a claim for
attorney fees would not be inconsistent with such other statute or contract."

7

8
9

10
11

12

CONCLUSION
A relatively small estate has been required to incur over $10,000 in attorney's fees
(which have been reduced by counsel because of the size of tbe estate Le. should have
been $20,000 or more) because of the over extension of power by the Department of

13

Health and Welfare. The Department has not cited one case to tle Court in support of its
14

position. It supported its position with a portion of some docum~nt without a name, date,
15
16
17

or author.

It contends the statute permits it to enforce its I ien against the separate

property of the non-recipient spouse, when the legislative history states otherwise. The

18

Department was not willing to discuss settlement of the maHer, making it an all or

19

nothing case. The Department also failed to disclose an

20

Perry decision, which was clearly relevant to the case at bar.

adv<:~rse

magistrate case, the

21

The only way to get the Department's attention that its position relative to the

22

non-recipient spouse's separate property is (a) not subject to its Medicaid lien, (b) is not

23

supported by law, (c) is not supported by facts, and (d) is c1mtrary to good common

24

sense, is to award attorney's fees against the Department.

25
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1
2

The award is the only way to make the Estate whole again" Attorney's fees and
costs awarded against the State are proper in this case.

3

4

Dated: April&-r;201O.

/~d

5
6

LL,

7
Attorney for Estate

8
9
10
11

12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19

20

21
22

23
24

25
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1

2
3
4

5

6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs was mailed by regular United States mail,
postage prepaid thereon on this t.,1iIayof

fl ~J

,2010, to the following:

7

8
9

Lynn Wiggins
1520 W. 2nd Street
Weiser, ID 83672

10
11

12

13

Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
c/o Kathy Garrett
Estate Recovery Officer
P.o. Box 83720
Boise, ID 836720-0036

14
15

)11}:)"21 ~

16
17

R. Brad Masingill

18
19

20
21

22
23

24
25
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R. BRAD MASIN GILL
Attorney at Law
27 West Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone # 1 (208) 414-0665
Fax # 1 (208) 414-0490
Email-bmasingiII@hotmail.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATES OF:

VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and
EMERSON D. WIGGINS,
Deceased.

) Case No.: 2009-1926
)
)

) MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEF$ AND
) COSTS
)
)
)
)

Comes now, the Personal Representative of the above-entitled estates and hereby files its
Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs against the State of Idaho, Department of Health and
Welfare (hereinafter State).
This Motion is made and based on the file in this matter, the Affidavit of Counsel in
Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs and the Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Attorney's Fees and Costs, filed concurrently herewith.
This motion is additionally based on Idaho Code 12-120, Idah() Code 12-121, IRCP 54,
and Idaho Code 12-117, and the fact that Estate was the prevailing party in the State's request
for a lien pursuant to Idaho Code 56-208.

It is respectfully submitted that the State had no legitimate is:me of fact and/or no

legitimate issue of law, upon which to base its request for a lien against the separate property of
Emerson M. Wiggins.

Dated this U'day of April, 2010.

L16~~-»
R. Brad MasingiH
Attorney f{r the Estate

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the (Omday of April, 2010,

:1

true and correct copy of

the foregoing Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs was mailed by regular United States mail,
postage prepaid thereon to the following:

Lynn Wiigins
1520 W. 2" Street
Weiser,ID 83672

Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
c/o Kathy Garrett
Estate Recovery Officer

P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 836720-0036

BRAD MASIN GILL
Attorney at Law
27 West Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone # 1 (208) 414-0665
Fax # 1 (208) 414-0490
Email-bmasingill@hotmail.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAJL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 01F 'VASHINGTON

) Case No.: 2009-1926

IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATES OF:

)
)

)
)
)
)

VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and
EMERSON D. WIGGINS,

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR )JTTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS, INCLUDING THE FACTORS IN
IRCP 54

)
)

Deceased.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

COUNTY OF W ASIDNGTON

ss.
)

R. Brad Masingill, being fIrst duly sworn on oath, deposes and ~;ays:
1.
That your Affiant is the attorney of record for tr e above-entitled Estate
(hereinafter Estate).
2.
That the following itemization of attorney's fees and costs is submitted pursuant
to IRCP 54(d)(5).
That to the best of your Affiant's lmowledge and belief the
Attorney's Fees:
following itemization is a true and accurate recital of your AffIant's actual time and services
rendered to the Estate regarding the Estate's defense of the State of Idaho, Department ofH,:ealth

3.

and Welfare's (hereinafter State) claim of lien against the separate property of Emerson D.
Wiggins, deceased.
3.
Attorney's Fees and Costs from Attorney, R. Brad MasingiU. See
attached Exhibit A (7-27-09 through 4-02-10 re attorney's fees of $12,880.00)
Amount requested is $12,880.00.
b.
Attorney's Fees from Attorney, Dennis Voorhees. See attached
Exhibit B (12-2-09 through 2-26-10). Total attorney's fees from attorney,
Voorhees, is $700.00.
4.
Total Costs (As a Matter of Right and Discretionary). That the total costs
shown on Exhibit A include (a) service fee on witness Robin Wood (manager of the nursing
home who took care of the books for the decedent); and (b) professional expert fees for Dennis
Voorhees, an expert on elder law. The fees for Mr. Voorhees are both attorney's fees and costs
pursuant to IRCP 54. Attached Exhibit C is the total costs associated with the lien issue and is
due pursuant to IRCP 54 in the amount of $720.00, which is the total of all the costs to date.

5.
Statutory and IRCP Authority:
That this Affida'vit is being submitted
pursuant to Idaho Code 12-120, Idaho Code 12-121, and Idaho Code 12-117, for attorney
fees and for costs pursuant to IRCP 54(d)(1), IRCP 54(d)(5). This Affidavit is submitted for
attorney fees pursuant to IRCP 54(e)(1), IRCP 54(e)(5), and as an item of costs under I]RCP
54(e)(1) and mcp 54(e)(5).

6.

}RCP 54 FACTORS:
Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare.

This Affidavit

IS submitt,~d

against the State of

A. Your Affiant was retained to represent the Estate at the agreed hourly rate of $200.00.
B. That such rate is reasonable based upon the experience and e '{pertise of your Affiant.
C. The time set forth herein was actually spent on this case and the amount is reasonable
based on the issues involved, the experience and expertise of your Affiant, and for the
issues involved in the claim of lien filed by the State.
D. That the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare presented no facts nor did
it submit any law to support its position.
E. The State lost on the sole issue it presented. The savings to ':he estate is significant as
the lien would have taken the entire separate property of the decedent, Emerson D.
Wiggins. The Estate was the clearly the prevailing party.

F. The costs are reasonable and necessary for the defense of 1he State's claim of lien.
The Estate had no way of resolving this issue other than defend it vigorously. The
costs and fees were incurred and were directly and proximately caused by the claim
of lien filed by the State, not against the recipient spouse, but against the separate
property of Emerson D. Wiggins, property the State itself a~sisted to be turned into
Emerson's separate property for getting the recipient spouse eligible for Medicaid.
The State stipulated that the recipient spouse had no interest whatsoever in the
separate property of Emerson, but went after it anyway. Jdaho Code 12-117 was
passed to remedy the exact situation in this case.
G. The present case was not the type of case widely desirable by the Plaintiff's bar
because of the specific and not well understood issues involved, i.e. Medicaid at both
the federal and state levels.

Dated this ~day of-!..h-4-P-!..\('-:"\...L\_ _ _ _, 2010.

dfi-~,,,,,-~
R. Brad M~ISingill
Attorney fOIl" the Estate

STATE OF IDAHO

County of Washington

On this

)
ss:
)

ljti1 day of April, 2010, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public for Idaho,

personally appeared R. Brad Masingill, known to me to be the person vJhose name is subscribed
to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the

SE me.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the
day and year first above written.

KALLEE EISENBARTH
NOTARY PUBLIC

STATE OF IDAHO

Notary Public for Idaho

Residing at: Weiser, Idaho
My Commi:lsi<on Expires: ~.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the JiVlday of

#\pill

, 2010, a tme and

correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Cost:; was mailed by regular
United States mail, postage prepaid thereon to the following:

Lynn Wiggins
1520 W. 2nd Street
Weiser, ID 83672

Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
c/o Kathy Garrett
Estate Recovery Officer
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 836720-0036

~?--ng-iI-I----------

R. Brad
...,J.,..,~..... ' P .A.
27 \V. Commercial Street
P. O. Box 467
Weiser
T.. . . . .

ID

83672

Lynn Wiggins

Date:

Weiser ID 83672

Invoice Number:

')4/02/2010
[446/001
[470

Re: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates
Attention:

DATE

INIT

DESCRIPTION OF SERVICE

07/2712009

RBM

07/27/2009

RBM

07/27/2009

RBM

08/03/2009
08/3112009

RBM
RBM

11106/2009

RBM

11/09/2009

RBM

11109/2009

RBM

11/13/2009

RBM

11113/2009

RBM

11113/2009

RBM

1111812009

RBM

HOUR~;

AMOUNT

Conference with client and email with client;
Review of bank statements and docs from

0.9;

190.00

Legal Research re Jackman case tobacco
llitigation and email to client
Preparation ofDocument(s)- Draft
Inventory
Preparation ofletter to client
Preparation of letter to client with
preliminary research on statutes
Preparation ofDocument(s)- 1st Draft of
Schedule of Final Distribution
Preparation of Document(s)- Order for
Distribution
Preparation of Document(s)- Notice of
Hearing
Preparation ofDocument(s)- Petition for
Final Approval and Distribution, letter to
client, letter to clerk, and letter to AG's

1.55

310.00

1.1,)

220.00

0.1')
1.5)

20.00
300.00

0.65

130.00

1.1)

220.00

0.25

50.00

1.1 )

220.00

E-mail correspondence with Wiggins, Lynn

0.05

10.00

Preparation of Document(s)- Final Schedule
of Distribution
Preparation of letter to client and

0.25

50.00

0.15

30.00

m

EXHIBIT
Continued ...
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DATE

INIT

1111812009
11118/2009
11118/2009

REM
REM
REM

11118/2009
11120/2009

REM
RBM

11/2412009

REM

11130/2009

RBM

12/0112009

RBM

12/0112009

REM

12/0112009

REM

12/01/2009
12/0112009
12/02/2009

REM
REM
RBM

12/02/2009

REM

12/03/2009

REM

12/0312009

OF SERVICE
telephone conference with Cory
Review of Document(s) Fax from Corey
E-mail Communication with client
Preparation ofDocument(s)- Inventory
Schedules of Property
Preparation ofletter to Corey
Review ofDocument(s) Letter from Corey,
Claim against Estate, Demand for Notice

AMOUNT

0.3')
0.05
1.2 5

60.00
10.00
250.00

0.1')
05)

20.00
100.00

Preparation of Document(s)- Notice of
Disallowance of Claim and review of

0.35

70.00

Review ofDocument(s) Fax from Corey re
Petition for Allowance of Claim
Preparation of Document(s)- 1st Draft
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Deny

055

110.00

4.31)

860.00

0.51)

100.00

0.05

10.00

0.0;
0.35
3.51)

10.00
70.00
700.00

Email communication with/from Vorhees
Review ofDocument(s) Memorandum in
Support of Petition for Allowance, Notice of

0.11)

20.00

0.61)

120.00

REM

E-mail correspondence with Cartwright,
Cory and telephone conference with Corey

0.15

30.00

12/03/2009

REM

0.2 1)

40.00

12/08/2009

REM

1.21)

240.00

12/22/2009

RBM

0.25

50.00

01105/2010

RBM

E-mail correspondence with Wiggins, Lynn
(4x)
Preparation ofDocument(s)- Revision of
Memorandum
Review of Document(s) Fax from Corey;
Preparation of Letter to Client
Preparation ofletter to client, Court, and
Corey; Preparation of Amended Notice of

0.55

110.00

01/05/2010

RBM

Preparation of Document(s)- Revision of
Memorandum in Support of Denial of Claim

1.6)

320.00

01/05/2010

REM

Email communication with/from Cory (3x)

0.15

30.00

01/06/2010
0110812010

REM
REM

Email communication with/from Dennis
E-mail correspondence with Wiggins, Lynn

0.05
0.05

10.00
10.00

0110812010

REM

0.05

10.00

0110812010

RBM

0.05

10.00

01/08/2010

REM

E-mail correspondence with Cartwright,
Cory
Email communication with/from Dennis
Voorhees
Review ofDocument(s) Stack of documents
for MSA all out of chronological order

3.5)

700.00

0111212010

REM

Email communication withlfrom Corey

0.05

10.00

Conference with client
E-mail correspondence with Cartwright,
Cory
E-mail Communication with client
Review of Document(s) Fax from Corey
Revision ofMemorandmn and legal research
regarding community and separate property

Continued ...
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Page:

Wiggins

04/02/2010

DATE

mIT

o1114120 10

RBM

Preparation ofDocument(s)- Final Revision
of Memorandum, meeting with clients,
conference with Zions Bank officials

2.0/)

400.00

01114/2010
01114/2010

RBM
RBM

Email communication with/from Dennis
E-mail correspondence with Wiggins, Lynn

0.05
O.O'i

10.00
10.00

0111412010
0112612010
01126/2010

RBM
RBM
RBM

1.00
LOf)
0.3')

200.00
200.00
60.00

01128/2010

RBM

0.7i

150.00

01/29/2010

RBM

Conference with client
Conference with client
Review ofDocument(s) Information from
e-mail with client
Conference with Robin Wood at Weiser
Care Center re MSA
Preparation ofDocument(s)- Fax documents
to Corey and email to client (2x)

O.2i

50.00

01129/2010

RBM

1.91)

380.00

02/0112010

RBM

004,)

80.00

02/01/2010

RBM

004,)

80.00

02/0l/201O

RBM

2.5)

500.00

02/0112010

RBM

0.25

50.00

02/02/2010

RBM

004)

80.00

02/02/2010

RBM

2.3)

460.00

02/03/2010

RBM

Preparation of Document(s)- Subpoena and
telephone conference with Robin
Preparation ofletter to client, Court, Kathy,
and Corey
Preparation of Document(s)- Responsive
Memorandum and email to Corey (2x)
Conference with client and review testimony

2.0)

400.00

02/03/2010
02/03/2010

RBM
RBM

1.0)
3.3)

200.00
660.00

02/03/2010

RBM

0.9)

180.00

02/04/2010

RBM

Court Hearing
Preparation of Document(s)- 1st Draft of
Post Hearing Memorandum
Review ofDocument(s) Reply Brief from
Corey
Preparation ofDocument(s)- work on Post
Hearing brief and review entire federal
statute for inclusion into the brief and email

1.00

200.00

02/08/2010

RBM

1.10

220.00

02/08/2010

RBM

0.30

60.00

02/08/2010

RBM

0045

90.00

02112/2010
02/24/2010

RBM
RBM

0.05
0.25

10.00
50.00

03/0112010

RBM

0.30

60.00

03/0112010

RBM

0.20

40.00

OF SERVICE

Preparation of Document(s)- Flow Sheet for
42 USC
Preparation of letter to Client, Kathy, and
Corey
Review ofDocument(s) Fax from Corey and
review of Reply Brief
Review ofDocument(s) File and
Documents, preparation of Trial Exhibits

Revision of Post-Hearing Memorandum and
email to Dennis
Preparation of letter to client, Court, and
Corey
Email communication with/from Dennis
Voorhees and review of e-mail from Corey
and attached Memorandum re Attorney Fees
Email communication with/from Dennis
Preparation ofletter to client and review of
fax from Corey
Preparation ofletter to Corey, Court, and
Client and email to Dennis
Preparation ofDocument(s)- Affidavit of
Service

Al\10UNT

Continued ...

3

')fOOl Lynn Wiggins

04/02/2010

DATE

INIT

03/0112010

REM

03/0412010

RBM

03/05/2010

REM

03/08/2010

RBM

03/09/2010

REM

0311312010

REM

03/1312010

OF SERVICE

Page:

S

AMOUNT

2.30

460.00

0.05

10.00

0.05

10.00

0.05

10.00

Email communication with/from Dennis
Voorhees
Review of Document(s) -Peny case, and
preparation of First SuppJ. Memorandum,

0.05

10.00

1.1J

220.00

REM

E-mail correspondence with Wiggins, Lynn

0.05

10.00

03115/2010

REM

0.20

40.00

03118/2010

REM

0.65

130.00

0312612010

REM

0.8·)

160.00

03/31/2010

REM

Preparation of letter to Corey and letter to
Client
Review ofDocument(s) Response to March
15,2010 Memorandum
Review ofDocument(s) IDAPA and
defenses from Dennis
Preparation of Document(s)- Responsive
Memorandum to Department's March 15,

1.60

320.00

03/31/2010

REM

E-mail correspondence with Wiggins, Lynn

0.05

10.00

03/31/2010
03/3112010

REM
REM

0.1,)
0.75

20.00
150.00

04/0112010

REM

0.05

10.00

04/0212010

REM

0.60

120.00

04/02/2010

REM

0.40

80.00

04/02/2010

RBM

Preparation of letter to Corey
Conference with clients, e-mail decision to
Voorhees
Email communication with/from Dennis
Voorhees
Preparation ofDocument(s)- 1st Amended
Petition for Distribution
Preparation of Document(s)- Preparation of
letter to Corey, Court, and clients
E-mail correspondence with Wiggins, Lynn

0.10

20.00

04/02/2010

REM

E-mail correspondence with Wiggins, Lynn

0.1 0

20.00

04/0212010

REM

0.30

60.00

04/0212010

REM

0.30

60.00

04/02/2010

REM

0.80

160.00

04/0212010

REM

Preparation ofDocument(s)- 1st Amended
Inventory Schedules of Property
Preparation ofDocument(s)- 2nd Amended
Notice ofHeariong
Preparation of Document(s)- 1st Amended
Schedule of Distribution
Preparation of Document(s)- revision of
Order Approving 1st Amended Petition for
Final Settlement of Estate and Closing Order

0040

80.00

64.4

$12,880.00

Preparation of Document(s)- Supplemental
Post hearing memorandum
Email communication with/from Dennis
Vorhees
Email communication with/from Dennis
Voorhees
Email communication with/from Voorhees
re statutes of liens, regulations, and

OUR FEE:

Continued ...
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THE VOORHEES LAW FIRM

Attorney at Law
112 Shoshone St E PO Box Z
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0090
Tel: (208)736-6000
R Bradley Masingill
Attorney at Law
PO Box 467
Weiser ID 83672

2/22/2010

Inv #: 2067

RE: Wiggins Medicaid Claim
Description
12/2/2009 Received and preliminarily reviewed Brad's request for
consultation and opinion on certain legal positions in
defense of Medicaid estate recovery claims. Locate and
transmit text of applicable IDAPA rules for Brad on the
topic of limits to state's Medicaid recovery rights.
12/3/2009 Analyze memorandum for facts and law. Email inquiry to
Brad re separate property claim.
1/6/2010 Preliminary additional questions re facts of case to Brad.
Analyze memorandum in detail
2/26/2010 Research and write defenses available for transmuted
property based on IDHW regulations and statutory
limitations on court action to set aside transfers. Discuss
defenses with Brad

Time Attorney/Professional
(1.8

Dennis S. Voorhees

0.5 Dennis S. Voorhees
1.2 Dennis S. Voorhees
1.0 Dennis S. Voorhees

Total Fees and Costs:

$700.00

Balance Due:

$700.00

EXHIBIT
Ih

CL

iu

--..

------~------..

-,-------.~------------------------------------

NON-TAXABLE EXPENSES:

FF Sum advanced for filing fees
Sum advanced for filing fees
Postage for January 2010
Postage for February 2010
Sum advanced for service fee Service ofRobin Wood··
Other professionals Expert Dennis Voorhees Bill
Total Non-Taxable Expenses
Total Expenses

90.00
34.00
1.22
8.49

20.00,
700.00
853.71
853.71

EXHIBIT

R. BRAD MASINGILL
Attorney at Law
27 West Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone # 1 (208) 414-0665
Fax # 1 (208) 414-0490
email bmasim!ill(a.)hotmail.com

f

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATES
OF:

VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and
EMERSON D. WIGGINS
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV 2009-1926
ORDER APPROVING PETITION
FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT OF
ESTATE ANn CLOSING ESTATE

Upon consideration of the Petition for Approval of Final Settlement of Estate, the
Inventory, and the Schedule of Final Distribution filed by the Personallepresentative, and good
cause appearing therefore, the Court finds that the allegations and statements in the Petition are
true, all required notices have been given or waived, and that the esta:e has been administered
according to the laws of the State of Idaho and the orders of this Court aJd should be closed.

Order Approving Final Settlement and Closing Estate - 1

THEREFORE, and in accordance therewith, the Court Orders as f()llows:

(1)

The Court approves the Petition for Final Settlement together with the Schedule

of Final Distribution annexed thereto as filed by the Petitioner; and

(2)

The Court authorizes and directs the Petitioner to pay any outstanding

encumbrances, pay any remaining costs or fees for administration, any attorney fees and costs
remaining unpaid, any taxes due, any interest which may have accrue'd during administration,
and any accounting fees necessary to close the estate, transfer title in the assets of the estate as
deemed necessary by the Personal Representative, and distribute the remainder of the assets of
the estate to the distributees in the amount (together with any interest earned thereon and less any
fees or costs as aforementioned) in the manner set forth in the Schedule of Distribution; and
(3)

That after Petitioner has made such final settlement and distribution, he is

discharged and released from his obligation.

()oIO
- - - - - ' 1 1 - - - - - - - , '2~

Order Approving Final Settlement and Closing Estate -::

Apr. 7. 2010

3:39PM

No.8169

P. 18

LAWRENCEG. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH

Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Human Services Division
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT

Deputy Attorney General
Human Services Division
3276 Elder. Ste. B
POBox 83720
Boise ID 83720-0036
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
ISB No. 3361
[cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov]

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAl, DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASIDNGTON
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2C09-1926

VIVIAN WIGGINS and

)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

EMERSON D. WIGGINS l

)
)

EXE'MPT: I.C. § 313212

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:

~

)

Deceased.

)

--------------------------~)
TO:

LYNN WIGGINS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, AND HfS ATTORNEY OF
RECORD, BRAD MASINGILL, ATIORNEY AT LAW, AND TO THE CLERK OF
THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GWEN THAT THE STATE OF IDAHO} DEPARTMENT OF

HEALTH AND WELFARE (hereinafter "the DepartmentH ), appeals pu meant Idaho Code
§ 17-201 and Rule 83, Idaho Rules ofCivll Procedure as follows:
j

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

Y;\MRCases\Estal j\WlgglnsVID Coul1\Nolice of Appeal.wpd

Apr. 7, 2010

1.

3:39PM

No.

~lb~

r

I~

The title of the court from which the appeal IS taken is th.le M:agistrate Division of

the District Court of the Third Judicial District ofllie State ofIdaho in 2tUd for the County of

Washington, Magistrate Judge Gregory F. Frates, presiding.
2.

The title of the court to which the appeal is taken is the District Court of the Third

Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Washington,
3.

The Department appeals from the MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING

PETITIONER'S CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE filed March 30, 20 O.
4.

This appeal is taken upon matters offact and law.

5.

This matter was heard by oral argument on February 3, 2010, at Weiser, Idaho~

however, no evidentiary hearing was had and no testimony or evidence ",vas taken. The hearing

was tape recorded and the recordings are in the possession of the clerk dthe court.

6.

The issues on appeal are:
ll.

Did the Magistrate err in determining that a Mardage Settlement

Agreement (MSA) existed and that such MSA trans mutt d Vivian Wiggins and
Emerson Wiggints community property to separate prop ,crY' (of Emerson

Wiggins), and that such MSA was executed in 2002 J anc. that such MSA met all
of the fonnalities required by Idaho law, and that the Department was not in error
in granting Medicaid benefits to Vivian Wiggins?

2.

Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation ofIdaho Code

§ 56-218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim ag:ainst the estate of
Emerson Wiggins?

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

Apr. 7. 2010

3:40PM

3.

IVa. d lOY

r.

LV

Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1396p as pre-empting application ofIdaho Code § 56-2187
4,

Did the Magistrate err in failing to apply the Idaho Supreme Court holding

in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman) 132 Idaho 213 (1998) to
the facts ofthis case?

5.

Is the Department entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

DATED this 7th day of Aprit 2010.

t.V~~1-~-1----Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of tho foregoing document was mailed,

postage pre-paid, and sent via facsimile, to the following:
LYNN WIGGINS

c/o R. BRAD MASINGILL
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 467
WEISER ID 83672
Facsimile: (208) 414-0490

DATED this

L

day of April, 2010.

~c1lc.LJh ~t)l.qo

MRI'C};lle Premo, Legal A;;'istant
Division of Human Servic~

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3

Y;\MRCase:s\Eslat :\wrgglnsV\D COlll1\Norlce of AP::x:al.Wpd

1

2

3
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5

R. BRAD MASIN GILL
Attorney at Law
27 W. Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone #1(208)414-0665
Fax #1(208)414-0490
Email: pmasingill({i1hotmail.com
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8
9
10

11

12

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF W ASHING10N

13
14
15

16
17
18
19

)
)
)
)
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS
)
EMERSON D. WIGGINS )
)
)
Deceased.
)

IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATES OF:

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO THE DEPARTMENT'S
MOTION TO STAY

20

21

COMES NOW, the above-entitled estate, by and through its attorney, of record,

22
R. BRAD MASIN GILL, and hereby submits the following Memorandum in Opposition
23
to the Department's Motion to Stay.
24
25

First, the Department provides the Court with no legal futhority for its motkm to
stay distribution.

The lack of authority in the Department's Motion and in its

Memorandum in Opposition to the
Department's Motion to Stay

1

Memorandum is due to the fact none exists. There is no law which would allow the

2

Court to deprive the Wiggins' heirs and/or its creditors to be held hostage to the appeal

3

by the Department of another case.

4

5
6

Second, the effect of the proposed stay is to remove the heirs and creditor's use
of the funds in the estate without any legal justification and 'Nould be a taldng

the

estate's property without compensation.

7

Third, there is no chance whatsoever that the Perry case" or the Wiggins case will

8
be altered on appeal.

The legal reasoning of two separate magistrates is not a

9
10
11

coincidence, it is the combined intellect of two jurists to see through the great Idaho
money grab.

12

Fourth, as the Department points out, the Personal Representative is responsible

13

to return the assets to the estate should the case be reversed or remanded. There has been

14

no effort to show that the personal representative, an upstanding citizen of the COlmty of

15

Washington, and former Assessor of Washington County, would not be good for it.

16

Fifth, the Department is unable, or unwilling, to post a bond or other type of

17

security required by all litigants should the losing party wish tl) appeal and preserve the

18

19

assets during the appeal. Normally, the appellate rules provide for the posting of a bond
in approximately one and one-half times the value of the asset~ being held, with interest

20
and other requirements. Some of the other requirements are picking the appropriate

21
surety. Due to the recession, it would be difficult for the Estate to submit its assets to the

22
23

24

possibility that the surety will navigate its way through the banking problems, and not
default if required to come up with the funds.

25
Memorandum in Opposition to the
Department's Motion to Stay

2

1

Finally, there are pending motions which need to be resolved, and any appeal

2

would not be allowed until those issues have been resolved. The Department seeks to get

3

around that problem by avoiding an appeal, and just seeking the Court's assistance in

4

5

depriving the heirs and creditors of the estate from their respedive rights to have those
issue resolved.

6
7

8

Dated:~ of April, 2010.

9
10
Attorney for Estate

11

12
13

14
15

16
17
18

19
20

21
22
23
24

25

Memorandum in Opposition to the
Department's Motion to Stay

1

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

3
4

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection to

5

Department's Motion to Stay was mailed by regular United States maiL, postage prepaid thereon

6

on this'l~"Jay of

,2010, to the following:

7

8

Lynn Wiggins
1520 W. 2 nd Street
Weiser, ID 83672

9

10
11
12
13

Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
c/o Kathy Garrett
Estate Recovery Officer
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 836720-0036

14

15

Lz/qllR~

16
17

R. Brad M asingIlI

18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25

Memorandum in Opposition to
Departmentls Motion to Stay

tne

R. BRAD MASINGILL
Attorney at Law
27 West Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone # 1 (208) 414-0665
Fax # 1 (208) 414-0490
E-mail: bmasingiH@hotmail.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ,\VASHINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF:

VIVIAN WIGGINS and
EMERSON D. WIGGINS,

Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2009-1926
1ST AMENDI::D PETITION FOR
APPROVAL OF FINAL SETTLEMENT,
AND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Category L 7 $ 9.00
Category L8 $25.00

PETITIONER, LYNN WIGGINS, of Weiser, Idaho, repres~nt~ to the Court thrat:

1.

decedents,

Petitioner is the Personal Representative of the estate of the above named
has collected and managed the assets of the estate, has filed Petitioner's final

inventory and schedules, paid all lawful claims against the estate, including all federal and state
estate, inheritance and other death taxes now due, and performed nIl other acts required of
Petitioner by the laws of this State pertaining to estates of the decedent5; and
2.

The time for presenting valid claims which arose prior to the death of the

decedents has expired, or it is not expected that any valid claims will be presented, all known

1st Amended Petition for Approval of Final Settlement - 1

valid claims have been paid, or have been provided for in the final dis tribution and there are no
known contingent, unliquidated, or future valid claims against the estate; and

3.

That there are no valid Medicaid claims; and

4.

Petitioner has filed concurrently herewith the following:

3.

1st Amended Inventory Schedules of Property 0 f Vivian M. 'Wiggins and
5t

the 1 Amended Inventory Schedules of Emerson D. Wiggins; and
b.

5.

1st Amended Schedule of Final Distribution; and

Testacy Status:
3.

b.

The decedents died intestate; and
Petitioner has been appointed Personal Representative of the estate of the
decedents; and

c.

Petitioner affirms that the statements set forth h Petitioner's Application
for Informal Probate heretofore filed; and

6.

Based on the foregoing, and on the documents

referenc(~d

above, it appears that a

final distribution of the assets at this time is proper, subject to the ri.sht to recover against the
distributees for proportionate payment of any claim or debt found by law to be due by the estate.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests that:

1.

The Court fix a time and place for hearing on this Petition; and

2.

Notice be given as required by law.

3.

After notice and hearing, the Court enter an Order:

a.

Approving the 1st Amended Petition for Final Settlement and Distribution

together with the amended schedules as filed by the Peti tioner; and

1st Amended Petition for Approval of Final Settlement - 2

b.

Authorizing

and

directing

Petitioner

to

pay

any

outstanding

encumbrances, pay any remaining costs or fees for am ninistration, any attorney
fees and costs remaining unpaid, any taxes due, any accounting fees necessary to
close the estate, transfer title in the assets of the estate

a~

deemed necessary by the

Personal Representative, and distribute the remainder of the assets of the estate to
the distributees in the amount (together with any intere::t earned thereon and less
any fees or costs as aforementioned) in the manner set forth in the 1st Amended
Schedule of Distribution; and

c.

After Petitioner has made such final settlement and distribution,

discharging and releasing Petitioner, and closing the administration of this estate.

Dated this 'way of April, 2010.

M~fi1'
R. Brad Ivilsingill
Attorney for the Personal
RepresentmiveiEstate

1sl Amended Petition for Approval of Final Settlement - 3

VERIFICATION

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Washington

)
ss:
)

The Petitioner, LYNN WIGGINS, being sworn, having read tbe foregoing, state that the
facts set forth therein are accurate and complete to the best of the Pt:titioner's knowledge and
belief.

~

In

'-

o~

WIGGINS!?

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on the

I3f~ay of April, 2010 .

.

~E~~f\.
KALLEE EISENBARTH
NOTARY PUBUC
STATE OF IDAHO

1st Amended Petition for Approval of Final Settlement - 4

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing in: Weiser
My Comm. E:xpires: 8-26-2015

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the

ay of April, 2010,

it

true and correct copy of

the foregoing 1ST AMENDED PETITION FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION
was mailed by regular United States mail, postage prepaid thereon to th:~ following:

Lynn Wiggins
1520 W. Second
Weiser, Idaho
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
c/o Corey Cartwright
State of Idaho
Office of Attorney General
Human Services Division
3276 Elder, Ste B
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036

asingiH
Attorney f.)r the Personal
Representative

1st Amended Petition for Approval of Final Settlement - 5

Apr 20. 2010

2:15PM

No.8512

P. 2

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH

Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Human Services Division

W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
Human Services Division
3276 Elder, Ste. B
POBox 83720
Boise ID 83720-0036
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
ISB No. 3361
[cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov]

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
VIVIAN WIGGINS and
t

EMERSON D. WIGGINS,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2009-1926
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF

MOTION TO IHSALLOW
ATTORNEY Fl!3ES AND COSTS

----------------------------)
COMES NOW the State ofIdaho, Department of Health and Wdfare (hereinafter the
'"Depaltment") and submits the following memorandum of points and allthorities in support of its
Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees and Costs:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISALLOW ATIORNEYFEES AND COSTS-1
Y;\MRCases\E.slale\WlgginsV"l"i~giSir.lie\Memorandum

in Supper. ofUoUon 10 D!$;lllol'l' Altorlley f<ws.wpd

Ap r 20. 2010

2: 15PM

No,8512

p, 3

I.
BACKGROUND FACTS
Vivian Wiggins applied for Medicaid benefits on November 18,2002) and was
detennined eligible for Medicaid benefits effective September 1, 2003. Between that time and
the time of her death, the Department paid Medicaid benefits on her behalf in the sum of
$272,134.68. Prior to applying for Medicaid, the assets of Vivian Wiggins and her husband
Emerson were held as community property. While no marriage settlem;mt agreement has been

discovered, as part of the process of detennining Vivian's eligibility for benefits, the Department
treated the assets as if they had been transmuted to the separate property of Emerson. Vivian
died January 30,2009. Emerson died less than two weeks later on February 9,2009.

Lynn Wiggins was appointed personal representative of the join [ estate of Vivian and
'
Emerson on May 22,2009. The Department was not given notice until the personal
I

representative filed a Petition for Approval of Final Settlement about November 16, 2009,1 The
Department then filed its Claim Against Estate in the sum ofS264.674A5 for medical assistance
benefits paid on behalf of Vivian. The personal representative disallow ~d the claim and the
Department filed its Petition for Allowance of Claim.
The Petition for Allowance of Claim was heard by the court on February 3t 2010, and the
court thereafter issued its Memorandum Decision Denying Petitioner's ·:;Iaim Against the Estate.

Ipersonal representatives of estates subject to Medicaid claims are required to g ve the DepaIimenl notice
within 30 days of their appointment. Idaho Code §§ 56.218(5), 15.3-g01(d).

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ~ 2

Y;\MRCases\Esi~t,\WigginsV'.Masislrnle\M;mol'llndum in SUppal! oCMolion (0 Disallow Altom6y I'eos.wpd

Ap r, LO, '2010

L: lJPM

No,

~JlL

r, 4

The personal representative now claims attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-1 17, 12-1202,
12-121, and Rule 54, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
II.

PREVAILING PARTY

As a threshold issue, attorney fees may only be awarded to a pre?ailing party. Rule
54(e)(l); Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Department filed its Notke of Appeal on April 7,

2010. and therefore which party may ultimately be the prevailing party has not been detennined.
However, the Department aclmowledges that the question of attorney fe;~ and costs is correctly
before the court pursuant to Rule 83(i)(2), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedu:r'e, and Rule 13(b)(9),
Idaho Appellate Rules. Therefore. for purposes of this memorandum, tbe Department will treat
the personal representative as the prevailing party.

In.
I

THE DEPARTMENT DID NOT BRING OR PURSUE ITS
CLAIM FRIVOLOUSLY, UNREASONABLY, OR
WITHOUT FOUNDATION.

Idaho Code § 12-121, together with Rule 54(e)(1), Idaho Rules e:fCivil Procedure,
pennits an award of attorney fees where the non-prevailing party's case was '1Jrought, pursued or
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Most of the personal
representative's suggestions of what might be frivolous or unreasonable arc~ merely
disagreements with the Department's theory of the case. That the court disagreed with the

lrhe personal representative provides no argument to explain how (his section could apply.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISALLOW ATIORNEY FEES AND COSTS ~ 3

Y:\MRCsse.s®iiaie\WigginsVIMagi,(ralc\}\,kmorandum in SupPOI1 ofUollon 10 Di:5illlow AHomey f~.wpd

Apr.LV.
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H

Department's arguments is a ugiven in this context and does not suggegt the Department's case
was pursued "frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation."

A.
Black.letter Idaho Law Clearly Supports tho Department's Clairrl in this Matter. and Preemption by Federal Law Was Certainly Not Obvious.
It is undisputed that the Department provided medical assistance benefits to Vivian

Wiggins in the sum of$272)134.68. Idaho Code § 56-218(1) provides a~ follows:
Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was
fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistance
may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of tl:le spouse, if any,
for such aid paid to either or both;
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (underline added), Clearly! the black-letter law in the State ofIdaho
pennits this claim. There is no restriction in this clear statutory grant of authorily which would
prevent the Department's claim from extending to property that had been community property
but was transferred toI the spouse. Indeed. IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 clearly anticipates
that
I
property transferred to the spouse will be subject to the Department's claim:
A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the value of the
assets of the estate that had been, at anytime after October 1, 19:!1. community

property, or the deceased participant's share of the separate property, and jointly
owned property.

IDAP A 16.03.09.900.20 (underline added). There is no question but thnt the Department's claim
in this matter is firmly supported by Idaho law.
The disallowance of the personal representative, and the holding of the court in this case
is based on pre-emption. The court held, in essence, that Idaho's clear statutory and regulatory

law cannot be enforced because it conflicts with a federa1 law. This is certainly not an obvious

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISALLOW ATIORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 4
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defect in Idaho law. As shown by the Affidavit ofW. Corey Cartwright the Department has
consistently sought recovery of the type of property identified in this cas e since at least prior to

1996. Before the recent ~ case in Ada County, and this case, the only challenge this law has
faced was in the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6
(1998) which the Department viewed as a victory, and fully supportive ofIdaho statutes and

Departmental practice. After Jackman, the Department's recoveries of tilis type of property from
spouse estates continued for more than another decade without a challenge, Indeed, during that
time; the law was re-drafted to comply with the Supreme Court's decisions in In re Estate of
Kaminsky, 141 Idaho 436,111 P.3d 121 (2005) and In re Estate of Eltiott, 141 Idaho 177.108
P.3d 324 (2005). These cases challenged the timing of the Department";;: claim in spouse estates,
but did not question the Department's right to recover property transfem:d to the spouse from the
spouse's estate. The re-drafting was performed by some of the most expert attorneys in the field
of estate planning and Medicaid taw and at no time was any issue raised about the Deparbnent's
ability to recover property transferred to the spouse, such as the issue raised in this case. Indeed,
the very purpose of the law was to recovery property of this type. Clearly, there was a solid
foundation for the Department's filing and attempt to enforce its claim in this matter.

B.

The Department's Conduct in this Matter Has Been Reasonable ;;Ind in Good Faith.
The personal representative also seems to take issue with the Department's conduct ill

this matter, claiming the Department failed to alert the court to the ~: decision:
The State faHed to alert the Court or opposing counsel of the Per:y decision,
despite its obvious relevance to this case. The failure to disclose dispositive,

relevant case law would be the subject of a bar reprimand if done by private

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISALLOW ATIORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 5
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/

counsel. The State ofIdaho's counsel should be held to a higher standard. The
State's blatant failure to disclose is unreasonable.
Memorandum in Support of the Estate}s Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. p. 4. Perhaps the
personal representative would not have been so quick to cast that stone ifhe had looked at the
timing more closely. As shown by the Affidavit ofW. Corey Cartwrigh!, the personal
representative received the ~ decision and transmitted it to the court before the attorney for
the Department had even seen it. The attorney for the Department saw the ~ decision for the
first time on March 16, 2010, and discussed the matter with his client and superiors the following
day, by which time, the personal representative's memorandum transmitdng that document to the
court had also been received. There was nothing to disclose that was not a1ready fully disclosed
to the court.
The personal representative also refers to "an unsigned, unverified, and wholly
inappropriate section of some document." Memorandum in Support of1lhe Estate's Motion for
l

Attorney Fees and Costs, p. 5. The Department cannot determine what document the personal
representative is referring to. If the personal representative is referring to the original Jaclanan
decision, that document was provided, not as authority, but as explanation for the court's later
revised decision, and is certified by the clerk of the Supreme Court.
Also. the personal representative refers to the Elliott case, supra: contending that in
Elliott "attorney's fees and costs were awarded against the State and affirmed on appeal by the
Idaho Supreme Court. The same award should be made herein." Memcrandum in Support of the
Estate's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, p. 7. This is the "attorney fees by association"
argument, and is factually incorrect. The Elliott case involved the timing of the Department}::;
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claim where there was a living spouse, not the validity of a claim againslt fonnerly community
property, and resulted in the re-drafting of the statute enacted by the 2006 legislature. In Ellio.ll,

there were no attorneys fees awarded by the magistrate, attorney fees were denied by the District
COUlt on

appeal, but were granted by the Supreme Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117, not

12-121. Neither the facts nor the legal issues in this case are in any way related to the Elliott
case.

Finally, the Department's actions in pursuing its claim have been continually reasonable
and above-board. While dealing with cont.inually shifting legal theories by the personal
representative, t.he Department provided advance legal briefing to the personal representative to
explain the Department's position, provided the Department's entire Medicaid file to the
personal representative upon a simple email request and without formality, attempted to stipulate
to facts to assist the personal representative to present his case, and did not object to the personal
t

representative's attorney twice postponing the hearing on the Department's Petition for
Allowance of Claim.

IV.
THE DEPARTMENT DID NOT ACT WITHOUT A
REASONABLE BASIS IN FACT OR LAW.

The personal representative also claims attorney fees under Idah:) Code § 12-117, which
pennits attorney fees where the non-prevailing party "acted without a reasonable basis in fact or
law." As noted in section IlLA., above, Idaho law unambiguously penn its the Department to
recover "from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to
either or both." Idaho Code § 56~218(1) (underline added), Further, DtlPartment rule. which was
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approved by the legislature and has the effect oflaw, pennits recovery f'om ((assets of the estate
that had been, at any time after October 1, 1993, community property." IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20.
While the court may conclude that federal law precludes the application ofIdaho law as written,

it is indisputable that the Department's claim is supported by a reasona.ble basis in law," As
U

shown by the Affidavit ofW. Corey Cartwright, it was certainly not ob'\'ious that the statute and
rule were pre-empted by federal law. The law has been in effect for mOle than fourteen years
without being challenged on the basis raised here. When the law was ft:-drafted in 2005, none of
the experts in Idaho Medicaid law raised the issue presented here as a challenge or defect.
Something so obvious as to make the Department's reliance on clear Idaho law unreasonable
would not have been overlooked by Idaho practitioners for more than fcurteen years.

The persona] representative also challenges the factual basis for the Department's claim.
It is undisputed, however. that the property of this estate had been comnunity property after

Octob~r 1, 1993, as provided in IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20. That fact, alene, is sufficient to

support the Department's claim. Even under the doctrine advanced by 1he personal
representative from the case ann re Estate ofBarg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008), there was a genuine

issue as to the community property status of the property in this eState. The personal
representative argues that "the State ... stipulated, that the properly the State was seeking to lien3
was not community property." This is incorrect. The Department stipulated that, for eligibility
purposes, the Department treated the couple as if they had a maniage settlement agreement. The

)The personal representative frequently refers to the Department's claim as a "I ien," While a lien was filed in
the Secretary of State's office in this matter, the Department has pursued (his matter as an estate claim, not a lien
foreclosure. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 56.218(6)(a), whether a lien is filed or not, the estate claim is unaffected.
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Department believes that was the extent of Us stipulation regarding community property. The
undersigned realizes the court found that the Department stipulated to much more, and if this is

so, the Department's attorney erred in doing so, because no stipulation n~garding the status of the
property beyond that indicated above was intended. No marriage settlement agreement was ever
produced, the terms of such an agreement, ifit existed) were never provf;ld. That the statutory
requirements for such an agreement, if it existed, were met was also never proved. Certainly the
facts of this matter provided a "reasonable basis in fact" for the Department's pursuit of its claim.

v.
FEES FOR ATTORNEY DENNIS VOORHEES SHOULD BE
EVALUATED AS ATTORNE¥ FEES, NOT COSTS

The personal representative has requested, as discretionary costs. attorney fees for Dennis
Voorhees. Mr. Voorhees is an Idaho attorney and the work performed v'as in giving legal advice
and services. As such, these fees should be evaluated as attorney fees, and subject to the same
i

~

limitations as attorney fees, not be awarded as discretionary costs.

VI.
CONCLUSION

Being the prevailing party, alone, is not sufficient to support an award of attorney fees.
The personal representative must show that the Department's claim was "hrought, pursued or
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Under Idaho Code § 12-117, the
personal representative must show the Department Hacted without a rea~lonable basis in fact or
law." The Department's claim was well supported by both fact and law.
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DATED this 20th day of AprilJ 2010,

N~~____S:;'::1W. C
Y CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent via
facsimile, to the following:

facsimile (208) 414-0490

LYNN WIGGINS
C/O R. BRAD MASINGILL
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 467
WEISER ID 83672

WASHINGTON COUNTY CLERK
WASHINGTON COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT
485 E 3RD STREET
WEISER ID 83672

facsimile (20B) 414-2335

DATED this ~ day of April, 2010.

_--=---:-:-\~.a.......t~~ 61 fb Zl
remo, Legal A:lsistant
Division of Human Services
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R. BRAD MASIN GILL
Attorney at Law
27 W. Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone #1(208)414-0665
Fax #1(208)414-0490
Email: bmasingiU@hotmail.com
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9
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF JDAHO
10

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

11

12
13
14

IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATES OF:

15

VIVIAN M. WIGGINS

16

EMERSON D. WIGGINS

17
18

Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO DEPARTMENT'S MOTION FOR
STAY re: ATTOFINEY'S FEES

------------------------~)

19
20
21

COMES NOW, the above-entitled estate, by and through its attorney, of record,
R. BRAD MASINGILL, and hereby submits the following Memorandum of Points and

22

Law in opposition to the Department's Motion for Stay as it relates to the attorney's fees

23

and costs incurred by the Estate to its attorneys, R. Brad Masingi nand Dennis Voorhees.

24
25

Facts:

On 10th day of March, 2010, the Court issued its order denying the

Department's Claim for reimbursement for Medicaid from the separate property of

Estate~

1

Emerson Wiggins. The Personal Representative paid the

2

on the 5th day of April, 2010, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The

3

Department filed its Motion to Stay on April 7, 2010. The Motion was not received by

4

the Estate until the 10th day of April, 2010.

5

attorneys fees by check

The Department also filed its Notice of

Appeal in the present case on April 7, 2010.

6
7

ISSUES:
8
(1)

Is the motion for a stay applicable to the payment of the attorney's fees, which

9
were paid before the Department filed its motion for stay

10
11

12

(2)

Is a subsequently entered Order Staying the payment of actomey's fees applicable
retroactively.

13

14
15

16

I

17

THE DEPARTMENT'S MOTION FOR STAY

18

IS NOT EFFECTIVE RETROACTIVELY

19
20
A. Motion is not a Stay:

21
The Motion filed by the Department on April 7, 2010, is not the equivalent of a

22
23
24

25

stay. It is a request for the same. The stay cannot be effective against any action by the
personal representative taken prior to an order being issued.

1

II.

2

THE DEPARTMENT'S MOTION FOR STAY

3

IS NOT EFFECTIVE UNTIL AN ORDER IS ENTERED

4
5

6

Even if the Court felt inclined to grant a stay in this natter, the attorney's fees
have already been paid by the personal representative and the Court does not have the

7

authority to make a ruling which is retroactive in effect.

Thus, the failure of the

8

Department to file and have its motion for stay heard prior to the payment by the personal

9

10

representative is fatal to its proposed stay.

11

12

III.

13

Idaho Code 15-3-720

14

Idaho Code § 15-3-720 provides that a personal represertative who:

15

"defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not ...
is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary exp~nses and disbursements
including reasonable attorney's fees incurred." The services rendered must benefit
the estate and cannot be incurred to protect personal interests. In Re Estate of
Sauter, 615 P.2d 875 (Mont.1980); Matter of Estate of :,tephens, 117 Ariz. 579,
574 P.2d 67 (Ariz.App.1978)." In re the Matter of Eli,lsen's Estate, 105 Idaho
234 (1983).

16

17
18
19

20

In the present case, there is no doubt the personal

r,~presentative

"defended"

21

the proceeding (the claim of lien) in good faith. There is no doubt that the services

22

rendered benefited the estate. Despite the fact Lynn is the only heir, the defense of the

23

Department's unreasonable claim of lien was the type authorized by the legislature.

24

25

1

The Department's reliance on In the Matter of the ESTATE of BERRIOCHOA.

2

108 Idaho 474 (1985) is erroneous. In Berriochoa, the trial court's determination of the

3

issues was found by the Idaho Court of Appeals to have been erroneous as a matter of

4
5

law. The issue dealt with the construction of the Will. It was in response to those
erroneous conclusions that the Court made the statement attributed to it by the

6

Department about Idaho Code 15-3-720. The erroneous detemdnation was described in
7

Berriochoa as follows:
8
9

10
11

12
13

14

'The trial court erred by failing to make any determination of what the testator
intended by the phrase "manager of Adrian's Club." Further, the trial court's
findings were infected by erroneous conclusions that appellant could not be the
manager of Adrian's Club--and thus receive the liquor, beer and wine licenses-because it might interfere with the subsequent management or disposition of the
real property which the 'will provided would be held in trust; it might give
appellant an undue advantage over the administration of the trust; or it might give
appellant the power to "bulldoze" the other devisees. TIlese conclusions were
erroneous, and they indicated that the magistrate's inquiry was misdirected,
confusing appellant's authority to continue to operate ':he business as personal
representative with his status as devisee under the fifth p[ragraph of the will. "

15

16
17

18
19

20

The Court of Appeals stated what the rule is when interpreting Idaho Code
15-3-720 as follows:
"Appellant has claimed attorney fees under I.C. § 15-3-720. We have held
that a personal representative who litigates his own pers(mal interests or bequests
is not entitled to attorney fees for such litigation from the estate under I.C. § ] 5-3720. See Eliasen v. Fitzgerald, 105 Idaho 234, 668 P.2d 110 (1983); In the Matter
of the Estate of William Peterson, 38 Idaho 195, 220 P. 1086 (1923); Matter of
Stephen's Estate, 117 Ariz. 579, 574 P.2d 67 (App.1978)."

21
22

The Appellant in Berriochoa was seeking a determination that he, as personal

23

representative, was entitled to be the manager of the bar which was a specific bequest, as

24

25

he alleged, in the Will. See the following:

1

2
3

4

5

6

"Testator died after owning and operating a small bar in Mountain Horne for
some 40 years. Approximately two years prior, the appellant, a grandson, moved
from Boise to Mountain Horne to assist testator in the operation of the bar. After
appellant's move, testator and appellant executed documents defining their
business relationships and thereafter testator executed the will in question. The
will states in part:
"FIFTH: In the event my grandson, Alan A. Marriage, is manager of Adrian's
Club, Mountain Horne, Idaho, at the time of my death, then I give, devise and
bequeath to him all liquor, beer and wine licenses used in connection with the
operation of said Adrian's Club."

7

8

9
10
11
12
13

The bequest was challenged by respondents who alleged that the condition
precedent was not satisfied, i.e., that appellant Alan .A. Marriage was not the
manager at the time of death. After a trial, the magistrate court determined that "at
the time of death of Adrian Berriochoa, Alan Marriage was not the manager of
Adrian's Club .... " The decision was appealed to and affirmed by the district court.

Berriochoa dealt with a specific bequest to the

App<~llant.

The present case

has no such issue, and is not seeking the affirmation or refection of any specific bequest,
or anything personal to Lynn Wiggins. The present case deals with a claim against the

14
estate, not against Lynn Wiggins. Lyim is the sole heir, but the claim of the Department

15
is against the estate, and thus is not the type of situation found in any of the cases cited by

16
17

the Department.

18
19

The Department is also erroneously relying on the

C2 se

of In re the Mattd?7 of

20

Eliasen's Estate, supra. In Eliasen, the magistrate allowed all attorney's fees incurred by

21

the personal representative. On appeal to the District Court, the attorney's fee award was

22

approved, except for the personal representative's effort tel (1) defeat the family

23

allowance, the homestead allowance, or the exempt property, ani (2) those attributable to

24

25

the resistance of the first Personal Representative to his removal.

The Idaho Supreme Court in Eliasen, reversed the District Court, reinstating

1

2

the entire attorney fee and cost award to the personal representat:i ve as follows:

3

"The only basis for the district court's denial or apportioning of the attomey's
fees sought by the personal representative was evidt;;ntly its belief that the
contesting of the widow's rights to family allowance, homestead and exempt
property was not brought in good faith. See I.e. § 15-3-720. The district court
also refused to affirm the magistrate's allowance of attomey's fees incurred by the
personal representative in his efforts to remain the per::onal representative. We
find no abuse of discretion in the rulings of the magistrat'~: court and hence reverse
the decision of the district court overturning the magistrate's allowance of those
attorney's fees.

4
5

6
7

8
9

As in the present case, and as is the case in mos"t probates, the personal

10
11

representative was also one of the devisees of the Eliasen estate. Thus, his actions in

12

defending the claims of the widow (who killed the decedent) were in the same nature as

13

those actions of the personal representative in the case at bar, i.e. the estate was benefited,

14

the claims of the widow were defended in good faith. Further, the attorneys fees and

15

costs associated with the defense of the motion by the widow to remove the personal

16

representative, was deemed to have occurred within the protection of Idaho Code 15-3-

17
18

19

720.
The Departments memorandum aside, it is clear the law

;ll

Idaho does not support

the denial of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code l5-3-720 despite the fact

20
the personal representative has an interest in the outcome as the sole heir to the estate. In

21
fact, the Department once again cites the Court to case which, after careful review, do not

22
23

24

25

support its position.
The Department next cited In re the Estate of Zonas, 536 N.E. 2d 642(1989).
This is a case out of Ohio, so its applicability to the case at barls suspect as it pertains to

1

Idaho law, which is based on an Idaho statute. Nevertheless, the Department's position is

2

similarly flawed.

3

4
5

Zonas, dealt with the issue of whether the statute providing for

attorney's fees in favor of the personal representative is also applicable to attorney's fees
recoverable by someone other than the attorneys for the fiduciary.

Zonas states as

follows:

6
7

8
9

10
11
12
13

14

15
16
17
18

19
20

21
22

23

24
25

Appellants contend that R.C. 2107.75 mandates the recovery of their
expenses incurred during the will contest. They claim that as attorneys for
beneficiaries under the contested will, they fall within the statute's scope and
purpose. The statutory language which provides that costs of defending an invalid
will shall be allowed II * * * to the fiduciary and to the attorneys defending such
purported last will * * *II is imprecise.
Only a few Ohio cases have dealt specifically with whether statum
attorney fees are recoverable by someone other than attol'~s for the fiduciary. In
Lindsey v. Markley (1950),87 Ohio App. 529, 533,430.0.317,319,96 N.E.2d
311, 313, the court found that G.C. 12082 did not limit authorization of fees only
to attorneys for the estate's legal representative, but that fees "shall be allowed 'to
the attorney or attorneys defending such purported last will,' etc." However, in
Doty v. Peters (1958), 106 Ohio App. 435, 442, 7 O.0.2d 181, 185, 155 N.E.2d
239, 245, R.C. 2741.04 (the immediate predecessor to the current R.c. 2107.75)
was construed to mean that It * * * the executor and his attorneys may
nevertheless be paid reasonable compensation out of the estate." (Emphasis
added.)
Although appellants would construe R.C. 2107.75 to include attorneys for
both executors and beneficiaries, we decline to apply SUCil a broad reading.
Upon review, we find that other states which have statutes concerning
attorney fees in a will contest generally limit recovery of such fees to the personal
representative, executor, or administrator. Several states model their statutes after
the Uniform Probate Code provision on attorney fees which states:
"If any personal representative or person nominated as a personal
representative defends or prosecutes any proceeding. in good faith, whether
successful or not, he is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses
and disbursements including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred. Uniform
Probate Code (1987), Section 3-720. "
II

1

As the Zonas case states, the fiduciary tor the estate is entitled to be granted

2

attorney's fees and expenses so long as it was done in good laith. The Department's

3

4

reliance on Zonas for any position it might take in this case, is flawed at best, and more
importantly helpful to Lynn Wiggins' position. In fact, it gives the court a look into the

5

intent behind the Uniform Probate Code's attorney fee and costs provision, i.e. 3-720.
6
Idaho Code 15-3-720 came from the Uniform Probate Code.
7
8

9
10

Finally, the Department cites Matter of Estate of Rog;rentien, 445 N. W. 288
(Iowa 1989) for the proposition that attorney's fees in the case at bar should be denied.

11

However, Roggentien, supra, does not have any application to the case at bar.

12

Roggentien, the Iowa Supreme Court was determining the appEcation of its own statute,

13

which dealt with the issue of "extraordinary" fees and costs. That statute being addressed

14

is inapplicable to the mandatory attorneys fees and costs under Idaho Code 15-3-720.

15

Furthermore, Roggentien did not conclude that the "extraordinary" attorney's fees should

16

be disallowed. In fact, just after the portion quoted by the Department, the Iowa Court

17
18

19
20

21
22

23
24

25

In

concluded as follows:
"We determine in this instance the executor in the'llterest of the estate was
correct in seeking legal assistance to assess the nature of the proceeding and the
course of action to take on the claim. However, when it became apparent the issue
was who would take the balance of the estate the claimants or the heirs, there was
no equity in accruing attorney fees to defend the heirs' position to the detriment of
the claimant should she be successful. We therefore determine the order for fees
and costs should be modified ....
We find the attorneys have met the statutory aI td rule requirements for
claiming extraordinary fees. We allow McMeen extrai )rdinary fees for sale of
realty of 1 hour; for a nonprobate procedure to clear title of 1A hours; and
litigation time of20.6 hours, for a total of23 hours at $75 per hour; we detennine
5 hours should be allowable for attorney Hobart at $75 per hour. We modify the
order to allow extraordinary fees of $1,725 to McMeen and $377 for Hobart."

1

2

3
4
5

The case at bar is entirely different in the most significam ways, the first being the
personal representative in the case at bar was successful and saved the estate the entire
amount it had, and second, the estate in Roggentien would have been gutted by the

6

attorney's fees and costs and the claimant would have received nothing, while the case at

7

bar is just the opposite, i.e. had the personal representative not contested the

8

Department's claim, the estate would have been gutted. In equity, the case at bar is

9

contrary to the considerations in Roggentien.

10
11

In fact, the decision in RoggeI1tien

affirms the right of the case at bar to be paid its attorney's fees and costs. Equity is not a
consideration under Idaho Code 15-3-702.

12

CONCLUSION

13

14

Idaho Code 15-3-720 is mandatory, despite success, that the personal

15

representative is entitled to recover the attorney's fees and cost!: incurred in a good faith

16

defense of the Department's claim:

17
18
19

20

"a personal representative who defends or prosecute:; any proceeding in good
faith, whether successful or not ... is entitled to receive from the estate his
necessary expenses and disbursements including reasonable attorney's fees
incurred."
The defense was in good faith, was successful, and vrithout it the estate would

21
not exist. It matters not if the Department thinks fees and costs are not in good faith jf the

22
23
24

25

defense is against it. The statute is not subject to equitable principles, is not subject to a
serious contention that the defense was not successful. The e:;taTe is entitled to pay its
attorney. The payment was made before the Department to(,k action, and before the

1

automatic stay on appeal was filed. The Department failed to perfect any stay outside the

2

automatic stay on appeal, but even had it done so, its request for a stay is not sustainable.

3
4
5

-tf;1
Dated: ApriQU 2010.
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R.BRADMAS
Attorney for Estate

,

1

2
3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

4

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in

5

Support of Objection to Department's Motion to Stay was mailed by regular United States mail,

6

postage prepaid thereon on thisdUA'ay of

~i \

,2010, to the following:

7

8
9

Lynn Wiggins
1520 W. 2 nd Street
Weiser, ID 83672
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11
12
13

Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
c/o Kathy Garrett
Estate Recovery Officer
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 836720-0036

14

15
16
17
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20
21
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f!Ij~j ~:
R. Brad M:lsingill

I

KENNETH LYNN WIGGINS

I 1520 W 2ND ST
WEISER, IDAHO 83672-1208

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH
31-511240

DATE-dis JJ tl

Account Number:

422330274

EXHIBIT

f

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
VIVIAN WIGGINS and
EMERSON D. WIGGINS,
Deceased.

Case No. CV-2009-1926

ORDER RE: ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS

The Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs ofthe Personal Representative and the Motion
to Disallow Attorney Fees and Costs of the State ofIdaho, Department I)fHealth and Welfare,
having come before the court on the 21 sl day of April, 2010, and the COl.rt having received the
arguments and submissions of counsel, and being fully advised herein;
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Personal Representative shall
be allowed costs as a matter of right in the sum of $20 for witness fees, and discretionary costs in
the sum of$700 for services provided by Dennis Voorhees, for a total ([$720 in costs. Attorney
fees requested pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 121 are DISALLOWED. The court defers

n

the request for attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117, and it wi issue its decision on
that question by further order of the court.

J

ORDER RE: ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS-1

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
postage pre-paid, to the following:
LYNN WIGGINS
C/O R. BRAD MASIN GILL
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 467
WEISER ID 83672
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
HUMAN SERVICES DIVISION
3276 ELDER, STE. B
POBOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0036
DATED this

M

day of April, 2010.

Deputy Clerk

ORDER RE: ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS - 2

s~~~~(::),~
- .. \
1

2

3
4

5

R. BRAD MASINGILL
Attorney at Law
27 W. Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone #1(208)414-0665
Fax #1(208)414-0490
Email: bmasingill(a)botmail.com

BY(

~'.'. _ _
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\
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De~uty
"
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF llDAHO
10

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

11

12

13
14

IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATES OF:

15

VlVlAN M. WIGGINS

16

EMERSON D. WIGGINS

17

18

Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
THE ESTATE'S l\IOTION FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

---------------------------)

19
20
21

COMES NOW, the above-entitled estate, by and through its attorney, of record,
R. BRAD MASINGILL, and hereby submits the following Plaintiff's First Supplemental

22

Memorandum in Support of the Estate's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs. This

23

memorandum is submitted pursuant to the Court's request for ,:dditional support for the

24

Estate's request for attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code 12-Lf7.

25
Plaintiffs First Supplemental Memorandum re Idaho Code 1:~-117
1

1

Plaintiff re-asserts the legal and factual positions ir submitted in its motion

2

and memorandum in support of attorney's fees and costs, under both Idaho Code 12-121

3

and Idaho Code 12-117 without reasserting them herein.

4
5

I.

6
7

THE ESTATE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES Al\TJ) COSTS
8
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE l2-117

9
10

A.

11

Idaho Code 12-117 was enacted to provide mandatory relief

The Statute.

to estates which have incurred attorney's fees and costs because

12

i

governmental agency

acted without any basis in law or fact.

13
14
Idaho Code 12-117 reads as follows:

15
"In any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse

16

parties a state agency, a city, a county or other taxing district and a person, the

17

court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and

18

reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party ag~dnst whom the judgment

19

is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law."

20
21
22

B.

Case Law.
(1)

Elliott.

This statute has been applied against the State of Idaho

23

regarding its improper attempt to impose it's lien tmder the very same code section,

24

Idaho Code 56-218.

25

stated as follows:

See Matter of Estate of Elliott, 141 Ilaho 177 (2005), which
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1

2
3

4
5

6
7

8
9
10
11

12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19

20

21
22
23

24

25

[I]n any administrative or civil judicial proceedilg involving as adverse
parties a state agency, a city, a cOlmty or other taxing district and a person, the
court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorne y's fees, witness fees and
reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party agdnst whom the judgment
is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. I.C. § 12117(1)(2004).

This Court has held that the purpose of this sta:ute is "two-fold: '(1) to
serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency aCTion; and (2) to provide a
remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjuitified financial burdens
defending against groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies
never should harvel made." Rincover v. State, Dep't of Fin., Secs. Bureau, 132
Idaho 547, 549, 976 P.2d 473, 475 (1999) (quoting Bogner v. State Dep't of
Revenue & Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 859, 693 P.2d 1056, 1061 (1984». If the
Court determines that a party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, an
award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117 is mandatory. rd.
In ruling from the bench on the personal representative's request for attorney
fees, the district court noted that, "[s]o although I ruled in the [personal
representative's] favor and although I found that the ~:tate action was without
basis in law, as did Judge Dutcher, I do not find that the action was so
unreasonable or crossed that broad canyon that I think is required in 12-117." The
district court found that the Department's actions were vdthout a basis in law but
were not unreasonable. This determination is incolisistent considering the
circumstances of this case. The Department presented .a flawed interpretation
of I.C. § 56-218, an unambiguous statute, that botb the magistrate and the
district court judges rejected, as does this Court.

In Rincover, this Court determined that the prevaililg party was not entitled
to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117 against the Departmmt of Finance. rd. at 550,
976 P.2d at 476. This Court noted that the Departmen1 of Finance, in wrongly
denying the party's application for registration to sell securities, relied upon
statutory provisions that had not been previously construed by the court. Id.
The Court explained that, "[w]hile the district court b~low disagreed with the
Department's interpretation and application of [the statutes] to the facts presented
by [the applicant's] case, it does not appear that the Department's action was
unreasonable under the circumstances." Id. This determJ nation was based on the
Court's finding that the Department did not act "withou: or contrary to statutory
authority." Id.
This case is distinguishable from Rincover, where tile Court determined that
the Department of Finance's actions were not "without or contrary to stahltory
authority." The Department presented an erroneous interpretation of an
unambiguous statute, I.e. § 56-218. The Departmen1 a,eted without stahltory
authority in presenting its appeals to the district court and this Court.
Additionally, the Department submitted issues beyond th~ scope ofthe order :C'rom
Plaintiff's First Supplemental Memorandum re Idaho Code 1::-1 17
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which this appeal arose. The Department's actions in thi; case were unreasonable
and without a basis in law. I. C. § 12-117 required th ~ district court to award
attorney fees where the Department's actions were brought without a basis in law.
The district court correctly perceived the law but failed to properly apply I.C. §
12-117. The personal representative is entitled to her fee~ incurred in the appeal to
the district court and in the appeal to this Court pursuant 10 I.C. § 12-117."

1

2

3
4

The issue in Elliott, supra, is the identical issue

5

present~d

in the case at bar, i.e.

6

did the State pursue a lien based on its misinterpretation of the Medicaid statute, Ida/tO

7

Code 56-218. The newer cases dealing with the same issue 1:'re discussed hereinafter.

8

However, Elliott should have been a wake-up call to the Department that it's

9

interpretation of the Medicaid statute (which the Department ha 3 been misconstruing for

10

ten years) was improper and a closer look should have been

11

g~ ven

to make sure it was

being correctly interpreted.

12

(2)

13

Perry Case.

Additionally, as the Affidavit of Peter Sisson reveals, the

Department knew of the potential misinterpretation of Idaho Code 56-218 regarding the

14
issue of taking the non-Medicaid spouse's separate property,

110

Jess later than June 4,

15
2009, when Peter Sisson challenged its interpretation in the Peny ease. See Affidavit of

16

Peter Sisson filed concurrently herewith. Yet, the Department :tiled its lien request with

17

this Court on the 18th day of November, 2009 and filed its pethion for allowance of the

18

19

claim on November 30,2009. By then (5-6 months after the issue was brought up in the

20

Perry case), there was no excuse for the Department not reass,~ssing its position in the

21

case at bar. The Departments claim it had no notice of this issue for 10 years is not true.

22
23
24
25

C.

No Facts.

Idaho Code 12-117 is applicable to the present ca3e. The State had no law

upon which it could make a cogent argument. Furthermore, the facts of this case clearly
showed, as the State so stipulated, that the property upon whicl the State was seeking a
Plaintiff's First Supplemental Memorandum re Idaho Code 1: -1 7
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1

lien was not the community property of Mr. and Mrs. Wiggins, not the separate property

2

of Mrs. Wiggins, but the separate property of Emerson D. Wiggins. There are no facts

3

upon which the State could have been justified in bring this lien claim.

4

At the time of filing its lien and petition for allowance, the Department was well

5

aware of the issue, contended that the filing of a joint probate was tantamount to

6

admitting Mrs. Wiggins had an interest in Mr. Wiggin's separate property, and had

7
assisted the Wiggins in dividing the assets and making Mr. Wiggin's property separate.

8
Despite the Department's contention it had a factual basis for its claim, it had no

9
such thing. In fact, the facts show just the opposite.

10
11

12
13

D.

No Law.

In addition to the law cited to the Court in the previous memorandums, the

following recent cases support the Estate's position.

14

(1)

Taylor.

In Taylor v Canyon County Board of Commissioners, 147

15

Idaho 424 (2009), Justice Horton, concurring in part and dissentmg in part, held that it is

16

insufficient to avoid attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code 12-117 to contend it is

17

relying on a statute. Justice Horton stated in Taylor as follows:

18
19

"I concur in the result, save as to the denial of the Board':; request for an award of
attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-117. "

20

and

21

"Furthermore, because there is no statute authorizing, review of the Vickers'
petition, I would conclude that not only are they not the prevailing party, but that they
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law in bringing theii: petition. Giltner Dairy,
LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 633-34, 181 P.3d 1238, 1241-42 (2008). I would
thus award the Board attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-117. Id." (emphasis added).

22
23
24
25
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1

In Taylor, Justice Horton found that Salva's contention there was statutory

2

authority under Idaho Code 67-6512 for the Court to judicially review the issues was

3

improper.

4

5

In Taylor, the Court determined that a condition 11 rezone based upon a

development agreement was the functional equivalent of an i::suance of a special use
permit, citing Idaho Code § 67-6512.

The Court majority incorrectly, according to

6
Justice Horton, that the Court was authorized to review the Bnard's action pursuant to
7

Idaho Code 67-6512.

8
9

10

However, Justice Horton correctly pointed out that they (conditional rezone and
permit) are not the same, nor are they a functional equivalent. He would have awarded

11

attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code 12-117 against Savala for misreading the statute,

12

i.e. contending Idaho Code 67-6521 gave them the right of judicial review. See Justice

13

Horton's dissent as follows:

14
15
16
17
18

19

"In sum, I find that there is no statutory basis for any portion of the
Vickers petition for review and thus that they acted with;mt a reasonable basis in
fact or law in bringing it. I would accordingly remand. with instructions to the
district court to dismiss the petition and would award attorney fees to the Board
but not Savala." (emphasis added).

The point being, Justice Horton acknowledged that when dealing with a statute,
the misreading or misapplication thereof will not relieve a party of liability for costs and

20
attorney's fees under Idaho Code 12-117. The State, in the case at bar, contends that

21
22
23
24

because it relied on the federal and state statutes, as well as en the Jackman decision
(which only discussed community property), it is sheltered from liability under Idaho

Code 12-117.

25
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1

As mentioned in the prior memorandums, the State had the obligation to know the

2

law prior to filing its claim for lien. A simple review of the wording of the Idaho statute,

3

the legislative intent of the Idaho statute, or the wording of the federal statute would have

4
5

led a prudent attorney to question the applicability of the same t(l the separate property of
the non-Medicaid spouse. Furthermore, the State assisted the Wiggins' by dividing lheir

6
estates and paying down the estate of Vivian Wiggins (the Medicaid recipient spouse)
7
until she was eligible for Medicaid.

Eligibility is established pursuant to Medicaid law

8
when the recipient has "no interest in any other assets". As a result, Vivian had no
9

10
11

interest in Emerson's separate property due to the acts ofthe De:)aJtment. Finally,

the

foregoing was insufficient to put the Department on notice, surely the identical

12

contention in the Perry case, some 5-6 months before would have put the Department on

13

notice that its interpretation of the law deserved a closer look. There is no indication in

14

the record of any such review, but instead the Department simply claims it had been

15

doing the same thing for a decade. Doing something incorrectly for a decade does not

16

make a continued reliance thereon reasonable.

17
18

19

It is, however, the definition of

"tmreasonable" as the Court so found.
The State, in the case at bar, went far beyond the failure to properly interpret the
effect of a statute as Justice Horton opined was grounds for awarding attorney's fees

20
pursuant to Ida/to Code 11-117.

21
The State actually participated

III

the removal of all of Vivian's interest in

22

23
24

25

Emerson's property. It further attempted to use an unsigned, undated, and inadmissible
portion of a purported decision as support for its position. That action is tmreasonable as
per Idaho Supreme Court rule lS(fU which states that an unpubli:;hed opinion of the Idaho
Plaintiffs First Supplemental Memorandum re Idaho Code 1::-117
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1

Supreme Court may not be cited to any court. The Departm=nt violated the rule by

2

submitting its copy of an unpublished, portion, unsigned, and lmproper opinion of the

3

Idaho Supreme Court in Jackman.

4
5

TIle State cannot now validly claim it acted with a reasonable basis in law or fact
by claiming a lien against Emerson's separate property. There is no law supporting the

6

State's position to claim an interest, through Vivian, in Emerson's separate property, nor
7

are there any facts which could justify that position.

The :filcts and law are totally

8

9

opposite to the claim of the State in the case at bar.
If Idaho Code 12-117 applies at all, it applies in the cm:e at bar. It applies as a

10
11

matter of law and as a matter of fact.
(2.)

12

Court's Decision.

Furthermore, the Court made a finding that the State

13

acted "unreasonably". Discussing the obvious difference between automatic and non-

14

automatic transfers pursuant to 42 U.S.c. 1396(b)(4)(B), this Court stated in its decision:

15

"A transfer of community property by a Marriage Settlement Agreement is
not an automatic transfer like those specifically listed in 42 U.S.C. 1396(b)(4)(B).
Another remedy for recovery is provided in Idaho Code 56-218(2). The
Department's expansive interpretation to include lill transactions is not
reasonable." (emphasis added).

16

17
18

(3).

19

Sunnyside.

The foregoing finding alone supplies the elements

20

necessary for the mandatory award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code

21

12-117.

22

Professional Park, LLC v Eastern Idaho Public Health Distrid, --- Idaho -----, (2009)

23

which states:

24

25

Idaho Code 12-117 mandates attorney's fees. See Slimnyside Industrial And

"Idaho Code Section 12-117 is not a discretionary statute. Rincover v.
State, Dept. of Fin., Sec. Bureau, 132 Idaho 547,549,976 P.2d 473, 475 (1999)"
(emphasis added).
Plaintiffs First Supplemental Memorandum re Idaho Code 1::-1 17
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1

2
3

4

(4)

RammeH.

In a recent case, Rammell v Idaho State Department Of

Agriculture, 147 Idaho 415 (2009), Rammell asserted the foDowing issues on appeal
from a determination that he violated the department's regulation:) and a statute:

5

6
7

8
9

10
11
12

"The Rammells appeal to this Court, and present five arguments: that (1) the
hearing officer violated their due process rights by excluding some of their
proffered evidence regarding the reasonableness of the Department's rules; (2)
I.C. § 25-3708 is unconstitutional; (3) the hearing ofii(:er erred by refusing to
disqualify herself; (4) the Department regulations at issue were umeasonable and
beyond the scope ofthe Department's authority; and (5) the award of attorney fees
and costs imposed against them was improper. The Department, in turn, claims
that it is entitled to costs and fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-117."

Rammell involved the misinterpretation of a statute and regulations

an

individual against a State agency. The Court found that despite Rammell's contentions

13
that the action of the department violated its own statute and regulations, and that

14
Rammell's actions did not, an award of attorney's fees and costs against them was he1d to

15
16
17
18

19

be proper pursuant to Ida/to Code 12-117.

Rammell, supra, stands for the proposition that if dther party to an action
involving a state agency fails to correctly interpret the intentio;l of a statute, the losing
party will be awarded attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idah(} Code 12-117.

20

It is submitted that the case at bar involves a claim 1: y the State that it simply

21

misread the statutes, and therefore should not have attorney's fees and costs awarded

22

against it. Rammell instructs otherwise.

23
24

25

(5)

Truman.

In

The Matter Of The Driver's License

Suspension Of: Hal R. Truman v Department Of Transportation (hereinafter Truman),
Docket No. 36082 Court of Appeals of Idaho (filed Januar:r 27, 2010) was a case
Plaintiff's First Supplemental Memorandum re Idaho Code 1: ~-l [7
9

1

involving the failure of the Department of Transportation to grant a hearing to the driver

2

who was cited for DUI. The Idaho Supreme Court found:

3
4
5

"The district court found that the de[!artment's narrow reading of IDAPA
39.02.72.100.02 was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion because it
failed to articulate reasons for denying the hearing other than the timeliness of the
request and failed to articulate the guidelines upon which it reviews untimely
hearing requests. " (emphasis added).

6

Based on the foregoing finding, the district court awarded attorney's fees and

7

costs to the appellant pursuant to Idaho Code 12-117.

Although the district court was

8
reversed on appeal, in Truman, supra, the reversal was not on the attorney's fees issue

9
10

pursuant to Idaho Code 12-117.
The import of the Truman decision at the district court level was the

11

12

imposition of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho' Code 12-117 for the

13

Department's failure to accurately read and apply its own regulations.

14

application is required in the case at bar.

15

(6)

Gardiner.

The same

Finally, the very recerlt eases of Gardin,er v

16

Boundary County (hereinafter Gardiner), Docket No. 35007, Supreme Court of Idaho,

17

Boise, (filed March 18,2010) and In The Matter Of David T. K{)otenai Hospital District

18
19
20

v Bonner County (hereinafter David T.), Docket No. 36217, Supreme Court of Idaho,
Moscow, (Filed April 23, 2010) end any doubt regarding the iSSlle before this Court.

Gardiner, supra, holds that the agency's misinterpretation of an ordinance (the

21
same construction is used for interpretation of a statute) is suffi~ient to award attorney's

22
23

24

25

fees and costs pursuant to the mandatory provisions of Idaho Code 12-117.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Gardiner stated:
"This Court affirms the district court's award of atto:ney fees and costs and
awards attorney fees and costs on appeal.
Plaintiffs First Supplemental Memorandum re Idaho Code I:!-117
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1
2

3

4
5

6
7
8
9

10

The district court required the Board to pay attorney fees to the Gardiners under
I.C. § 12-117(1). Idaho Code § 12-117(1) provides:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil judicial
proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, o. city, a county or other
taxing district and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable
attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the
party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law.
The Board claims that the award of attorney fees was unwarranted. The Board
cites Ralph Naylor Farms v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806, 172 P.3d 1081 (2007),
Payette River Prop. Owners Ass'n, 132 Idaho 551, 976 P.2d 477 (1999), and
Idaho Potato Comm'n v. Russet Valley Produce, 127 Idaho 654, 904 P.2d 566
(1995), to demonstrate that even if it was improper for the Board to grant a special
use permit, the ruling of the Board was reasonable.

11

The Gardiners argue that Chapter 7, Section 1(E) conflicts with the
unambiguous meaning of I.e. § 67-6512(a), and in light of its clear meaning, the

12

Board's interpretation was unreasonable.

13

This Court exercises free review over a district court's application of I. C. §
12-117. Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 352, 109 P.3d 1091, 094
(2005). "The prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees under I.e. § 12-117 if
they show that the state agency 'acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.'''
Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand & Gravel, 140 Idaho 11 118, 90 P.3d 340, 343
(2004).

14

15
16
17
18

19
20

This Court affirms the award of attorney fees by the district court. This case
is similar to Lane Ranch P'ship v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 88-91,175
P.3d 776, 778-80 (2007), and Fischer, 141 Idaho at 356, 109 P.3d at 1098,
because in both cases an agency ignored the plain and unlll1biguous language of a
statute or ordinance, which led to the award of attorney f~es. Likewise, the grant
of attorney fees to the Gardiners is affirmed because the Board acted contratyjQ
an unambiguous state statute and a local ordinance.

21
22

23
24

25

(7)

David T.

In David T, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court again held

that attorney's fees under Idaho Code 12-117 were proper:
"On the other hand, we find the Hospital's position to be without reasonable
basis in fact or law and, therefore, award the County its attorney fees pnrsuant to
Idaho Code section 12-117."
Piaintiffs First Supplemental Memorandum re Idaho Code n-117
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1

David T. involved the Hospital's misinterpretation of Idaho Code 31-3505(4)(a).
2
3

4
5

6
7

8
9

10
11

12

13

With the same reasoning as this Court used in finding the State's interpretation

42

U.S.c. 1396(b)(4)(B) failed to consider the automatic enumerated situations in which the
federal statute was applicable, the David T., supra case held as follows:
"A first-party insurance claim is not one of th~: enumerated resources
contained within the exhaustive list in Idaho Code section 31-3505(4)(a), and
consequently, the Hospital cannot show that David T. filed a bona fide
application. Because David T. did not file a timely claim and because his
application cannot be construed as a valid delayed appl:ication, it is unnecessary
for this Court to consider the other arguments made by the parties. Accordingly,
we affirm the district court's decision denying David T.':; delayed application for
indigencyassistance."

David T., supra, is applicable on all fours to the C8se at bar.

This Court

determined that the list of enumerated automatic transfers in 42 U.S.c. 1396(b)(4)(B)
made the State's attempted application of the facts of the case at bar unreasonable. David

14

T., supra, found the same thing. There is no distinction between David T., supra, and the
15

16
17
18
19

case at bar.
(8)

List of Issues.

David T., supra, is applicable to the case at bar

because of the most compelling lack of facts and law summarized as follows:

a.

Idaho Code 56-218 is subject to the corstraints of 42 U.S.c.
1396(b)(4)(B); and

b.

The list of automatic transfers in 42 U.S.C. 1396(b)(4)(BJ are not
applicable to the non-automatic transfer to Mr. Wiggins; and

c.

Jackman clearly applies only to community property; and

d.

Citing to this Court an unpublished, unsigned, portion of a draft of a
decision of the Idaho Supreme Court violates Internal Rules of the Idaho
Supreme Court (lRISC) 15(/) which states:

20

21
22

23
24

25

Plaintiffs First Supplemental Memorandum re Idaho Code U-117
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"(f) Unpublished Opinions of the Court. At or after the oral conference
following the presentation of oral argument or the submission of the case
to the Court on the briefs, the Court, by the unanimous consent of all
justices, may determine not to publish the final opinion of the Court. If an
opinion is not published, it may not be cited as. authority or precedent
in any court"; and

1
2

3
4
5

e.

Idaho Code 32-903 is existing law which makes a pmiy's separate property
non-assailable; and

f.

In re the Estate of Barg, 752 N. W. 2nd (May 30, 2008) is directly on point;
and

g.

The legislative history of Idaho Code 56-218 c1~arly shows it was only
applicable to community property, not separate property of the nonMedicaid spouse; and

h.

The State assisted Emerson and Vivian in making Emerson's property
separate from Vivian's so Medicaid could be affo··ded to Vivian; and

i.

The State's assistance in making Emerson's property separate is a
judicially binding act of the Department which co ntradicted its filing a lien
against the separate property of Emerson; and

j.

This Court found the State's position to be unreascnable.

6
7

8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

II.
CONCLUSION

21

For the State to claim it is free from the application of Idaho Code 12'-117

22

because no one had opposed the State's similar actions for ten years does not allow the

23

Department to escape the liability for attorney's fees and costs. The Department was also

24

made aware of this issue in the Perry case, some 5-6 months prior to filing its claim of

25
Plaintiff's First Supplemental Memorandum re Idaho Code 12-117
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1

lien in the case at bar, contradicting the Department's claim it ilad never had this issue

2

come up.

3
4
5

6

In fact, most of the Department's claims in this case are very troubling.
Wiggins' attorney, and Peter Sisson in the Perry case, could

~!ee

If

the problem with the

State's contradictory actions, research the law and find thatlhe State's position was
flawed, it is respectfully submitted that the State, with its enOrm[lUS supply of legal talent

7
and money should certainly have been able to ascertain the intent of the State statute and

8
the Federal statute. Thus, the actions of the State have no basis in law or in fact.
9

10

11

Furthermore, the State assisted Vivian Emerson to spend down her estate and thus
become Medicaid eligible. To become Medicaid eligible, Vivian had to devoid herself of

12

any interest in Emerson's separate property. See admission of llhe State on the record at

13

the first hearing.

14

reasoning. The State is estopped from doing so both judicially and factually. The State

15

took a position in Vivian and Emerson's probate which is dinctly the opposite of the

16

position it now takes before this Court.

17

18

19

To come after Emerson's estate through Vivian is simply devoid of

If a private attorney filed a case without knowing the sta tutory and case law basis
for the same, while also taking a factual position in Court whicJ l is contrary to a position
taken in another part of the same case, that attorney would ne,t only sUQ,ject his or her

20

client to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code 12-121, he or she

21
would be sanctioned urtder IRCP 11.
22

23
24

25

The State should be held to a standard in excess of that of a private attorney. as a
matter of law. The State's actions have grave consequences for parties in a probate.
They are not likely to oppose the awesome power of the State, and they should be able to
Plaintiff s First Suppiemental Memorandum re Idaho Code 12-117
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1

rely upon the State's attorneys to be diligent in protecting all parties rights in a probate

2

where Medicaid is involved. It is clear the Department has not done so in the in:,tant

3

case, and Emerson's estate will never be made whole until attorney's fees are awarded

4
5

pursuant to the code section which mandates the recovery, i.e. Idaho Code 12-117.
The State had no basis in fact upon which to assert its 1len.

The lack of either

6

law or fact, mandates attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code 12-117.
7

As to the Court opining that Mr. Cartwright has been V(:ry pleasant to deal with,
8

9
10

the Court does not know the other side and the estate is concerned that issue will affect
the Court's decision before it. During the case, the Estate's atto:ney sent an email to Mr.
a~

he had not been such to

11

Cartwright asking him to be a bit more pleasant to deal with,

12

that date.

13

discussions. In addition, although the State did stipulate to the existence (or its

14

equivalence of) a Marriage Settlement Agreement, it did so

15

despite being asked to do so on numerous occasions. It had steadfastly denied one

16

existed until a witness was going to be called by the Estate shewing the Wiggins had to

17

18

In fact, Mr. Cartwright was curt and rude prior to the hearing in all

OI~

in front of the Court,

have executed a Marriage Settlement Agreement, because if they did not Vivian would
never have become eligible.

The witness would have also tesffied that over 70% of the

19
documents she sends to the Department are lost and the Deprutment calls to have them

20
resent. It was because of the foregoing Mr. Cartwright stipulated in Court to the obvious

21
22
23

.-

existence of a Marriage Settlement Agreement.
Dated: May.l, 2010.

24

25

Attorney for Estate
Plaintiff s First Supplemental Memorandum re Idaho Code 12-117
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1

2
3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

4

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the fc regoing Plaintiff s First

5

Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Attcmey's Fees and Costs

6

Pursuant to Idaho Code 12-117 was mailed by United States mail on this '5~ay of

7

I-'l &oW ' 201 0, to thefollowing person(s):

8
9

10

Lynn Wifgins
1520 W. 2" Street
Weiser,ID 83672

11
12

13
14

15
16

Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
c/o Corey Cartwright
State of Idaho
Office of Attorney General
Human Services Division
3276 Elder, Ste B
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036

17
18

19
20
21

/lA,l c
R. Brad l' asingill

22
23

24
25
Plaintiffs First Supplemental Memorandum re Idaho Code 12-117
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JEANNET.GOODENOUGH
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Human Services Division
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
Human Services Division
3276 Elder, Ste. B
POBox 83720
Boise ID 83720-0036
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
ISB No. 3361
[cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov]

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

IN THE MATIER OF THE ESTATE OF:

VIVIAN WIGGINS and
EMERSON D. WIGGINS,
Deceased.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2C09-1926
SECOND AFF!DA VIT OF '''.
COREY CARTWRIGHT

)
) ss.
)

W. COREY CARTWRIGHT, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
1.

I am the Deputy Attorney General for the Department of Health and Welfare, in

the above~captioned matter, and have personal knowledge of the matter:; stated herein.
2.

Attached are true and correct copies of the email corresp<mdence between myself

and the attorney for the personal representative.
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT - 1

Z;\MRCases\Estate\Wigginsv\Magistrate\Second Affidavit ofVICC.wpd

3.

Other than simple transmittals, I believe this is all of the correspondence between

myself and Mr. Masingill.
DATED this 14th day of May, 2010,

A~£

/~

W. ~ CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE me this

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT - 2

Jt

day of May, 2010.

Z;\MRCases\Estate\WigginsV lMal,>istrate\Second Affidavit ofWCC.wpd

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that duplicate originals of the foregoing
SECOND AFFIDA VIT OF W. COREY CARTWRIGHT were trl.ailed first class, postage
prepaid, on the 11
day of May, 2010, to:

LYNN WIGGINS
CIO R BRAD MASINGILL

ATTORNEY AT LAW
POBOX467
WEISER ID 83672
WASHINGTON COUNTY MAGISTRATE CLERK
WASHINGTON COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT
485 E 3 RD STREET
WEISER ID 83672

~Qjtra.d ~'-YKL
0;

Marchell Premo, Legal Assistant
Division of Human Services

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT - 3

From:
To:

Subject:

Date:

R. Brad Masingill
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid;
Re: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates
Tuesday, December 01,20094:13:01 PM

Cory: as per our discussion, please be advised that I have vacated the
hearing on the above entitled estate set for tomorrow at 11 am. I will be
in touch for determination of our further proceedings. Thank:,; for your
kindness in dealing with me. It is quite uncommon for me to be involved in
this type of matter. Bear with me, as I am learning. Despite going to the
seminars about this Medicaid and medicare stuff, it is a little complicated
when first approaching it.
Brad

From:

R. Brad Masingill
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid;
RE: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates
Thursday, December 03,20094:27:30 PM

To:
Subject:

Date:

Thanks.

Brad

-----Original Message----From: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid [mailto:CartwriW@dhw.idaho.gov]
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2009 3:45 PM
To: R. Brad Masingill
Subject: RE: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates
Here you go.
-----Original Message----From: R. Brad Masingill [mailto:bmasingill@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2009 2:54 PM
To: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid
Subject: Re: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates
Cory: I have received a copy of your most recent Memorandum. I am
collaborating with other attorneys in this case, and will have to scan the
document into my computer in order to get a copy to them. Could you be so
kind as to email me a copy? Thanks.
Brad
The information contained in this email may be privileged, confidential or
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are advised that they may
face penalties under state and federal law for sharing this information with
unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in error, please reply
to the sender that you have received this information in error. Also,
please delete this email after replying to the sender.

From:

To:
Subject:

Date:

R. Brad Masingill
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid;
RE: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates
Tuesday, January 05, 2010 3:39:36 PM

Thanks. I don't really know what I am looking for other than the look back
paperwork. I have the brief done and will file it when I have finished
reviewing the documents. Brad
-----Orig ina I Message----From: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid [mailto:CartwriW@dhw.idjlho.qov]
Sent: Tuesday, January OS, 2010 3: 18 PM
To: R. Brad Masingill
Subject: RE: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates
Sorry. I thought you were going to ask for what you wanted. I'll have
my paralegal gather the Department documents together and we'll email
them to you. Is there something in particular that you're interested in?
Corey
-----Original Message----From: R. Brad Masingill [mailto:bmasingill@hotmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, January OS, 2010 2:28 PM
To: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid
Subject: Re: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates
Cory: do I have to send discovery requests to you before I Ci:!n see the
file? I thought you had mentioned you would be willing to make that
available. Is there a way I can get it in sufficient time to use the
documents for our hearing? I would be willing to come over 1:0 Boise to
pick it up, but would rather you just copy and send it to me. Thanks.
Brad
The information contained in this email may be privileged, confidential or
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are advised that they may
face penalties under state and federal law for sharing this information with
unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in error, please reply
to the sender that you have received this information in error. Also,
please delete this email after replying to the sender.

From:

To:
Subject:

Date:

Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid
tlR. Brad Masingill";
RE: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates
Monday, January 111 2010 5:37:00 PM

Brad: I asked my staff about this. The order of the documents doesn't mean
anything. I'm told the regional files come to us in no particular order and the
order your received the documents was just the order in which they were pulled
and scanned.
-----Original Message----From: R. Brad Masingill [mailto:bmasingill@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, January 08, 20102:13 PM
To: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid
Subject: Re: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates
Corey: the documents I received were in no particular order by date. I resorted them, but now that I think about it, was there some reason for them
being out of chronological order? Thanks.
Brad

From:

To:
Subject:
Date:
Attachments:

Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid
fiR. Brad Masingill";
RE: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates
Monday, February 01, 20104:21:00 PM
20100120 Caseworker Notes.pdf

Brad, I've been digging through this file looking for anything having to do with
the MSA, and I found these caseworker notes. They weren't part of the regional
file (they come off the computer only), so I don't think you got them.
Page 3 refers to a redetermination done in 2004 where the wl)rker assumes
there was a marriage settlement agreement when eligibility was first
determined. Note the "HOPE SO ANYWAY" language.
I'm not sure this helps except to support the belief that DHW assumed one
existed, but I thought you should have it.
Corey

-----Original Message----From: R. Brad Masingill [mailto:bmasingi@ruralnetwork.net]
Sent: Saturday! January 09, 2010 1:38 PM
To: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid
Subject: RE: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates
Ok. Thanks. Brad
-----Original Message----From: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid [mailto:CartwriW@dhw.idaho.gov]
Sent: Friday, January 08, 2010 3:09 PM
To: R. Brad Masingill
Subject: RE: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates
Brad, we've looked and we don't have the marriage settlement agreement.
Not sure it was ever provided to the Department.
-----Original Message----From: R. Brad Masingill [mailto:bmasingill@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, January 08, 2010 1:16 PM
To: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid
Subject: Re: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates
Corey: I could not find a Marriage Settlement Agreement in the file you sent.

Could you make sure it has not been overlooked? Thanks.
Brad
The information contained in this email may be privileged, confidential or
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are advised that they may face
penalties under state and federal law for sharing this information with
unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in error, please reply to the
sender that you have received this information in error. Also l please delete this
email after replying to the sender.

From:
To:
Subject:
Date:

Brad Masingill
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid;
Wiggins Estate
Monday, February 01, 2010 5:00:45 PM

Corey: thanks for the copy of the previous Jackman decision. I will read
it tonight and get back to you tomorrow.
Brad

From:

To:
Subject:
Date:

Brad Masingill
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid;
Wiggins Estate
Monday, February 01, 2010 4:34:45 PM

Cprey: I wanted you to know that we have not been able to find the
MSA. We are still looking. If you wish to talk about settling this case
please give me a call. I would talk to my clients about t if you are
interested.
Brad

From:

To:

Subject:
Date:

Brad Masingill
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid;
Wiggins Estate
Tuesday, February 02, 2010 9:41:30 AM

Corey: I am afraid I don't read the first Jackman decision the way you

do. I will be filing a response to your brief.
Brad

from:
To:

cc:
Subject:

Date:
Attachments:

Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid
HR. Brad Masingill";
Genta, Stacey - Medicaid;
RE: Wiggins Estate
Monday, February 08, 2010 9:46:00 AM
Generic Brief.Ddf

Brad, I think a personal representative can be reimbursed for attorney fees
reasonably necessary for administering an estate. IC 15-3-715(21). However, a
personal representative is a fiduciary who has at least as much of a duty toward
creditors of the estate, such as the Department, as he does toward the heirs of
the estate, including himself. A personal representative is not permitted to take
sides. In our case, I believe you are representing the family in a personal
capacity in seeking to overturn Idaho law, rather than the personal representative
administering the estate in accordance with existing law. I think the family has to
be responsible for those portions of your attorney fees relatinrJ to challenging
Idaho law governing spousal estate recovery. I've attached a generic brief that
I've used in the past that deals with the duty of the personal mpresentative in not
taking sides.
Corey

From: R. Brad Masingill [mailto:bmasingill@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, February 04, 2010 5:09 PM
To: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid
Subject: Wiggins Estate
Corey: I will likely be filing my Post Hearing Brief tomorrow.
attorney's fees paid from the estate? Brad

em I

get my

From:

To:
Subject:

Date:

R. Brad Masingill
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid;
RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement
Tuesday, April 13, 2010 12:21:45 PM

Corey: I agree that our documents must have passed in the mail. I had
no more than objected to the motion for stay than I had an appeal in the
mail. On the other scores, I think your appeal is quite premature. The
issue of attorney's fees and costs is a necessary elemert to have
resolved before removing jurisdiction from the magistrate. I think you
will find the District Court agreeing with that assessmerlt, and it will only
take more time to go forward with whatever you intend to do. I don't
know everything about appellate practice, but I would suggest you
withdraw your appeal and wait until you have a final judgment from
which to appeal. Maybe the State is exempt from the !'ules, so I will
take a look, but I cannot imagine an appellate court hearing your appea
and then having the second part of it coming up. Let me know what you
want to do. You were quite cold to me when we starteci this case, but
you have improved, so I would be willing to stipulate to some other
procedure if you think of one. I was thinking of stipulating that the
appeal would be held until the attorney's fees and costs issue was
resolved, but I don't know if he can stipulate away or to jurisdiction.
But, if it is helpful to you I would be willing to do so. I don't hold
grudges. One other thing, I need to know if you are aV\dare of any other
magistrate or district court decisions on this issue. It Vvould be helpful to
see those court's reasoning. Brad
From: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid [mailto:CartwriW@dhw.idaho.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 10:52 AM
To: R. Brad Masingill
Subject: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement
Dear Brad: I have your 1st Amended Petition for Approval of Final Settlement and
other documents (We got them yesterday, April 12. They show they were mailed
Monday, April 5, so the mail is slow coming from the statehousH). Since our Notic,3
of Appeal was filed on the 8th and your documents were mailecl on the 5th (and
filed with the court on the 9th), it appears these may have crossed in the mail.
Since this isn't one of the matters listed under JAR 13(b), I woul:1 think the
magistrate no longer has jurisdiction to hear this matter. Do you clgree? If so, will
you vacate the hearing now set for April 21?
I also have your Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs and your Memorandum in
Opposition to the Department's Motion to Stay (which were are stm trying to set for
hearing), so we'll still have a couple of upcoming hearings in this matter, but I think
the petition for final settlement will have to wait until after the appeal.

Please let me know what your intentions are.
Corey Cartwrig ht

The infonnation contained in this email may be privileged, confidential or
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are adviE~ed that they may
face penalties under state and federal law for sharing this bfonnation with
unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in error, please reply to
the sender that you have received this infonnation in error., Also, please
delete this email after replying to the sender.

From:
To:
Subject:
Date:

Brad Masingill
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid;
RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlemert
Tuesday, April 13, 2010 12:36:08 PM

Corey: I agree that our documents must have passed iT, the mail. I had
no more than objected to the motion for stay than I had an appeal in the
mail. On the other scores, I think your appeal is quite premature. The
issue of attorney's fees and costs is a necessary element to have
resolved before removing jurisdiction from the magistrate. I think you
will find the District Court agreeing with that assessment, and it will only
take more time to go forward with whatever you intend to do. I don't
know everything about appellate practice, but I would suggest you
withdraw your appeal and wait until you have a final judgment from
which to appeal. Maybe the State is exempt from the rules, so I will
take a look, but I cannot imagine an appellate court hearing your appeal
and then having the second part of it coming up. Let me know what you
want to do. You were quite cold to me when we starteei this case, but
you have improved, so I would be willing to stipulate to some other
procedure if you think of one. I was thinking of stipulating that the
appeal would be held until the attorney's fees and costs issue was
resolved, but I don't know if he can stipulate away or to jurisdiction.
But, if it is something you want to try, I will be happy to do so.
Brad

Subject: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 2010 10:52:05 -0600
From: CartwriW@dhw.idaho.gov
To: bmasingill@hotmail.com
Dear Brad: I have your 1st Amended Petition for Approval of I=inal Settlement
and other documents (We got them yesterday, April 12. They show they were
mailed Monday, AprilS, so the mail is slow coming from the statehouse). Since
our Notice of Appeal was filed on the 8th and your documentn were mailed on
the 5th (and filed with the court on the 9th), it appears these rllay have crossed in
the mail. Since this isn't one of the matters listed under tAR 13(b), I would think
the magistrate no longer has jurisdiction to hear this matter. Do you agree? If so,
will you vacate the hearing now set for April 21?
I also have your Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs and you;, I'vtemorandum in
Opposition to the Department's Motion to Stay (which were al'e still trying to set
for hearing), so we'll still have a couple of upcoming hearings in this matter, but I

think the petition for final settlement will have to wait until aftel' the appeal.
Please let me know what your intentions are.

Corey Cartwright
The information contained in this email may be privilegE:ld, confidential or
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are advised that they
may face penalties under state and federal law for sharing this
information with unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in
error, please reply to the sender that you have received this information
in error. Also, please delete this email after replying to the sender.

From:

To:
Subject:

Date:

R. Brad Masingill
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid;
RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement
Tuesday, April 13, 2010 3:05:57 PM

Thanks for the reply Corey. I also want to be friends. I seldom have
a case where the opposing attorney and I are at odds. Hal Ryan, my
former partner, told me to be that way and I have tried. As you know,
I hope you don't succeed in your appeals. Good legell issues, don't
you think? It is not often we get such juicy ones. Brc\d
From: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid [mailto:CartwriW@dhw.idaho.gov]

Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 2:02 PM
To: R. Brad Masingill
Subject: RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement
Brad: The attorney fees and costs are listed under IAR 13(b)(9), so the appeal
doesn't deprive the magistrate of jurisdiction to hear that. I don't think the appeal is

premature. The magistrate's decision on attorney fees can become an issue on
appeal if needed. I'll do my motion to disallow the attorney fees and set that for
hearing before the magistrate as contemplated by the rules. I don't think that will
affect the appeal going forward since it will take time to get the transcript prepared
and the transcript and record settled. The attorney fee question will be decided
long before we get to the briefing stage on the appeal.
I'm trying to set the Motion to Stay before the district court (appnllate) judge
because I've asked to stay the appeal itself which I don't think tile magistrate has
authority to do. I did the motion to stay the appeal itself simply :0 save everyone
(myself included) time and expense. I'm not trying to stay the attorney fee issue,
just distribution of the estate and the appeal itself. While I can't guarantee it, I think
the Perry case will go to the Supreme Court. I think Pete Sisson will appeal if we
prevail before the district court. That would certainly decide at least the important
legal issues in this case.
I'm sorry if I seemed "cold" to you. I was under the impression I had been overly
helpful and cooperative, to the point of perhaps harming my cliHnt since the
magistrate certainly got the facts different than I had thought I rad stipulated to. I
would hope that we could keep this matter on a professional and collegial basis
rather than have it become personal (I get paid the same (not much) whether I win
or lose).
If you are asking if there are other Idaho court decisions relatinq to the Barg case, I
don't know of any. I'm sure we'll get some more objections based on Barg before

this is all decided and I'll simply try to stay them pending the outcome in Perry and
this case.

From: R. Brad Masingill [mailto:bmasingi@ruralnetwork.net]
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 12:22 PM
To: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid
Subject: RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement
Corey: I agree that our documents must have passed in the mail. I had
no more than objected to the motion for stay than I had an appeal in the
mail. On the other scores, I think your appeal is quite premature. The
issue of attorney's fees and costs is a necessary element to have
resolved before removing jurisdiction from the magistrclte. I think you
will find the District Court agreeing with that assessment, and it will only
take more time to go forward with whatever you intend to do. I don't
know everything about appellate practice, but I would suggest you
withdraw your appeal and wait until you have a final judgment from
which to appeal. Maybe the State is exempt from the rules, so I will
take a look, but I cannot imagine an appellate court hearing your appeal
and then having the second part of it coming up. Let me know what you
want to do. You were quite cold to me when we started this case, but
you have improved, so I would be willing to stipulate to some other
procedure if you think of one. I was thinking of stipulating that the
appeal would be held until the attorney's fees and costs: issue was
resolved, but I don't know if he can stipulate away or to jurisdiction.
But, if it is helpful to you I would be willing to do so. I don't hold
grudges. One other thing, I need to know if you are aVlare of any other
magistrate or district court decisions on this issue. It would be helpful to
see those court's reasoning. Brad
From: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid [mailto:CartwriW@dhw.idaho.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 10:52 AM
To: R. Brad Masingill
Subject: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement
Dear Brad: I have your 1st Amended Petition for Approval of Filla! Settlement and
other documents (We got them yesterday, April 12. They show they were mailed
Monday, April 5, so the mail is slow coming from the statehouso). Since our Notice
of Appeal was filed on the 8th and your documents were mailed on the 5th (and
filed with the court on the 9th), it appears these may have crosHed in the mail.
Since this isn't one of the matters listed under tAR 13(b), I would think the
magistrate no longer has jurisdiction to hear this matter. Do you agree? If so, will

you vacate the hearing now set for April 21?
I also have your Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs and your Memorandum in
Opposition to the Department's Motion to Stay (which were are :Btill trying to set for

hearing), so we'll still have a couple of upcoming hearings in this matter, but I think
the petition for final settlement will have to wait until after the appeal.
Please let me know what your intentions are.
Corey Cartwright

The information contained in this email may be privileged; confidential or
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are advised that they may
face penalties under state and federal law for sharing this information with
unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in error, please reply to
the sender that you have received this information in error., Also, please
delete this email after replying to the sender.
The information contained in this email may be privileged,: confidential or
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are advised that they may
face penalties under state and federal law for sharing this information with
unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in err!)r, please reply to
the sender that you have received this information in error Also, please
delete this email after replying to the sender.

From:
To:
Subject:

Date:

Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid
"R. Brad Masingill";
RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement
Tuesday, April 13, 2010 3:49:00 PM

As far as good legal issues, for me Yogi Berra's famous quotE) comes to mind:
"This is like deja vu all over again." I thought we had put this issue to rest in
1998 in Jackman. When the Barg case was decided the estate recovery folks
from many states talked about it and asked what states would be affected. I
remember thinking it wouldn't affect Idaho because the issue had already been
litigated and decided in Jackman. I wasn't surprised when someone brought up
the issue, but I am surprised it has gotten traction. I really have not seen this as
a difficult question, but then I've been doing this a long time and you get pretty
close to the law and issues. It's a reminder to me to step back and show the
court the whole picture. If this issue goes to the Supreme Court, which seems
likely to me, I hope the Supreme Court will state their holding clearly one way or
the other. My guess is, if the Department loses, it will go to trle legislature for a
change like Minnesota did. At any rate, I agree it's more fun 10 have juicy legal
issues to spice things up.
Do I need to file anything for the hearing set for next Wednesday the 21 st, or will
you take that off the calendar until the appeal is concluded?

From: R. Brad Masingill [mailto:bmasingi@ruralnetwork.net]
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 3:06 PM
To: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid
Subject: RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement

Thanks for the reply Corey. I also want to be friends, I seldom have
a case where the opposing attorney and I are at odd::;. Hal Ryan, my
former partner, told me to be that way and I have tried. As you know,
I hope you don't succeed in your appeals. Good legal issues, don't
you think? It is not often we get such juicy ones. Brad
From: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid [mailto:CartwriW@dhw.idclho.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 2:02 PM
To: R. Brad Masingill
Subject: RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement

Brad: The attorney fees and costs are listed under lAR 13(b)(9'!, so the appeal
doesn't deprive the magistrate of jurisdiction to hear that. I dor;'t think the appeal is
premature. The magistrate's decision on attorney fees can become an issue on

appeal if needed. I'll do my motion to disallow the attorney fees and set that for
hearing before the magistrate as contemplated by the rules. I don't think that will
affect the appeal going forward since it will take time to get the transcript prepared
and the transcript and record settled. The attorney fee question will be decided
long before we get to the briefing stage on the appeal.
I'm trying to set the Motion to Stay before the district court (appHllate) judge
because I've asked to stay the appeal itself which I don't think the magistrate has
authority to do. I did the motion to stay the appeal itself simply to save everyone
(myself included) time and expense. I'm not trying to stay the attorney fee issue,
just distribution of the estate and the appeal itself. While I can't guarantee it, I think
the Perry case will go to the Supreme Court. I think Pete Sisson will appeal if we
prevail before the district court. That would certainly decide at I(,~ast the important
legal issues in this case.
I'm sorry if I seemed "cold" to you. I was under the impression I had been overly
helpful and cooperative, to the point of perhaps harming my cli€'nt since the
magistrate certainly got the facts different than I had thought I had stipulated to. I
would hope that we could keep this matter on a professional and collegial basis
rather than have it become personal (I get paid the same (not much) whether I win
or lose).
If you are asking if there are other Idaho court decisions relatin~l to the Barg case,
don't know of any. I'm sure we'll get some more objections based on Barg before
this is all decided and I'll simply try to stay them pending the ou':come in Perry and
this case.

From: R. Brad Masingill [mailto:bmasingi@ruralnetwork.net]
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 12:22 PM
To: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid
Subject: RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement
Corey: I agree that our documents must have passed in the mail. I had
no more than objected to the motion for stay than I had an appeal in the
mail. On the other scores, I think your appeal is quite premature. The
issue of attorney's fees and costs is a necessary element to have
resolved before removing jurisdiction from the magistratt~. I think you
will find the District Court agreeing with that assessme1t, and it will only
take more time to go forward with whatever you intend to do. I don't
know everything about appellate practice, but I would :;uggest you
withdraw your appeal and wait until you have a final judgment from
which to appeal. Maybe the State is exempt from the rules, so I will

take a look, but I cannot imagine an appellate court hec;lring your appeal
and then having the second part of it coming up. Let me know what you
want to do. You were quite cold to me when we started this case, but
you have improved, so I would be willing to stipulate to some other

procedure if you think of one. I was thinking of stipulating that the
appeal would be held until the attorney's fees and costs issue was
resolved, but I don't know if he can stipulate away or to jurisdiction.
But, jf it is helpful to you I would be willing to do so. I don't hold
grudges. One other thing, I need to know if you are aware of any other
magistrate or district court decisions on this issue. It would be helpful to
see those court's reasoning. Brad

from: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid [mailto:CartwriW@dhw.idaf10ogoV]
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 10:52 AM
To: R. Brad Masingill
Subject: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement
Dear Brad: I have your 1st Amended Petition for Approval of Final Settlement and
other documents (We got them yesterday, April 12. They show they were mailed
Monday, April 5, so the mail is slow coming from the statehousEl). Since our Notice
of Appeal was filed on the 8th and your documents were mailec on the 5th (and
filed with the court on the 9th), it appears these may have cros~ed in the mail.
Since this isn't one of the matters listed under JAR 13(b), I woukl think the
magistrate no longer has jurisdiction to hear this matter. Do you agree? If so, will
you vacate the hearing now set for April 21?

I also have your Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs and your Memorandum in
Opposition to the Department's Motion to Stay (which were are still trying to set for
hearing), so we'll still have a couple of upcoming hearings in this matter, but I think
the petition for final settlement will have to wait until after the appeal.
Please let me know what your intentions are.
Corey Cartwright

The information contained in this email may be privilegec!, confidential or
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are advi sed that they may
face penalties under state and federal law for sharing this ],nformation with
unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in ennf, please reply to
the sender that you have received this information in error. Also, please
delete this email after replying to the sender.
The information contained in this email may be privileged, confidential or
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are advised that they may

face penalties under state and federal law for sharing this information with
unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in error, please reply to
the sender that you have received this information in error. Also, please
delete this email after replying to the sender.

From:
To:
Subject:
Date:

R. Brad Masingill
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid;
RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement
Wednesday, April 14, 2010 4:30:04 PM

Corey: I will review your brief and objection. My inclination is to take
the distribution off, but I need to be sure. The attornEV's fees issue
needs to be resolved, and I thought you were thinkinn it is not subject
to the stay. Anyway, I will let you know tomorrow. Brad
From: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid [mailto:CartwriW@dhw.idano,gov]
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 3:49 PM
To: R. Brad Masingill
Subject: RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement
As far as good legal issues, for me Yogi Berra's famous quote comes to mind: "This
is like deja vu all over again. I thought we had put this issue to rest in 1998 in
Jackman. When the Barg case was decided the estate recovery folks from many
states talked about it and asked what states would be affected. I remember
thinking it wouldn't affect Idaho because the issue had already been litigated and
decided in Jackman. I wasn't surprised when someone brought up the issue, but I
am surprised it has gotten traction. I really have not seen this as a difficult question,
but then I've been doing this a long time and you get pretty closf3 to the law and
issues. It's a reminder to me to step back and show the court the whole picture. If
this issue goes to the Supreme Court, which seems likely to me·, I hope the
Supreme Court will state their holding clearly one way or the otller. My guess is, if
the Department loses, it will go to the legislature for a change like Minnesota did. At
any rate, I agree it's more fun to have juicy legal issues to spice things up.
II

Do I need to file anything for the hearing set for next Wednesday the 21 st, or will
you take that off the calendar until the appeal is concluded?

From: R. Brad Masingill [mailto:bmasingi@ruralnetwork.net]
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 3:06 PM
To: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid
Subject: RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement

Thanks for the reply Corey. I also want to be friends I seldom have
a case where the opposing attorney and I are at odds. Hal Ryan, my
former partner, told me to be that way and I have tried. As you know,
I hope you don't succeed in your appeals. Good legal issues, don't

you think? It is not often we get such juicy ones. Brc:d

from: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid [mailto:CartwriW@dhw.idaho.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 2:02 PM
To: R. Brad Masingill
Subject: RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement
Brad: The attorney fees and costs are listed under IAR 13(b)(9) so the appeal
doesn't deprive the magistrate of jurisdiction to hear that. I don't think the appeal is
premature. The magistrate's decision on attorney fees can become an issue on
appeal if needed. I'll do my motion to disallow the attorney fees and set that for
hearing before the magistrate as contemplated by the rules. I don't think that will
affect the appeal going forward since it will take time to get the lranscript prepared
and the transcript and record settled. The attorney fee questior will be decided
long before we get to the briefing stage on the appeal.
I'm trying to set the Motion to Stay before the district court (appellate) judge
because I've asked to stay the appeal itself which I don't think tile magistrate has
authority to do. I did the motion to stay the appeal itself simply:o save everyone
(myself included) time and expense. I'm not trying to stay the attorney fee issue,
just distribution of the estate and the appeal itself. While I can't guarantee it, I think
the Perry case will go to the Supreme Court. I think Pete SiSSO.l will appeal if we
prevail before the district court. That would certainly decide at least the important
legal issues in this case.
I'm sorry if I seemed "cold" to you. I was under the impression had been overly
helpful and cooperative, to the point of perhaps harming my cliEnt since the
magistrate certainly got the facts different than I had thought I had stipulated to. I
would hope that we could keep this matter on a professional and collegial basis
rather than have it become personal (I get paid the same (not much) whether I win
or lose).
If you are asking if there are other Idaho court decisions relatinu to the Barg case, I
don't know of any. I'm sure we'll get some more objections based on Barg before
this is all decided and I'll simply try to stay them pending the outcome in Perry and
this case.

from: R. Brad Masingill [mailto:bmasingi@ruralnetwork.net]
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 12:22 PM
To: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid
Subject: RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement

Corey: I agree that our documents must have passed ill the mail. I had
no more than objected to the motion for stay than I had an appeal in the
mail. On the other scores, I think your appeal is quite premature. The
issue of attorney's fees and costs is a necessary element to have
resolved before removing jurisdiction from the magistrate, I think you
will find the District Court agreeing with that assessment, and it will only
take more time to go forward with whatever you intend to do. I don't
know everything about appellate practice, but I would suggest you
withdraw your appeal and wait until you have a final judgment from
which to appeal. Maybe the State is exempt from the rules, so I will
take a look, but I cannot imagine an appellate court hearing your appeal
and then having the second part of it coming up. Let me know what you
want to do. You were quite cold to me when we started this case, but
you have improved, so I would be willing to stipulate to some other
procedure if you think of one. I was thinking of stipulating that the
appeal would be held until the attorney's fees and costs issue was
resolved, but I don't know if he can stipulate away or to jurisdiction.
But, if it is helpful to you I would be willing to do so. I don't hold
grudges. One other thing, I need to know if you are aware of any other
magistrate or district court decisions on this issue. It would be helpful to
see those court's reasoning. Brad
From: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid [mailto:CartwriW@dhw.idaho,gov]
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 10:52 AM
To: R. Brad Masingill
Subject: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement
Dear Brad: I have your 1st Amended Petition for Approval of Fina! Settlement and
other documents (We got them yesterday, April 12. They show they were mailed
Monday, April 5, so the mail is slow coming from the statehouso). Since our NoticH
of Appeal was filed on the 8th and your documents were mailed on the 5th (and
filed with the court on the 9th), it appears these may have crossed in the mail.
Since this isn't one of the matters listed under IAR 13(b), I would think the
magistrate no longer has jurisdiction to hear this matter. Do you agree? If so, will
you vacate the hearing now set for April 21?
I also have your Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs and your Memorandum in
Opposition to the Department's Motion to Stay (which were are still trying to set for
hearing), so we'll still have a couple of upcoming hearings in this matter, but I think
the petition for final settlement will have to wait until after the appeal.
Please let me know what your intentions are.

Corey Cartwright

The information contained in this email may be privileged~, confidential or
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are advised that they may
face penalties under state and federal law for sharing this information with
unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in error, please reply to
the sender that you have received this information in error. Also, please
delete this email after replying to the sender.
The information contained in this email may be privileged, confidential or
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are advised that they may
face penalties under state and federal law for sharing this information with
unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in err{)r~ please reply to
the sender that you have received this information in error.. Also, please
delete this email after replying to the sender.
The information contained in this email may be privileged, confidential or
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are advised that they may
face penalties under state and federal law for sharing this information with
unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in error, please reply to
the sender that you have received this information in error. Also, please
delete this email after replying to the sender.

